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Abstract 
 
The ‘reform and opening’ policy initiated since 1978 has profoundly changed the operation 
and function of Chinese television. Following the accelerated market reforms from 1992, the 
production of Chinese TV programmes has become increasingly driven by ratings and 
oriented towards popular entertainment. Within this context, this project aims to examine how 
Chinese television has evolved over recent decades in response to wider political, economic 
and cultural changes in China, with a focus on prime-time television dramas broadcast 
between 1992 and 2017. It situates the analysis of TV dramas within the spectrum of two poles 
– propaganda and entertainment, aiming to explore how these TV programmes have 
continued to serve the propaganda imperatives of the Party-state, while at the same time 
responding to audience demands regarding entertainment. 
 
In order to map the changes and continuities exemplified by Chinese TV dramas, this project 
has adopted a mixed-method approach. This approach includes a systematic quantitative 
analysis to delineate long-term trends, and four qualitative case studies to establish a more 
thorough understanding of the detailed transformation in Chinese television. The thesis 
demonstrates that while Chinese television has become increasingly driven by commercial 
values that prioritise audience interests and popular elements, television entertainment in 
China still needs to align with official ideological lines. In the meantime, varying degrees of 
political supervision have been identified from different levels of TV stations, and the Party-
state has actively engaged in promoting its own agenda through Chinese television 
entertainment. These have shown an increasingly complex picture of socialist television in the 
new era. 
 
In these ways, this project sheds light on the interplay between political propaganda and 
commercial trends within the Chinese television system over the past two decades and a half. 
It is intended to contribute to existing studies on the relationship between propaganda and 
popular entertainment, and to the analyses of propaganda in television drama. It would also 
facilitate a systematic understanding of socialist television contexts, bridging the east-west 
divide on the perceptions of contemporary socialist television culture. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Chinese Television, State Control and Market Reforms 
 
In late April 2017, when the broadcast of In the Name of the People (Renmin de mingyi), a 
Chinese anti-corruption TV drama (fanfuju), was approaching its end, its audience reception 
percentage had allegedly reached the highest over the last decade, making this drama one 
the most popular TV productions since the new millennium (Zeng, 2017). Quite unlike other 
contemporary hit dramas that mostly revolve around urban romance or ancient legends, In the 
Name of the People depicts China’s current anti-corruption campaign, featuring a dashing 
young prosecutor who fearlessly challenges authority and exposes the corrupt dealings of 
high-ranking Party cadres. Some viewers were surprised to see such an official propaganda 
production win over the market by transforming politics into entertainment. Others, including 
Zhou Meisen, screenwriter of the drama, expressed surprise that censorship officials strongly 
supported this drama, even though it revealed the negative side of Chinese politics (BBC 
News, 2017). This debate shows that this drama embodied a successful collaboration between 
popular entertainment and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) propagandistic agenda. It 
also reflected the multiple factors involved in the content production of contemporary Chinese 
television, including censorship, the audience’s pursuit of entertainment, producers’ 
professional objectives, and fundamentally, the state’s political control as well as market forces.  
Television technology arrived in mainland China in 1958 as part of the project of socialist 
modernisation (Guo, 2005). According to media scholars (Zhao, 1999: 292; Sun, 2007:188), 
the first Chinese television, Beijing Television (renamed China Central Television in May 1978), 
was created as the ‘throat and tongue’ (houshe) of the Party, placed within a tight system of 
state propaganda and used for mobilising the population in the building of socialist modernity. 
Hence people often associate Chinese television with heavy political control and think of it as 
a propaganda mouthpiece. Yet, the engagement of Chinese television with economic reforms 
over the last four decades offers an opportunity to reconsider its propaganda role and 
instrumentalisation by the Party-state. Since the ‘reform and opening’ (gaige kaifang) policy 
was implemented in 1978, Chinese television has experienced unprecedented changes 
amidst the economic, political and cultural transformations of Chinese society. Watching 
television has since then gradually become a crucial part of people’s life and an indispensable 
means of entertainment. The official establishment of a market economy in 1992 further 
accelerated the marketisation of the television system. Since the state began to withdraw from 
providing subsidies in the early 1990s, the production of TV content has become increasingly 
reliant on advertising revenue, driven by ratings and consumption, and oriented towards 
satisfying audience expectations. In this situation, the economic independence obtained 
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through market reforms somehow loosens the connection between Chinese television and the 
state, allowing the television to wholeheartedly embrace the market logic and pursue creative 
autonomy.  
 
1.1 Chinese television in a ‘tug of war’ between state power and market forces 
Overall, the market reform has indeed affected the Party’s monopoly of television 
broadcasting. Yet to what extent the market forces can subvert the Party’s intervention into 
content production and further alter the propaganda role of Chinese television remains a 
matter of debate. The existing literature on the transformation of Chinese media system in 
general and television in particular has invariably noted the tension between continued 
ideological control and rapid marketisation, and tends to create a binary opposition between 
state power and market forces. On the one hand, researchers who emphasise the liberating 
force of the market believe that market-oriented content productions promote diversity, 
allowing different social groups to project their will onto the production process, which in turn 
weakens the Party’s ideological hegemony over the media system. For instance, in his 
analysis of Shanghai Television’s Documentary Channel, Chris Berry (2009) argues that the 
launch of this channel signified a symbolic shift in Chinese television from being a pedagogical 
tool of the Party-state apparatus, to engaging with market competition and public participation, 
which involves audience preferences, the autonomy of media practitioners, and the interests 
of advertisers in cultural production. He also notes that so long as television stations do not 
openly challenge the Party line, they can exist in a grey area in which state control of 
information is loosened. 
On the other hand, more scholars (He, 2000; Bai, 2005; Lee, He and Huang, 2006; Brady 
and Wang, 2009; Chang and Ren, 2016) have expressed a different view, contending that the 
liberating effects of the market are fundamentally subject to the Party’s control. According to 
their argument, it is the Party-state that has initiated market reforms and subsequent media 
restructuring process in the first place (Bai, 2005). Even though the media system, including 
television, has been granted a certain extent of freedom, its role has only shifted from being 
the Party mouthpiece to becoming its commercially operated ‘publicity Inc.’, with the 
propaganda function remaining intact (Lee, He and Huang, 2006). After decades of 
marketisation and media commercialisation, state power has been strengthened rather than 
weakened because the Party-state has been consciously upgrading its propaganda strategies 
through the media system (Brady and Wang, 2009). For researchers who hold a binary 
perspective, the situation of Chinese television is best described as a ‘tug-of-war’ between the 
state and the market (He, 2000). 
 There are also researchers who pick neither the side of the state nor that of the market, 
and instead cultivate ‘a dual recognition’ by suggesting that neither the state nor the market is 
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external to each other (Ma, 2000; Wang, 2001; Winfield and Peng, 2005). This strand of 
research shows that Chinese television is leading a double life, not only continuing to serve 
the Party’s propaganda work, but also seeking to please the audiences by exploring various 
popular formats (Zhao, 1999; Sun, 2007; Li, 2013). In their analysis, state and market forces 
are not incompatible in the television sector. Rather, it becomes increasingly obvious that the 
Party-state is taking advantage of the benefits brought by market reforms, and the television 
industry has become prosperous and profitable with the support of government policies. As 
discussed in detail in chapter 3, this structural coexistence is evidenced by recent attempts of 
state-sponsored film and television productions which have repackaged propaganda by 
including popular elements (e.g. Hollywood narrative strategies) and have achieved both 
commercial success and public acceptance of current policies (Veg, 2012; Ma, 2014). It 
suggests that once the Party realised that market forces would not necessarily undermine its 
rule or social stability, the Party-state ceased to oppose utilising market resources to support 
official propaganda (Zhao, 1999). As Li (2013: 915) notes, the state and the market are 
‘certainly not antagonistic’ in the field of mass communication. In line with this view, the old 
domination/resistance model which assumes that the state has limited the autonomy of the 
media in following market logics, and that the liberating effect of the market has threatened 
the cultural dominance of the Party state, becomes no longer appropriate to understand the 
state-market complex in which Chinese television resides. 
As a result, scholars have increasingly called for the need to go beyond the state-market 
dichotomy, and to integrate other cultural and historical experiences to analyse the socio-
political transformation of Chinese media and television. Xueping Zhong (2010) argues that 
between the state and the market, there lie different historical, cultural and ideological legacies, 
real socio-economic problems and tensions which also inform and influence television 
production and consumption. Zhao (1998; 2008) suggests exploring the constructive 
relationship between the state and market with reference to China’s revolutionary legacies, 
class structure and social conflicts. By focusing on how the Party legitimises its rule with the 
help of the Chinese media system, Zhao (2008) highlights a ‘collusive relationship’ between 
the state and media organisations. On the one hand, media practitioners exercise their 
freedom to address social concerns within the boundaries set by the Party-state, and frame 
social issues in popular ways in order to attract the audience. On the other hand, the Party-
state tolerates media organisations’ practice of pursuing professional objectives and profits, 
under the conditions that they adhere to the official line and that their broadcast is helpful to 
maintaining social stability. In this way, both the Party’s will and media organisations’ 
commercial interests are realised. However, what is neglected from discussions of this 
‘collusive relationship’ is the media power that stems from the editorial freedom and 
professional norms held by media practitioners. 
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Recent studies that transcends the dichotomised state-market framework have actually 
recognised this issue while stressing the growing importance of media power in contemporary 
Chinese television industry (Zhang, 2011; Bai, 2012; Xu, 2015). It has been acknowledged 
that it is the media professionals who undertake the task of negotiating between multiple 
cultural needs and political demands, and therefore their mediating role cannot be ignored 
(Bai, 2012). Zhang (2011) maintains that television journalists have been bargaining with the 
state for more autonomy, which plays a significant role in the transformation of Chinese media. 
In Xu’s (2015: 375) view, the increasingly privatised Chinese television and the Party’s political 
power tend to cooperate with each other; however, this does not always lead to ‘a rigid and 
invariable promotion of political ideology’. In fact, producers have been probing the tolerance 
of the Party towards sensitive issues. Apart from the state and market forces in shaping the 
transformation of Chinese television, there is thus still a middle ground for media practitioners 
to manoeuvre between multiple constraints.  
So far, existing scholarship has been mostly aware of the depth and pervasiveness of 
market reforms in Chinese television, the continuing impact of state control over television 
broadcasting, as well as the collaboration between the two forces. Since media professionals 
need to serve two masters – the state and the market – how do their practices lead to changes 
in television content? As Eric Ma (2000: 29) has noted, media producers tend to stretch 
ideological limits between different media texts: for instance, there are discrepancies in textual 
meanings between Party mouthpieces and the regional media not heavily restricted by the 
central government. Besides, ‘there are also ideological gaps between media texts of big 
factual news and soft infotainment.’ In these regards, the competing imperatives in content 
production have translated themselves into ‘hybridised media texts’, which display strong 
‘polysemic tendencies’. While these studies provide a rich theoretical perspective to dive into 
the study of Chinese television, they seldom offer a systematic micro-analysis of the nuanced 
change in television content; nor do they incorporate a historical and global perspective that 
would allow us to link contemporary transformations to not only past socialist traditions but 
also a global socialist media culture. 
 
1.2 Breaking the dichotomy: Socialist TV, continuities and global relevance  
In this thesis, I regard the state and the market not as two mutually exclusive forces but as 
intrinsically constructive elements for both the Party’s propaganda work and the marketisation 
of Chinese television. In this sense, my argument follows the works that go beyond the state-
market dichotomy to consider Chinese television as an arena of contradictions, negotiations 
and cooperation between different parties, including state and non-state actors. Moreover, I 
focus on television content, and take into account various forces that shape the transformation 
of Chinese television, not limiting myself to those stemming from the state and the market.  
5 
 
As noted earlier, studies on the transformation of Chinese television in the post-1978 reform 
era largely focus on either the political economy of the television industry or the evolution of 
media practices – i.e. the macro-level of institutional and operational changes in the television 
sector. They have paid comparatively little attention to changes in television content that 
people watch extensively in their living room or other environments, let alone a systematic 
account of these. Yet, content change is also of great importance to the study of Chinese 
television in transition. As Garnham (2000: 138) has noted, ‘no study of the media can bypass 
the complex and difficult questions posed by their content, by the symbolic forms they create 
and circulate.’ Donald and Keane (2002: 11) further argue that the viability of media industries 
is contingent on the creation and distribution of film, video, music, and information services, 
delivered through multiple platforms and formats. In other words, content industries nowadays 
have become the basis of economic exchange, the incubator of ideas and training sites for 
creative personnel. However, in the Chinese context, Donald and Keane go on to argue that 
the exchange value of television content remains subject to its social and/or political benefits, 
due to the continuing state control of TV broadcasting. In this sense, the content of Chinese 
television programmes embodies the negotiations of meaning in the process of symbolic 
exchange.  
In recent years, scholars have become more interested in the content of Chinese TV in their 
approach to understanding the social, political and cultural changes in contemporary China. 
Relevant studies roughly fall into two categories: one focusing on television dramas, the other 
on a variety of entertainment TV shows. Some of the monographs on Chinese TV dramas 
focus on a particular subject or social phenomenon, such as divorce (Xiao, 2014), corruption 
(Bai, 2014), Confucian politics (Zhu, 2008), and use analyses of themed TV dramas to verify 
the authors’ views of the chosen subject. Other monographs seek to explore the role of TV 
dramas in assisting political communication in China (Schneider, 2012) and in reflecting recent 
changes, conflicts, concerns and interests within contemporary Chinese society (Cai, 2016a). 
There are also edited books on Chinese TV dramas, dedicated to the exploration of different 
themes, styles, and socio-political significance of popular dramas produced in the last two 
decades (for instance, Zhu, Keane and Bai, 2008a). Apart from the works on TV dramas, a 
considerable amount of research is concerned with the political implications of entertainment 
TV shows. For instance, in Entertainment and Politics in Contemporary China (2017), Jingsi 
Wu examines how Chinese entertainment TV (e.g. girls’ singing contests) facilitates the 
creation of a public sphere that is still underdeveloped in China. In Tele-modernities (2016), 
Lewis, Martin and Sun offer insights into popular lifestyle TV programmes and their promotion 
of individual identities and capitalist modernities from a comparative perspective. In addition, 
the edited book, Chinese Television in the Twenty-First Century (Bai and Song, 2014) treats 
entertainment TV shows, educational programmes and TV dramas as sites of recent 
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ideological contestations and formations. Shenshen Cai (2016b) also looks at how China’s 
various entertainment media, including films, documentaries, TV variety shows and serial 
dramas, have been used for the state’s propagandistic agendas, elucidating the recent 
evolution of official propaganda mechanisms that have become more softened and 
commercialised. Among this literature, we find that recent studies of Chinese television have 
experienced a paradigm shift from theoretical exploration of the big picture to empirical 
investigation of nuanced dynamics. There is also a strong tendency within these studies to 
explore the political significance of Chinese entertainment TV.  
Based on these works, this project takes an important ‘next step’ for the study of Chinese 
television by providing a systematic, empirical account of the nuanced temporal changes in 
TV programmes. Specifically, it considers the making of television content as the process and 
result of various negotiations among political, economic, cultural and ideological forces, and 
situates the analysis of television programmes in the spectrum of two poles: propaganda and 
entertainment. The goal of this project is to explore, in the broad context of market reforms, 
how Chinese television programmes have attuned to and further facilitated the propaganda 
imperatives of the Party-state, while at the same time responding to audience demands of 
entertainment. In order to demonstrate the subtle processes of conflict and reconciliation, I do 
not focus on news programmes that are heavily bounded with political purposes but 
investigate an entertainment genre – TV drama – that is popular with audiences and hence 
has potentially political significance (Zhu, 2008; Schneider, 2012). Particularly, I look at 
fictional TV dramas because these dramatic forms generally have greater popularity and are 
more ‘open’ and polysemic than actuality genres. As Xueping Zhong (2010: 12) has noted, 
Chinese TV fictions have been functioning as ‘a cultural site where contemporary socio-
economic issues are addressed, and different cultural legacies and ideological views 
transmitted and contested’. In this sense, they can be deemed important cultural indicators of 
wider political, social and economic changes in China. Therefore, in this project, my focus is 
on developing a temporary comparison of Chinese TV dramas that charts change and 
continuities over a lengthy period, and mapping how their narrative content and forms have 
evolved in response to the transformations in China. 
The distinctive contribution of this project is fourfold. First, while existing studies provide 
large bodies of qualitative case studies, their methods of selecting TV programmes, despite 
serving their own analytical purposes, are not systematic enough to shed light on the long-
term patterns in Chinese television programming. This project addresses this gap by 
employing quantitative content analysis, so as to provide insights into the long-term changes 
in the content production of TV dramas. The findings from the quantitative analysis are then 
carried further by detailed case studies of how specific TV dramas – selected on the basis of 
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the quantitative findings – interact with not only institutional constraints, but also a range of 
political, commercial and cultural considerations.  
Secondly, while it has been widely noticed that Chinese television has undergone a set of 
transformations in the reform era, existing studies seem overwhelmingly preoccupied with the 
exploration of various recent changes and pay little attention to continuities, particularly those 
deriving from China’s history and the traditions of its socialist revolution. These studies 
therefore tend to exaggerate the impact of a capitalist market on the Chinese society, while at 
the same time downplaying the enduring character of socialism, or simplify the socialist 
traditions to ‘state and/or Party control’. This project contests this stance by demonstrating the 
continued relevance of China’s socialist revolution and its traditions, not only through the 
mechanisms of Party-state control, but more extensively existing through the cultural form of 
contemporary television entertainment.  
Thirdly, by looking at how Chinese television has evolved in response to the Party’s 
imperatives of political propaganda and to audiences’ entertainment needs, this research 
offers insights into the relationship between propaganda and popular entertainment in the 
Chinese media landscape. Rather than treating television viewing as a process of political 
indoctrination, or as an escapist pastime, I start this research on television by focusing on the 
intersection between propaganda and entertainment. It is hoped that this project will contribute 
to revaluating the role of entertainment TV and the development of propaganda techniques 
under new socio-political conditions.   
Last, existing studies tend to regard Chinese television as operating within a self-contained 
national system, explaining the cause of Chinese television’s transformation primarily with 
reference to domestic developments, while paying comparatively less attention to 
transnational and international influences. Several works (Hong, 1998; Zhu, 2008; Keane, 
2015) have noted this issue and sought to integrate both external factors (e.g. new 
technological advancement, global capital flows and competition, Western formats and 
programming strategies) and internal factors to conceptualise the changes in Chinese 
television. However, they associate the external factors with influences mostly from developed 
capitalist countries, notably the US, Western Europe, as well as Japan and South Korea, while 
disregarding transnational influences from state television in other (former) socialist countries. 
This project builds on these studies and extends them by connecting studies of Chinese 
television to a global socialist media culture. Drawing on existing research on socialist media 
in Central and Eastern Europe, I situate my approach to Chinese television within a broader 
framework of de-Westernising media studies, and highlight both the regional uniqueness of 
Chinese television and its transnational similarities with the socialist television in other 
contexts.  
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1.3 Structure of this thesis    
This thesis is organised into ten chapters. Chapter 1 serves as a general introduction and 
reviews existing studies on the subject of Chinese television. The research goal, questions, 
and potential contribution of this project are also outlined in this section. Following this brief 
introduction, Chapter 2, entitled ‘Socialist Television between Propaganda and Entertainment’, 
provides theoretical perspectives on socialist television, propaganda and entertainment. It 
starts from a de-Westernised approach, seeking to map general assumptions about socialist 
media and television, whilst attending to the specificities of socialist television in their own 
historical and regional contexts. I find that socialist television is far from being a pure 
propaganda tool, but like television in liberal democracies, or anywhere else, has both a 
political and cultural dimension, both propaganda functions and entertainment values. I 
consider propaganda a universal phenomenon that is not particularly tied to socialist regimes, 
and see entertainment as a politically important genre having the ability to shape public 
opinions. In this sense, this chapter puts forward the argument that television propaganda and 
entertainment are in many ways intertwined with each other.  
Chapter 3, ‘The Changing Landscape of Chinese Television in the Reform Era’, provides a 
historical account of the development of Chinese television. Specifically, I attempt to 
contextualise television within the broader political, economic and cultural transformation 
taking place in the post-1978 reform era, whilst noting the key factors that have shaped this 
development, such as the shifting focus of the Party’s propaganda work towards economic 
growth, the restructuring of media institutions, and the emergence of China’s popular 
entertainment culture. The chapter outlines how under these conditions, the production of TV 
programmes in China has changed from a top-down model to a multilateral system that 
involves negotiations between political and commercial interests. Even so, I emphasise the 
fact that all transformations were initiated and guided by the Party-state as part of its socio-
political agenda of promoting nationalism, collectivism and socialism. 
After outlining the general features of socialist television and the historical and institutional 
specificities of Chinese television, I provide a methodological and analytical framework to 
investigate the dynamics in Chinese television programming in Chapter 4. I begin by justifying 
of the choice of studying TV dramas, an entertainment but also politically important genre. The 
chapter then introduces the mixed methods adopted in this project, which include a 
quantitative content analysis to delineate long-term trends of TV dramas, and qualitative case 
studies to establish an in-depth understanding of specific TV programmes. The selection of 
dramas spans two decades and a half, starting in 1992 when the socialist market economy 
was officially established in China. The dramas were drawn from two different sources: CCTV-
1, the official mouthpiece of the Party-state, and Hunan Satellite TV, the first and most 
important entertainment-oriented national broadcaster (hereafter referred to as Hunan TV). 
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After a presentation of the data collection procedures, the chapter discusses the use of 
statistical analysis software and narrative theories to analyse the data. It concludes with a brief 
reflection on the strength and limitation of mixed research methods. 
Following the discussion of the theoretical, historical and methodological basis of this 
project, Chapters 5 to 9 present empirical findings of the quantitative and qualitative studies. 
Chapter 5 displays the results of the quantitative content analysis, delineating and comparing 
the main themes of prime-time dramas on the two TV channels. It shows how the 
propagandistic agenda of the Party-state and the entertainment pursuits of TV viewers have 
been juxtaposed in television programming in the last twenty-six years: while CCTV-1 has 
abided by its political mission by broadcasting large amounts of revolution-themed TV dramas, 
there is also a clear trend showing a steady increase in both the number and proportion of 
romantic themes on this TV channel. Conversely, while the TV dramas on Hunan TV have 
primarily focused on romantic love – an audience-favoured theme, the broadcaster has also 
shown allegiance to the Party’s propaganda work by promoting nationalist themes during 
politically important commemorative periods.  
Based on the findings from the quantitative analysis, Chapters 6 to 9 present case studies 
of four sets of TV dramas revolving around the two prominent themes of revolution and love. 
Chapters 6 and 7 offer in-depth analyses of two sets of revolution-themed TV dramas, 
respectively selected from CCTV-1 (Chapter 6) and Hunan TV (Chapter 7). The revolutionary 
dramas represent a crucially important propaganda genre for the Party-state because of their 
depiction of the revolutionary history of the Party. The two chapters provide a closer scrutiny 
of the production context, narrative strategies and commercial considerations in reproducing 
the collective narrative of the revolutionary movement. Chapter 6, entitled ‘Patriotism, 
Nationalism and Historical Figures’, discusses three propaganda TV dramas aired on CCTV-
1 in 1999, 2005 and 2015. I demonstrate in this chapter that under the pressure from market-
oriented productions, the central television has increasingly drawn inspiration from popular 
narrative strategies to portray the human side of Communist heroes and Party leaders, aiming 
to foster a national identity on the one hand and consolidate the Party’s legitimate rule on the 
other.  
Chapter 7, ‘Omnipotent Heroes and Sexy Spies’, provides a comparison to the findings from 
Chapter 6 by focusing on two TV fictions broadcast on Hunan TV in 2005 and 2015. In this 
chapter, I show that Hunan TV has made more concessions to audience tastes by 
broadcasting dramas that incorporate bolder imaginations of revolutionaries’ emotional 
experiences, more complexity regarding the identity of Communist soldiers, more suspense 
and abundant excitement in the representation of the revolutionary past. While there is evident 
development in narrative techniques, informed by the contextual changes over time, the two 
chapters also display a certain degree of similarity and continuity in the revolutionary dramas, 
10 
 
with regard to the greatness of the Communist heroes (including political leaders) and the 
sacrifices they have made in achieving the revolutionary goals. 
    Analysing from a different angle, Chapters 8 and 9 focus on love-themed TV dramas. This 
genre is not explicitly political, but well-received among the audience because of its depictions 
of personal issues, such as family life and emotional relationships that immediately appeal to 
the viewers. Chapter 8, entitled ‘Soap Operas for Social Education and Political Propaganda’, 
looks at three dramas aired on CCTV-1 during different periods and examines how the popular 
agendas of love, romance and family have been integrated into the socio-political framework 
of Party propaganda and social education. I find that even though these dramas centre on the 
affective dimension of people’s domestic life, their emotional and familial experiences are 
intertwined with wider social, economic and political changes, recording and embodying 
dominant ideologies at different times.  
As a comparison, Chapter 9, ‘Soap Operas for Entertainment’, focusing on three romantic 
TV dramas aired on Hunan TV in 2000, 2010 and 2016, examines the unique traits of popular 
narrative forms provided by Hunan TV in telling love stories, and delineates their evolvement 
over time. In this chapter I demonstrate that the love-themed dramas on Hunan TV show more 
traits of melodrama and are aimed for providing fantasies for the audiences, while making less 
commitment to reflecting socio-political changes. These melodramatic narrative formulas have 
also been subject to increasing influence from South Korean and Taiwanese popular culture. 
Apart from the differences between the two TV channels, the findings from Chapters 8 and 9 
show considerable similarities and continuities regarding the narratives of domestic life. They 
both show people’s yearning for and satisfaction with stability and prosperity, which implicitly 
validates what the Party has achieved through its economic experiments in recent decades. 
Besides, all the romantic dramas retain a remarkably conformity to a traditional patriarchal 
hierarchy, hence continuing to contribute to the reinforcement of existing power relations.  
Chapter 10 is the concluding chapter where I summarise the findings from the quantitative 
and qualitative studies, and link the results to the research goal and questions set in this 
introductory chapter. I show that whilst Chinese television has become increasingly driven by 
commercial values that ostensibly prioritise audience interests and popular elements, 
television entertainment, albeit in varying degrees, still aligns itself with official political lines. 
Nonetheless, within the politically sanctioned discourses, television entertainment enjoys a 
great extent of creative freedom and is expected to contribute to social stability, economic 
development and the legitimisation of the Party’s rule over China. I also highlight the limitations 
and major contributions of this thesis in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2  
Theoretical Framework: Socialist Television between  
Propaganda and Entertainment 
 
In the early years, the development of Chinese television was heavily influenced by other 
(former) socialist countries and modelled on the Soviet media systems. The launch of 
television in China was partly for engaging in a competition with capitalist broadcasting 
systems, and to serve as a propaganda weapon, while also providing education and 
entertainment for the people (Guo, 2005; Zhao and Guo, 2005). In many aspects, Chinese 
television culture shared the traits of television cultures elsewhere in the socialist world at the 
time, attuning television broadcasting to political agendas, prioritising information and 
education over entertainment, as well as aiming to ensure that personal conduct aligned with 
collective and state interest through mediated communication (Mihelj and Huxtable, 2018: 
296-297). At first glance, these characteristics of socialist media culture are vastly different 
from those of the media systems in Western liberal contexts. Hence, they often lead to an 
impression that socialist media are generally static and operate in a uniform manner, act as 
handmaidens of the government for ideological indoctrination, are subordinate to party politics 
as well as devoid of entertainment, and finally are powerful enough to manipulate audience 
perceptions (cf. Sparks, 2000: 37; Mihelj, 2014: 9). It is certainly true that socialist media 
systems operate under different rules and hence exhibit distinctive features, particularly with 
regard to their subordination to political control and their limited editorial freedom. However, 
alongside the transformations taking place in socialist states from the late twentieth century 
onwards, many scholars (Sparks, 1998; 2000; Curran and Park, 2000; Pertierra and Turner, 
2012; Mihelj, 2014; Imre, 2016) began looking into the changing structure and practice of 
media systems in the context of Central and Eastern Europe. Through these approaches, they 
have called for a more balanced account of socialist media systems that takes into account 
the regional and historical specificities of a media system from a de-Westernised approach.  
In this chapter, I build on these theoretical efforts to develop a conceptual framework for 
understanding socialist media, television propaganda and entertainment. The first section 
starts with a reflection on Colin Sparks’s arguments about the nature and function of socialist 
media systems. In the second section, I show how socialist television intrinsically bears much 
resemblance to Western public-service broadcasting, but has been shaped by competing 
forces both from within and outside of socialist states. This is followed by a discussion of 
propaganda and television, in which I highlight the characteristics of communist propaganda 
and its application and adaptation to new socio-political and technological contexts. In the 
remaining two parts, I turn to the political significance of entertainment media, and then 
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delineate how entertainment has historically been involved in political propaganda. 
 
2.1 De-westernising socialist media studies 
    In the early attempts of classifying world media systems, socialist (or communist) media 
have often been subsumed under a model of authoritarianism by Western theorists, a model 
that places government control as the central force shaping any form of mass communications, 
and emphasises the instrumental usage of media systems. These works include the well-
known book Four Theories of the Press by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1976), which 
placed the ‘libertarian’ media model deriving from the US and Britain at one end of the freedom 
spectrum, and the authoritarian and communist model at the other (Donald and Keane, 2002: 
7). Communist media systems, represented here by Soviet media, are characterised as 
political tools for mobilising the proletarian revolution, disseminating Soviet official ideologies 
and achieving the unity of the state (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1976: 121-122). In this 
theorisation of the communist media, the content of and materials in mass communication 
appear to be solely determined by political considerations and subordinate to the instrumental 
ends (Sparks, 1998: 54). Given that this model was developed against the Cold War 
background, with the aim of highlighting the superiority of Western liberal conceptions of the 
press against Soviet communist ones (Nerone, 1995; Hallin and Mancini, 2008), it comes as 
little surprise that socialist media systems were portrayed as an integral part of the party 
apparatus and thus the opposite of press freedom.  
As for the communist regimes themselves, the ruling groups’ perceptions and organising 
principles of the media system were to a large extent informed by Leninist theory of socialist 
press, or the mass media in a broader sense (Sparks, 1998: 45). Lenin’s most famous 
articulation of the function of media is indicated in the following paragraph:  
    The role of a newspaper […] is not limited solely to the dissemination of ideas, to political education, 
and to the enlistment of political allies. A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective 
agitator, it is also a collective organiser (Lenin, 1977: 22). 
As Sparks (1998: 46) argues, this is clearly a theory of the socio-political function of the media, 
put forward by Lenin during the period of the Russian revolution. Evidently, Lenin’s assertion 
highlights the propagandist and agitational role of the press, ostensibly establishing a Soviet 
model for other socialist countries’ building their media systems. This model thus seems 
applicable to describe Chinese media system under the rule of Chinese Communist Party. It 
is generally believed that the CCP inherited this tradition shortly after its foundation in 1921: 
the media, including newspaper, pamphlets, radio and at a later stage, television, have since 
then been used to mobilise Chinese people for revolution prior to 1949, and to publicise Party 
policies and direct people toward the socialist cause from 1949 until the post-reform era (Hong, 
13 
 
1998: 42). However, as Sparks (1998: 46-47) argues, ‘this idea of the organising and partisan 
nature of the working-class press was neither original nor unique to Lenin’; such a model of 
party-press integration or coordination can also be found in the reformist strands of the political 
Left – for instance, in the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) at the turn of the twentieth 
century, and even in Western liberal democracies, particularly in the US – even though the 
latter’s media practices involved more commercial incentives rather than political movement. 
Moreover, the seemingly socialist tradition is in fact identifiable in wider socio-political contexts, 
including non-communist regimes in East Asia. For example, the ruling party of the Republic 
of China, the Kuomintang (hereafter KMT, also known as Chinese Nationalist Party), also used 
broadcast media for wartime propaganda and education between 1928 and 1948 (Guo, 2005: 
231). In fact, as maintained by Daniel Lynch (1999: 20), ‘the KMT consciously borrowed from 
fascist and Leninist models to try to contain and channel China’s socio-political mobilisation.’ 
When they retreated to Taiwan from 1949, following their defeat in the Chinese civil war, and 
established a totalitarian regime there, the media system remained in tight control of the KMT 
regime until the mid-1980s, serving the party’s political principle of anti-communism and 
cultural dominance (Lewis, Martin and Sun, 2016: 13). These examples suggest that the 
propagandistic use of media system cannot be solely associated with communist regimes. 
Moreover, Sparks (1998; 2000) contends that the ‘Leninist theory of the press’ was more 
fragmented, derived from his scattered writings from specific historical situations, so that it can 
hardly be treated as a systematic theory applicable to other socialist states. Hence, it would 
be inaccurate to speculate the practical features of a media system purely based on the ideas 
held about them by the leading figures, or on the characteristic of the political system they 
reside in. Sparks continued to stress that Schramm’s categorisation of communist media in 
Four Theories of the Press has likewise demonstrated this ideological bias, in which people 
take it for granted that media systems in socialist countries, are of necessity subservient to 
politics, have no commercial practices or editorial freedom, and hence constitute the opposite 
of the Western libertarian model. Since in media and communication studies, there is often ‘a 
gap between actors’ accounts of a situation or process and the features that present 
themselves to outside observers’ (Sparks, 1998: 53), it becomes the researcher’s job to 
identify and explore such a gap within any media system.  
In terms of how to recognise the varied socialist media systems, Sparks further examines 
Central and Eastern European media systems in late socialist period and contends that there 
was no fixed and static Soviet media model in these socialist countries (ibid.: 56-62; 1997: 99). 
Indeed, in his empirical studies of media systems in the Soviet Bloc, we see that although the 
Soviet model was allegedly implemented in these former socialist states, different degrees of 
deviation were also evident. This included loosened state control in some satellite states and, 
consequently, more entertainment content and openness to Western programmes, as well of 
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preliminary adaptation to the market system and advertising activities. Furthermore, within the 
media system there had already started a process of market-oriented structural and 
operational reform in some socialist states, such as Poland, which was primarily driven by an 
economic crisis rather than political reasons. In this regard, diverse small narratives were 
simultaneously taking place within the media systems of Central and Eastern Europe, albeit 
under the premise of a seemingly unified Soviet model. These findings are also echoed by 
other scholars specialising in media studies of former state-socialist countries (for instance, 
Bren, 2010; Imre, 2016; Mihelj and Huxtable, 2018).  
If we look at elsewhere in the world at the time, for instance, China in the Mao era (1949-
1976), the influence of the Soviet model is also worth a second thought. Although the founding 
of the CCP’s broadcasting system dates back to the revolutionary time, was modelled on the 
Soviet media system and later received support from other socialist countries, especially in 
terms of TV programme exchange, existing sources suggest that China’s broadcasting system 
in the Mao era was relatively insulated from both Western and Soviet influences: following the 
Sino-Soviet split1 in the 1960s, Chinese television turned to Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea 
for cooperation. Meanwhile, due to Mao’s policy of ‘self-reliance’, which was aimed at 
protecting national sovereignty and cultural identity, Chinese political authorities remained 
alert to potential negative impact from both the Soviet Union and Western imports (Hong, 1993: 
6). Detailed information regarding the Chinese media system will be discussed further in the 
next chapter. Here, it is important to note that media systems in socialist states, whilst being 
an alternative to Western media models, are by no means uniform replicas of Leninist visions 
of agitation and propaganda.  
Sparks (1997; 1998) further compares communist media systems with those in democratic-
capitalist states and finds that political intervention is evident on both sides. The difference is 
that communist regimes normally exercise more direct control over media systems than their 
Western counterparts. This was largely due to the established principle of political intervention 
in the day-to-day running of socialist mass media, as well as the reliance of the media on a 
central command economy. Despite the comparatively more political control, different levels 
of commercial operation and liberalisation can also be found in socialist countries. This 
suggests that socialist media systems are adjustable amid shifting socio-political conditions. 
Based on these variations and changes within the media systems, Sparks concludes that 
socialist media in some countries were far from tightly controlled, propagandistically organised 
 
1 The Sino-Soviet split refers to the breaking of a series of political, diplomatic and military relations between the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from the late 1950s to late 
1960s. It is believed that the Sino-Soviet split was caused primarily by ideological disagreement over the method 
of establishing a socialist society domestically and over the direction of the joint policy of the socialist camp 
toward the capitalist world. See Lüthi (2008: 1).   
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systems, but sometimes surprisingly open with histories of substantial change, which requires 
the researcher to further investigate the nuances, looking at the conflict between economic 
and political forces rather than the centrally imposed value system (2000: 38-40). Sparks also 
offers theoretical perspectives on the media systems of these states after their transition from 
socialism to capitalism. Whilst much has changed, the fundamental structural and organising 
features of the media, and television in particular, remained the same. Following this 
observation, we thus should pay particular attention to the continuities, e.g. the linkages 
between political and economic power, the alignment of business and political interests, and 
other competing forces in the media as the public arena (ibid.:45-46; 1998). 
Sparks’s theories of socialist media have of course received some criticism in terms of his 
heavy attack on the ‘four theories’ and lack of alternative systematic accounts of (post) socialist 
media (see, for instance, Mwakikoti, 1999). Nevertheless, his theories provide a valuable 
framework for analysing Chinese media system, particularly in the complexity of political and 
economic powers, as well as newly emerged forces that shape the realities of media. This is 
a useful starting point for understanding Chinese media in a period when China has just 
experienced a transition from centralised socialism to market socialism – and for this reason, 
is somehow viewed as embarking on a capitalist path (Dirlik, 1989). Regardless of the various 
formulations by which China’s reform has been characterised – be it post-socialism or state 
capitalism, the process of marketisation has obviously initiated a redistribution of power and 
interests among different agents in the media sector, which thus deserves closer attention. 
There are also media scholars (e.g. Donald and Keane, 2002) attempting to explain the 
transitional character of Chinese media within the framework of ‘authoritarian liberalism’, a 
model frequently seen in Asian states, such as Singapore and Malaysia. It entails the 
combination of liberalised economic practices with the authoritarian rule of the state, wherein 
the media are still expected to play an instrumental role to advance the state’s modernisation 
project. This approach can also be termed an ‘authoritarian market model’ which examines 
the changing nature and function of Chinese media in two dimensions: political 
authoritarianism and the liberating role of the market (Winfield and Peng, 2005). These 
theoretical approaches have invariably pointed in the same direction, which is the entangled 
economic and political powers in Chinese media system.  
Instead of investigating the mass media as a whole, this project focuses on Chinese 
television. Based on the experience from Central and East European media systems, changes 
in television have tended to be a more considered and regulated business; and television has 
responded to new economic, political and social conditions in more consistent ways, as 
compared to swift evolutions of the press and radio broadcasting (Sparks and Reading,1994: 
244). Undoubtedly, television has its own magic that is able to link political goals, economic 
interests, media elites and audience expectations. Before venturing into the evolution of 
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Chinese television, it is worth noting several theoretical approaches to understanding socialist 
television. 
 
2.2 Understanding socialist television  
Compared with press and radio broadcasting, the emergence of television happened much 
later, and yet television quickly acquired considerable cultural, economic and political 
significance. There have been different approaches to theorising television since half a century 
ago. After television had gained prominence worldwide in the 1950s, McLuhan (1964) has 
noted the revolutionary implications of this new technology and highlighted the influence of 
this medium on society. Raymond Williams (1990) has also recognised the advancement of 
television as a ground-breaking technology, but unlike McLuhan’s technological determinism, 
Williams’s account of television is thoroughly historical, social and more critical, positioning 
television as a mode of communication responding to specific political and commercial 
situations and intentions (Corner, 1999: 9). Specifically, Williams maintains that television as 
a technology tends to be neutral, but it can be used for different political and economic 
purposes and thereby generates social and cultural impact. After television had become 
accessible to the general public, theorists began to explore both its political and cultural 
function. As an information supplier that mediates public and private spaces, television tended 
to be viewed as both enabling public participation and distorting political culture and processes. 
Other scholars approached television from a cultural perspective, and treated it as a cultural 
form that disseminates meanings and pleasures for viewers’ relaxation, entertainment and 
consumption, which has interwoven television into the dynamics of everyday life (Morley, 1986; 
Silverstone, 1994; Fiske, 2011).  
In recent decades, the emergence and rapid popularisation of new media (i.e. the computer 
and the Internet) have profoundly changed the way in which television programmes are 
delivered and watched. The new technological innovations associated with TV viewing, such 
as commercial-pay TV, smart TV with integrated Internet services, smart phones and various 
portable devices with access to TV programmes, have cultivated various niche markets with 
diverse but specific viewing tastes. These developments have led to what Buonanno (2008: 
23) calls ‘a transition from broadcasting to narrowcasting’ – indicating the diffusion of television 
content to smaller sections of the public. In line with these changes, scholars (Turner and Tay, 
2009; Pertierra and Turner, 2013) have started to review the relationship between television, 
sociocultural practices and everyday life, with an attendant recognition of the contingency of 
television’s formation in regional and historical specificities. We see that in all these 
approaches, television has been treated as a technological advance having the potential to 
change society, but the innate institutional character of television means that its production, 
distribution and reception are confined by a series of technological, economic, political and 
17 
 
cultural factors. Furthermore, as some scholars (Corner, 1999; Pertierra and Turner, 2013) 
have noted, there are clear national variations in the nature, practice and function of television.  
Knowing the characteristics of television and a range of research approaches, how do we 
understand socialist TV, a form of television that is specifically tied to a political system and 
ideology? To answer this question, the institutional character of television should first be 
mentioned. In terms of funding models and organisational forms, television can roughly be 
classified as: 1) commercial television – based on advertising and sponsorship (e.g. American 
TV networks); 2) public-service broadcasting – reliant on a license fee (e.g. BBC); 3) state 
television – sanctioned, funded and operated by a central government (e.g. the Korean Central 
Television of North Korea); and 4) a combination of state-owned television stations and 
commercial operation (e.g. China Central Television since 1992). Socialist television certainly 
falls into the category of state television because it is state-owned and subservient to the 
communist authorities. Hence, it is tempting to think that, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
socialist TV is immediately tied to the political and ideological goals of the party-state, serving 
as a propaganda machine and a cultural form devoid of entertainment.  
However, these assumptions of socialist TV tend to simplify the problem that television faces 
within a multi-dimensional sociocultural context. As Corner (1999: 18) points out, the extent to 
which the output of television can be predicted from its funding base is still open to debate. 
This suggests that there exist complexities in the practical operation of television, such as 
technology and institutions, so that political, economic and cultural factors all take a part in 
shaping the output of television. This point can be illuminated by Corner’s (ibid.) account of 
the BBC: although public television is regulated for the purpose of providing public service and 
education, its programming has been unprecedentedly affected by privatisation and 
deregulation amid the forceful expansion of a free market in the 1990s. As a result, producers 
have needed to exercise their creativity, drawing on experiences from commercial TV and 
audience demand to increase viewership, committed to the development of popular television, 
thereby fulfilling public service responsibilities. From the example of the BBC, we see that our 
knowledge of a television system cannot be solely dependent on its institutional character or 
any ideological stereotypes around it. Moreover, operation and practice within a television 
system do not just take place in a top-down fashion, but also need to integrate viewers’ 
expectations in a bottom-up way. More academic scrutiny thus should be given to the interplay 
of the forces shaping television as a medium and to the political and commercial imperatives 
informing its applications.  
Among the diverse approaches to television in the socialist sphere, Anikó Imre (2016) offers 
a conceptual framework to shed light on the complex entanglements of television, culture and 
society from the socialist to post-socialist periods. She first introduces three underestimated 
aspects of socialist TV, based on her experience with Hungarian television and beyond. The 
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first is concerned with the ambivalent role of television: the communist authorities sought to 
mould television to suit their own political purposes, whereas viewers identified television 
primarily as a medium of leisure – a contradictory situation causing confusion to TV 
professionals as well. The second overlooked aspect is socialist audiences, who were far from 
being supposedly passive subjects, easy to be brain-washed, but were actually actively 
expressing their preference for entertaining programmes. The last aspect is the transnational 
character of socialist television, embodied by not only its openness to Western TV formats, by 
the exchange of TV programmes and technological expertise within the socialist camp and 
with the West, but also by a shared ethos and practice of public service broadcasting. The 
latter two aspects resonated particularly well with arguments of other scholars in this field. As 
Mihelj (2013) shows, socialist audiences in Yugoslavia in the 1960s also engaged in public 
discussions when issues such as unemployment or income disparities were represented by 
TV serials. In Understanding Socialist TV (2014), Mihelj also emphasises the transnational 
characteristics of socialist TV and puts forward the need to avoid methodological nationalism 
– an analytical tendency to explain developments found in a nation-state primarily with 
reference to national factors and regardless of transnational influences. If explanations are 
confined within the frame of a national history, they limit our ability to distinguish between 
‘national specificities, shared features of socialist television, or characteristics of television as 
a global phenomenon’ (ibid.:8). It should be noted that the transnational dimensions of socialist 
TV are by no means found only in Central and Eastern Europe, but are also evident in socialist 
countries across the Atlantic. In Yeidy Rivero’s (2015) research on Cuban television from the 
1950s to the early 1960s, she shows how Cuban television was heavily penetrated by popular 
programmes from the US, which in turn helped constitute and spread Fidel Castro’s vision of 
a communist modernity. Similarly, the development of Chinese entertainment television since 
the 1990s was informed by the popular culture from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and later South 
Korea, which I will elaborate further in chapters 8 and 9. 
Starting from these underestimated aspects of socialist television, Imre’s work particularly 
explores how television, as a mass medium and an effective communication conduit, can be 
used to address various social, economic and political issues. At the same time, she 
demonstrates how TV producers negotiated between viewers’ wishes to watch entertainment 
programmes, and the broadcasters’ mission to inform and educate whilst promoting 
nationalism – a difficult situation generally shared by public-service broadcasting in Western 
contexts. Huxtable (2018: 94) attributes these practices and output of socialist television to 
the influence of ‘the core values of socialism – equality, humanism and education for all’. At 
least among the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, it is obviously vital to link the 
formation of their television with cultural norms proclaimed by the socialist regimes. However, 
to what extent these values have their origins in socialism rather than other contexts remains 
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to be explored. Nevertheless, these findings provide illuminating insights into the interplay of 
influences from different social agents, including political authorities, media professionals, 
audiences and even advertising companies, inside or outside of the socialist countries. 
Despite specific variations in the Chinese context, the findings also serve as a springboard to 
zooming in on the dynamics of Chinese television, particularly in its engagement with Party 
propaganda and popular entertainment. It seems apparent that one of the myths associated 
with socialist television is its exclusively propagandistic function. Now it is worth delving further 
into this terminology to develop a deeper understanding of what propaganda means and 
brings to socialist television. 
 
2.3 Communist propaganda and television  
As Jowett and O’Donnell (2006:2-3) point out, the meaning of the word ‘propaganda’ in the 
last few centuries has evolved from a neutral sense of promoting or disseminating particular 
ideas, to its current negative connotations of deception and brainwashing. They contend that 
in order to analyse propaganda, one needs to identify its characteristics first. In their approach 
to propaganda, they see it as a form of communication and define propaganda focusing on its 
presence in the communication process: 
     Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and 
direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist (ibid.:7). 
In this definition, Jowett and O’Donnell emphasise both the intentional and systematic nature 
of propaganda, meaning that propaganda, as a technique of communication, involves careful 
consideration ahead of time and is carried out in a well-organised manner. Particularly, they 
mention that propaganda is not limited to government activities but can be employed by other 
social organisations as well, including corporations, as long as these organisations have a 
clear objective that could help maintain the power of the propagandist. As Jowett and 
O’Connell go on to the argue, propaganda involves a series of carefully designed techniques 
aimed at shaping the perceptions and directing the behaviours of certain audiences. In this 
sense, propaganda is often concerned with varying degrees of disinformation. As noted by 
them, ‘the means may vary from a mild slanting of information to outright deception, but the 
ends are always predetermined to favour the propagandist (2006: 26).’ Following these 
attempts, what is crucial to propaganda is its achieving desirable attitudes and behaviours 
from a certain audience from which the propagandist can benefit. Whether or not the 
propaganda process is effective depends on whether the propagandist’s goals are achieved.  
    In order to better explain the meaning of propaganda, Jowett and O’Donnell distinguish it 
from persuasion. Specifically, they regard persuasion as a process of informative and 
interactive communication which values mutual understanding and satisfaction. In contrast to 
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persuasion, propaganda only fulfils the needs of the propagandist, which is not necessarily in 
the interest of the audience. Propaganda thus tends to be a one-way communicative process: 
even though a propagandist has to gather information about the intended audience in order 
to formulate their favoured beliefs, values and behaviour, this attempt only serves the purpose 
or promotes the specific ideology of the propagandist, and is by no means based on reciprocal 
interests. This suggests that there is unbalanced power distribution on the two sides involved 
in the communication, and that the interests of propogandists exceed those of the audience.  
    Jowett and O’Connell’s explanation of propaganda provides a generic definition for this term. 
This is certainly valid in Western societies, and the examples they used, ranging from wartime 
propaganda, political elections to advertising campaigns, are absolutely helpful in broadening 
our knowledge of the procedures involved in propaganda. Yet this analytical model is not 
automatically applicable to approach propaganda in a different socio-political context, namely 
the socialist (communist) context. Although propaganda in communist regimes in many 
aspects overlaps with the process of propagandistic communication as defined by Jowett and 
O’Connell, communist propaganda nevertheless displays a unique set of intentions, methods, 
and tactics.  
As William Griffith (1980) observes, communist propaganda derived from Marx’s emphasis 
on educating the masses by communist revolutionaries who had achieved consciousness 
themselves, and from Lenin’s elitist practice of ‘coercive persuasion’, which entails relying on 
a centralised propaganda apparatus to lead public opinion and thereby impose the 
communists’ revolutionary consciousness on the masses. Griffith shows that in different 
situations and contexts, the function of communist propaganda might vary. For instance, in 
underdeveloped countries, propaganda has played a major role in advancing political and 
economic development and in mass mobilisation for these purposes (ibid.: 240). Its function 
has been to create the prerequisite conditions for the creation of a nation, including a common 
language, modern transportation and communication systems, as well as mass literacy (cf. 
Liu, 1971). In the case of communist leaders who have become dictators, propaganda is used 
to ‘develop an overwhelming cult of personality and thus to create or strengthen a charismatic 
leader’ (Griffith, 1980: 243). However, despite its specific applications, propaganda in Marxist-
Leninist settings is generally used to maintain unanimity among communist elites, as well as 
to secure the power and political legitimacy of the propagandist while at the same time giving 
ideological education to the masses. To these ends, the organisational strategy and tactics of 
communist propaganda have been navigated largely centring on the Leninist tradition, which 
requires all means of elite and mass communication, as well as various cultural activities 
ranging from history and social science to art, music and literature, to facilitate the 
implementation of the communist party line, and suppress any expression of views or 
intellectual output contrary to the party line (ibid.: 243-244). In this sense, propaganda has 
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been incorporated as an integral part of the communist movement and a form of ritual 
indoctrination that surpasses space and time. In other words, communist propaganda seems 
to be an innate and long-term mission of communists, which has been blatantly written into 
the party line. This is particularly evident in the Chinese political context, where propaganda 
(xuanchuan, literally meaning to publicise, promote or disseminate) is being described as the 
‘life blood’ (shengmingxian) of the Party-state (Brady, 2006; 2008). As David Shambaugh 
(2007, 2015) has noted, propaganda in China is not a derogatory term but more of a means 
to manage and control information. Moreover, scholars tend to use ‘communist propaganda’, 
‘education’ and ‘mass persuasion’ interchangeably (see Griffith, 1980; Brady, 2009); because 
in the socialist context, they all denote the manipulation of the consciousness of the masses.   
This is not to suggest that communist propaganda has no specific purpose or 
propagandistic campaign. For example, Shambaugh (2007: 26-27) has identified a series of 
‘thought control’ techniques adopted by Mao Zedong in socialist China. To name a few, these 
included the creation of study groups for imparting Marxist-Leninist doctrines, the construction 
of ‘models’ to be emulated by the masses and the use of propaganda teams to indoctrinate 
specific segments of the population. Besides, Griffith (1980) has also distinguished different 
phases of China’s propaganda campaigns in the Mao era. He maintains that Chinese 
Communist propaganda has been ‘a mixture of the Marxist-Leninist propaganda tradition with 
the influence of a specific history and culture’, which has been and is still profoundly influenced 
by the personality of Mao, notably in terms of his dedication to anti-intellectualism, conflict, 
social manipulation etc. (ibid.: 249). Following this, he goes on to stress two phases of Chinese 
propaganda: ‘thought reform’ as the moderate and coercive persuasion as the radical phase. 
The latter in particular involved violent denunciation of internal enemies by means of big 
character posters (dazibao), radio broadcasting and public trials.  
It should be noted that Griffith’s account of communist propaganda invariably draws on 
examples from socialist Cuba, China and the Soviet Union before the mid-1970s. By the time 
when he was writing this article, drastic changes in the socialist world, notably the demise of 
communism in Central and Eastern Europe had not occurred yet, let alone the progress of 
globalisation and worldwide commercialisation. However, he predicted that the future appeals 
of communist propaganda will become ‘more nationalistic, more concerned with power, 
science, and technology – in short, with power and modernisation’ (1980: 256-257). 
Propaganda has proved to be a long-established tradition of communist parties worldwide and 
will remain a major part of their rule, but its foci, goals and organising strategies will be subject 
to change in the new economic, political, cultural and technological context.  
Griffith’s prediction seems to have been verified by more recent research on propaganda in 
communist regimes. Take China’s propaganda reform as an example: scholars (Lynch, 1999; 
Lee, 1990; 2000) claim that the power and effectiveness of China’s propaganda system in the 
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post-1978 reform era has considerably declined; and commercialisation has been a significant 
driving force behind this change (Shambaugh, 2007). Others, however (notably Brady, 2006; 
2008; 2009), insist that China’s modern-day propaganda has deliberately absorbed the 
methodology of political public relations, modern communication and persuasion techniques 
seen in Western democracies, to revitalise itself, so as to maintain the CCP’s political 
legitimacy. More details about Chinese propaganda system will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Here, it is important to note the distinctiveness of communist propaganda, particularly 
in terms of its continuity over a lengthy period and adaptability to new conditions and needs. 
We may wish to understand communist propaganda as a specific subtype of propaganda 
which shares many characteristics with other socio-political contexts, while at the same time 
keeping its own set of principles influenced by Marxist-Leninist doctrines.  
Among the various means of communication, television offers an excellent platform for 
propaganda. As discussed earlier in this chapter, television is an institutionalised medium of 
public communication with multi-channel capacity and attractive audio-visual forms. It 
mediates audiences’ perceptions of and their everyday experience with the outside world. 
Hence, television is considered a medium with far-reaching social and political impact, making 
it a natural propaganda conduit. As Jowett and O’Connell (2006:140) have shown, television 
has ‘a major propaganda function in the area of news reporting’. The representation of news 
items often involves different degrees of distortion, misinformation or even biases against 
certain issues, which might serve the particular agendas of the agency producing the news. 
This kind of news content is able to shape the attitude of audiences on a variety of issues, 
thereby achieving the desired result of propaganda.  
Compared to the more blatant propaganda model in news reporting, propaganda by means 
of entertainment television appears more covert but still deliberate. As mentioned previously, 
audiences are inclined to use television mainly as a medium for entertainment and leisure. 
Such attractiveness with the audience provides television with another opportunity to 
propagandise in the guise of entertainment. Jowett and O’Connell (ibid.: 143) have listed 
examples of using TV soap operas to disseminate pro-social messages for issues such as 
breast-feeding and birth control in India and Mexico. They maintain that these seemingly 
regular TV soaps have been carefully crafted by script writers working with social scientists to 
ensure these ‘positive’ propagandistic messages smoothly integrated with the plot. Similar 
cases of using TV soap dramas for positive propaganda and social education are also evident 
in Eastern Europe in the late socialist period, as well as in contemporary China. Through her 
analysis of domestic drama serials produced in Eastern European socialist states by the 1970s, 
Imre (2016: 19) shows that dramatic programming, with less didactic and more entertaining 
elements, proved to be a much more effective means than news programmes for working 
through various social issues and affirming the regimes’ cultural and political directives. In 
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China, TV drama is the most widely watched form of entertainment; because of its popularity, 
the political authorities consider it an important channel with great political significance (Zha, 
1995; Yin, 2002). As I demonstrate in the subsequent empirical chapters, Chinese TV dramas, 
particularly state-sponsored ones, not only contribute to the legitimation of CCP rule, as well 
as the discursive construction of nationalism and patriotism, but also work towards explaining 
government initiatives, addressing social concerns, and giving advice to the public.  
So far, we see that television propaganda uses the widely-popular entertainment genres to 
facilitate the acceptance of a message or an ideology. In the next section, I look further into 
the concept of entertainment, exploring its relations to television, and in particular, the political 
significance of entertainment television. In so doing, I wish to shed light on the relationships 
between entertainment media and politics. 
 
2.4 Entertainment, television and politics 
From ancient times to the present day, entertainment has played a significant part in human 
life with respect to the pursuit of enjoyment and pleasure. Particularly in recent decades, 
entertainment activities have been made viable by various electronic technologies and 
become increasingly interwoven into modern life. Based on these observations, Zillmann 
(2000: 18) asserts that ‘entertainment will define, more than ever before, the civilisations to 
come’. Despite its rising importance in modern societies, entertainment still tends to be placed 
in an inferior position to work and family. In academic approaches to defining entertainment, 
there often comes up rigid distinctions between mass entertainment and art, between popular 
culture and elite culture, between pleasure and work. Among such constructions, 
entertainment is treated as escapist enjoyment, a pastime devoid of seriousness or meaning, 
and hence secondary to more ‘meaningful’ claims, such as morality, politics and aesthetics 
(Dyer, 1992: 2). Yet, when the form and content of entertainment have been increasingly 
bound up with modern communication technologies since the prevalence of radio, television, 
and most recently, broadband Internet, theorists began to further explore the multiple functions 
and meanings of entertainment. 
It is true that entertainment experiences are primarily associated with the pursuit of pleasure. 
For instance, Zillmann and Bryant (1994: 438) define entertainment as ‘any activity designed 
to delight and, to a smaller degree, enlighten through the exhibition of fortunes and misfortunes 
of others, but also through the display of special skills by others and/or self’. From a 
psychological point of view, they explain that in entertaining communications, audiences’ 
affective dispositions towards their liked characters in the media narratives would generate 
positive feelings for them (ibid.; Zillmann and Cantor, 1977; Zillmann, 2003: 554). As noted by 
Vorderer (2001: 251), this affective-disposition theory helps to understand people’s 
entertainment-seeking behaviours, which are largely driven by the ‘desire to have a good time’. 
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However, there is more than delight in the experience of entertainment; media users also 
encounter suspense and even suffering in their consumption of media products – this usually 
happens when the story of beloved characters does not unfold as the audience hoped for 
(Vorderer, 2001; 2003).  
To account for how these different experiences relate to the enjoyment that entertainment 
usually provides, Vorderer, Klimmt and Ritterfeld (2004) conceptualise media entertainment 
as a complex and dynamic experience that includes not only affective but also physiological 
and cognitive affects. They identify enjoyment as the core of entertainment experiences, but 
insist that such enjoyment is also shaped by media users’ motivation of being entertained, 
their emotionality at certain times, as well as by the technology, aesthetic feature and content 
of the given media product. Eventually, what the media user experiences is not only short-
term transfer of excitation from a negative to a positive condition, but could also include 
profound comprehension and learning (ibid.: 402-403). For instance, a reader who is seeking 
entertainment in a thriller has to go through phases of suspense and relief before she can 
enjoy the moment of her hero’s final triumph; a TV viewer is able to learn about the real-life 
dilemmas in an emergency room through empathising with the characters portrayed in a 
medical drama (ibid.: 404). Bartsch and Schneider (2014) characterise the latter experience 
as eudaimonic gratification that derives from insight, meaning, and self-development. Unlike 
the hedonic pleasure that rests on fast and immediate change of mood, the enjoyment of 
seeking truth and meaning requires more elaborate forms of cognitive information processing. 
They claim that in this effortful cognitive processing, entertainment activities have the potential 
to engage audiences with realistic and politically relevant issues.  
The above exploration of entertainment falls largely into the realm of individual experience 
of being entertained. If we situate entertainment in a broader social context, we immediately 
find that ‘entertainment producers, distributors and consumers operate in a web of 
relationships with government and other cultural institutions, too’ (Bates and Ferri, 2010: 11).  
For Zillmann (2000), the technology of recording and transmitting sound and imagery has 
effectively transformed every home into an entertainment venue. People no longer need to go 
where the live-action events take place but can still enjoy a theatrical play or movie at home. 
This is not to say live-action entertainment is out-of-date, but rather that modern means of 
mass communications offer a broad range of entertainment opportunities, which further 
encourages entertainment-seeking behaviours. As a result, the entertainment industries have 
sought to predict what type of entertainment genre the audiences are most likely to be fond of, 
and to tailor programmes as they would prefer (Vorderer, Klimmt and Ritterfeld, 2004). This 
process could also be used by governments to promote certain agendas. As maintained by 
Bates and Ferri (2010: 11), government propaganda offices during war time worked closely 
with producers to ensure that ‘film and other entertainment media stayed on message’. In 
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these cases, entertainment clearly has a socio-political dimension if its function was not limited 
to providing individual enjoyment.   
Among the many forms of entertainment, entertainment TV makes an indispensable part of 
providing fun and enjoyment for people. Between the 1960s and 1970s, much of the leisure 
time of Americans was spent on viewing television (Robinson, 1981). Although television is 
used by some viewers as a source of information, most people watch TV for pleasure seeking. 
Television entertainment offers a wide range of choices, through its programmes made with 
entertainment as the primary goal, such as soap operas, situation comedies, game and variety 
shows. The attractiveness of these entertainment TV programmes is readily demonstrated by 
its easiness to use. As Jerome Singer (1980: 47) maintains, ‘television removes the effort that 
the less well-educated or indeed that almost anybody has to put into the reading process by 
presenting its packaged diversion and fantasy’. It attracts the audience by ‘movement, by 
conversation and music’, by presenting the most powerful stimuli in the environment, the 
human face, as well as by the imitation of human lives. This is in stark contrast to reading a 
novel, where the reader needs to take the effort of ‘generating visual and auditory images’ 
(ibid.: 48-49). Compared with movies and theatre plays, the advantage of entertainment TV is 
more revealingly reflected in its provision of a safe and comfortable viewing environment. It 
has the ability to intrigue the audience without threat, and to arouse interest but will not lead 
to ‘extremes of affect’ as a thriller film does to audiences (ibid.). That is to say, entertainment 
TV provides the easiest, most nondemanding and flexible resource for relaxation and 
enjoyment. Despite the introduction of the Internet and wireless connectivity that has largely 
changed people’s television-viewing habits nowadays, ‘television remains a central mode of 
information and entertainment in our present-day global culture, and it appears that it will 
continue to do so for many years to come’ (Spigel, 2004: 1). As discussed in previous sections, 
television has kept revitalising itself in the last few decades, adapting itself to the new digital 
environment by enhancing interactivity with audiences. It is reasonable to speculate that 
television-based entertainment will remain a big part in human life, and that entertainment TV 
will persist as an important category providing amusement to viewers.  
The popularity of entertainment TV, or entertainment media as a whole, has attracted 
enormous scholarly attention. Apart from exploring the psychological mechanism behind the 
enjoyment experience in TV viewing, a considerable portion of attention has been placed at 
theorising the socio-political function of entertainment TV. Theorists generally believe that 
entertainment TV can do more than entertaining people. While entertainment TV delivers 
humour and excitement to the audience, it disseminates information, ideas and knowledge at 
the same time, which could be used for education and personal enrichment (Gray, 2008). 
Hence it has been noticed that the entertainment and educational functions of television are 
increasingly integrated (McGhee, 1980). In addition to this integration, the political function of 
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entertainment TV has also become a hot topic in the field of political communications over 
recent decades.  
Delli Carpini (2012) has identified three strands of competing views among existing studies 
that measure the political impact of entertainment media, particularly entertainment TV shows 
and dramas. The first strand sees entertainment media ‘as particularly effective genres in 
reinforcing deep-seated, semi-conscious and hegemonic values’ (ibid.: 10). It assumes that 
the content of entertainment media is largely homogeneous, so that the socio-political 
worldviews of heavy media users will be cultivated by this content. However, this approach, 
especially its emphasis on the hegemonic power of media content, has become increasingly 
at odds with the more complex and diverse mediated world of the new century. In the new 
context, active audiences are no longer docile receivers of mediated messages, but often take 
an active role in constructing meaning from the media they consume.  
The second strand of research considers entertainment media as a distraction from politics 
or as a major source of decreasing democratic engagement. This line of research has 
attempted to make causal inferences between the increasing use of television and Internet 
(especially among younger generations) and the loss of interest in civic engagement or decline 
in social participation. Key proponents of this view include Robert Putnam (2000), who argues 
that the decline in social participation results from a combination of various factors, including 
television’s usurpation of time that could otherwise use for more civic-minded activities, the 
psychological effects of television that inhibit social participation, and the specific content of 
television that undermines civic motivations (Delli Carpini, 2012: 12). Neil Postman (1986: 78) 
also worried about the power of television entertainment to sway public opinion, for that he 
thinks all public understanding of politics, news, education and religion ‘is shaped by the 
biases of television’. It thus becomes possible that the recreational and entertainment use of 
television might contribute to the displacement of public attention from the complexities of 
politics, and hence to the decline in public involvement.  
The third and very recent strand of research has brought closer scrutiny to the effects of 
specific entertainment genres. They tend to view entertainment TV as an alternative source of 
political engagement, particularly for people who have no interest in traditional news outlets. 
Scholars find that under the right conditions and for the right people, politically relevant 
entertainment content can affect audiences’ attitudes, opinions, and behaviours in the same 
way as traditional news and public affairs media have been found to do (Delli Carpini, 2012: 
13). The programmes under research include not only reality-based programming such as soft 
news, daytime and evening talk shows, but also fictional content in forms of situation comedies 
and crime dramas. Even though audiences attend to these programmes mainly for their 
entertainment value, their political opinions and positions are still likely to be shaped and 
changed by the part of the entertainment content that addresses political topics. 
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 All the three lines of argument lead to the conclusion that entertainment TV has the potential 
to create political impact on viewers’ attitudes and beliefs of politics. It proves that television 
entertainment is able to provide an all-encompassing package of information, amusement and 
political participation. In this regard, entertainment TV can be considered ‘integral parts of a 
society’s political culture’ (Street, 2011). The third line of research above also draws us into 
more nuanced investigations of a particular entertainment genre. As Delli Carpini (2012: 15) 
has noted, the political influence of entertainment media varies significantly depending on the 
form and content of the medium, specific genres of programmes, as well as a set of 
demographic, attitudinal and behavioural characteristics of media users. In the next section, I 
turn to investigate how entertainment TV genres can be integrated with political agendas.  
 
2.5 Entertainment as propaganda: From wartime film to socialist TV drama 
Following the previous section which explores the theoretical possibility of entertainment for 
political communication, this section offers empirical examples of how entertainment-oriented 
media forms have historically been used for political purposes. In these examples, we will see 
that modern means of mass entertainment such as films and TV shows, have had a long 
history of serving propaganda purposes for the government in both the socialist and capitalist 
states.  
The most prominent example is propaganda films during wartime periods. In the First World 
War, the British government commissioned film production as part of the effort to cultivate 
patriotic sentiments, so as to maintain a high level of popular commitment to the war. This was 
of course enabled by the growing popularity of the cinema as a mass form of entertainment 
among the working classes (Taylor, 2003: 194). Similar strategies were also adopted by Nazi 
Germany in the Second World War. Newsreels and feature films were favoured by Hitler and 
his associates to present German victories or to denounce the enemies. Most of the films were 
self-congratulatory in nature, offering a full package of sound, image and music to attract the 
audiences (ibid.: 244). It is worth noting that the main theme of Nazi propaganda films had 
shifted over time, from promoting the supremacy of the German military in the early years of 
the war to glorifying the sacrifices necessary in the late stages. This change served the 
practical ends of running propaganda campaigns at different times.  
The role that films had played in wartime propaganda campaigns extended well into the 
post-war era. Influenced by the atmosphere of the Cold War, Hollywood movies of the early 
1950s became extensively involved in the anti-communist campaign in the American society 
(ibid.: 260-261). Compared with previous wartime propaganda films, these Hollywood 
productions contained more dramatic imaginations but not necessarily less propagandistic 
messages. For instance, in the science fiction films of this time, alien threats were portrayed 
as reflections of what the Americans thought communists would do to them; spy movies also 
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gave clues on how Russian spies had undermined the US military power. Even after the Cold 
War, Hollywood films have still been seen as a useful conduit to provide pro-government 
information, such as justifying the US military operations and the actions of their soldiers 
(Soules, 2015: 134).  
In addition to popular films, entertainment TV has also shown to be a ready-to-use medium 
for presenting various political issues. For instance, British TV soaps have been found to 
deliver the messages desired by political parties; furthermore, politicians have embraced soap 
celebrities as useful instruments for their campaigns (van Zoonen, 2003). Faced with diverse 
entertainment content and genres on TV, Holbert (2005) offers a nine-part typology to firstly 
predict and differentiate the potential political relevance of different entertainment programmes. 
Specifically, this typology is constructed respectively from audience- and content-based 
enquiries, addressing the questions 1) to what extent can audiences expect politically relevant 
issues to be raised in a specific piece of entertainment content and 2) whether the political 
messages being provided in a specific piece of entertainment content are explicit or implicit. 
In his visualisation, Holbert arranges the three levels to which audience can expect political 
messages more or less vertically, and polarity of explicit versus implicit political messages 
Figure 2.1: Holbert's typology for the study of entertainment TV and politics 
(Source: Holbert, 2005: 445) 
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horizontally (see Figure 2.1). We see that from this classification, ‘fictional political dramas’ 
(e.g. The West Wing,1999-2006) has been put into a section to which the audience can expect 
to see a large portion of political messages, but these messages are represented in a 
combination of explicit and implicit methods. On the contrary, ‘lifeworld content’ (see Gamson, 
1999) that reflects entertainment-based content (dramatic or comic) and normally portrays 
individuals dealing with job loss, balancing family and work, etc. has been placed in the 
bottom-right corner. This classification of lifeworld content indicates that these TV programmes 
do not attempt to present an explicitly political agenda, and audiences do not watch these 
programmes primarily for political information. However, as noted by Holbert (2005: 445), 
existing research has increasingly pointed to popular forms of prime-time entertainment 
programmes providing audiences with socio-political information, and has shown lifeworld 
content as having the potential to influence public opinion concerning a wide range of issues. 
This suggests that some TV genres might seem apolitical at first sight but have clear socio-
political implications on closer inspection.  
This typology forms a crucial first step in evaluating the political influence of entertainment 
TV. It also highlights the political importance of seemingly apolitical, entertainment-oriented 
content. The idea of expanding our notions of politically relevant content is particularly 
important for understanding socialist television. If a television system is partially designed to 
serve the propagandandistic and educational agenda of communist parties by all possible 
means, we need to be attentive to the political potential of various genres and forms, including 
those created for entertainment purposes. This is not to say that media content in the socialist 
context is per se highly politicised. Rather, as discussed in previous sections, there are various 
competing forces and strategies of negotiation taking place among different agencies within 
socialist media systems. Even the seemingly simple task of propaganda requires careful 
considerations of audience interest in order to formulate desirable results of the propagandist. 
Hence, the different degrees of negotiation between propaganda and entertainment, between 
commercial interest and political agendas – demonstrated through media content – deserve 
our particular attention.    
Even though Holbert’s research has been conducted in the US and Western European 
contexts, drawing on examples from Western TV programming, some conclusions are 
applicable to socialist television systems, particularly with regard to TV programmes featuring 
‘lifeworld content’. For instance, Imre’s (2016: 199-224) discussion of socialist domestic serial 
dramas shows how this genre has been used for political agenda setting. These programmes 
revolve around midlife crisis, extramarital affairs, quitting smoking, hair loss, etc. – showing no 
explicitly political content at first glance, but in the storyline, they have disseminated an 
educational and didactic message that socialist citizens should take care of each other, and 
that this duty should fall to women. Specifically, by portraying central female characters who 
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act as problem-solvers between the private and public worlds, these domestic dramas have 
in fact showcased an ideal socialist lifestyle that all socialist citizens are expected to aspire 
and model on. Similar cases with notable political implications can also be found among 
contemporary Chinese ‘lifestyle advice’ TV programmes. As Lewis, Martin and Sun (2016: 63) 
observe, these programmes aim at giving practical consumer information concerning food, 
clothes and other goods to TV viewers. In doing so, they simultaneously contribute to the 
formation of a normative idea of consumer citizenship, because ‘in China, a good citizen is not 
only loyal to the Party and the nation, but equally importantly, also does his or her bit to spend 
money and engage in consumption, which is crucial to the sustained economic growth of the 
nation’. By studying these cases, we find that the political potential of ostensibly apolitical TV 
genres is manifest. Although political content is not treated as priority in lifeworld content, their 
underlying socio-political messages nevertheless echo the political context in which the 
programmes are produced, and further influence audiences’ perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviours in implicit ways.  
But it would be misleading to assume that Holbert’s typology can be applied to other 
contexts without any problems. For instance, in China, it is not common to see fictional political 
dramas that reflect or comment on the current political system, due to tight state control over 
politically relevant content. Instead, there are reality-based political-historical dramas which 
specifically serve the Party’s propaganda initiative. This genre will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter 6, where we will see the integration of explicitly political content within an 
entertaining and dramatic genre – TV serial drama. If subsumed under Holbert’s typology, this 
reality-based political drama would be easily placed in the upper left corner, where audiences 
expect to see a large amount of explicitly political messages. As noted by Imre (2016: 29), 
socialist television has a different set of programming strategies that are fundamentally 
designed to support the overarching educational aim of teaching viewers how to be good 
socialist citizens. While Holbert’s observation is useful in raising the importance of thinking 
about different degrees of political relevance in entertainment television, we need also to 
consider the specificities of any media outlets when using this typology to reflect on socialist 
entertainment television.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, drawing on theories of de-westernising media studies and political 
communication, I have mapped out a theoretical framework for understanding socialist media 
and television, which provides a starting point to examine Chinese media systems in general 
and television in particular. We have seen from above that socialist television is far from a pure 
propaganda tool but, like television in liberal democracies, has both a political and cultural 
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dimension, both propagandistic functions and entertainment value, which are informed by the 
changing economic and political environment, technological advancement and audience’s 
consumption patterns. Hence it is necessary to break the paradigmatic dichotomy between 
the West and East, and acknowledge that ‘the key point to emphasise is that media systems 
are shaped not merely by national cultural regulatory regimes and national audience 
preferences, but by a complex ensemble of social relations that have taken place in national 
contexts’ (Curran and Park, 2000:12). However, for understanding socialist television, this is 
still not adequate to see the whole picture. We need to avoid methodological nationalism and 
broaden our vision to be attentive to those cultural influences coming from beyond the national 
context.  
From the perspective of political communication, we also see that propaganda, as a form 
of communication, can be adopted in any socio-political context. Even though propaganda has 
been viewed as a long-established tradition among communist regimes, its specific task, goals 
and strategies also need to be progressed in order to suit the new social, political and 
technological conditions. Notably, propaganda via television sometimes has been integrated 
with entertainment genres and programmes. At the same time, entertainment TV, often 
perceived as an escapist pastime, has also proved to have great political potential that can 
shape and influence viewers’ political opinions and behaviours. But as long as we cannot 
explore the exact political impact on audiences, Holbert’s typology concerning the political 
relevance of entertainment television provides a conceptual framework for us to better 
understand the political potential of different TV programmes.   
Based on these theoretical perspectives and empirical findings, we find that propaganda 
and entertainment are actually two intertwined processes in TV programmes and in many 
cases not standing alone. Even though the development of Chinese television contrasts with 
the situation of the West in various degrees, the characteristics of the Chinese case are 
commensurate with Western media theories (Ma, 2000: 32). This project thus aims to 
understand Chinese television as a hybridised political and cultural form, a site of contestation 
shaped by different national and transnational influences. In the next chapter, I will turn to the 
institutional and historical specificities of Chinese television, with reference to the changing 
political, economic and cultural contexts.   
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Chapter 3  
Research Context: The Changing Landscape of  
Chinese Television in the Reform Era 
 
In the previous chapter, we have seen the dynamics of television communication between 
propaganda and entertainment in socialist contexts, informed by a set of social, political and 
economic factors from within or outside of the socialist states. While socialist television has 
demonstrated unique organising principles, it has also displayed similarities to Western TV 
formats and programming. In this chapter, I turn to the historical and regional specificities of 
Chinese television. Specifically, I attempt to contextualise Chinese television within the 
broader political, economic and cultural transformations taking place in the post-1978 reform 
era. As mentioned at the outset of the last chapter, the launch of Chinese television in 1958 
was partially for the purpose of engaging in an ideological competition between the socialist 
and capitalist camps, which also echoed the world-wide development of television technology 
and infrastructure. Yet, as we shall find in this chapter, Chinese television during its first two 
decades, either as a propaganda-education tool or an entertainment medium, had very limited 
reach and impact. This situation did not change drastically until the implementation of China’s 
economic reform starting from 1978. Chinese television has since then experienced a large-
scale transformation and reconfiguration. Such rapid development also led to the rise of 
popular entertainment culture in the 1990s, which gradually affected the role of television as 
a propaganda instrument, turning it also into a primary means of mass entertainment. This 
chapter offers an overview of the contextual changes that have shaped the Chinese television 
landscape, considering both national and transnational factors. I shall first examine the political 
context, focusing on the shifting foci in CCP propaganda and ‘thought work’ alongside the 
economic reforms, and their influence on the television sector. Secondly, I will demonstrate 
how the previously highly politicised sector of television has been transformed into a market-
oriented industry, so as to align itself with the newly introduced market economy. In the third 
part, I will look at the changes in the socio-cultural sphere, where entertainment-oriented 
television consumption became the mainstream among the audience, and urban consumers’ 
cultural tastes tended to shape content production. As a preliminary conclusion, this chapter 
highlights the paradoxical process Chinese television has experienced amidst the wider 
political, economic and social transformations.  
 
3.1 The shifting foci of Party propaganda and Chinese television 
The CCP’s propaganda and thought work (xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo), also known as 
‘educational propaganda’, ‘political propaganda’ and ‘propaganda work’, originated in the 
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revolutionary years of the early 1920s, when the newly founded party attempted to mobilise 
and persuade the Chinese people to take part in its revolutionary movement (Li and Yu, 2012). 
Since then, it has been characterised as a regular mission of the CCP which has aimed to 
publicise the Party line and policies, raise awareness of the people and mobilise them towards 
the goal of national emancipation and prosperity in different historical periods (Liu, 1993). The 
Chinese Communist propaganda system, however, is considered to have originated during 
the Yan’an Rectification Movement – an ideological campaign carried out between 1942 and 
1944 to unify various power bases within the CCP in support of Mao Zedong. As a result, the 
propaganda system became a key mechanism for Mao’s and the Party’s subsequent efforts 
to transform Chinese society after 1949 (Shambaugh, 2007: 26).  
According to Shambaugh (ibid.: 26-27), the Chinese Communist propaganda system has 
not only been modelled on the Soviet Union but has also incorporated the experiences of Nazi 
Germany and other totalitarian states’ propaganda systems, as well as of the Imperial and 
Nationalist Chinese governments. At the same time, this system represented the 
quintessential Leninist ‘transmission belt’ for indoctrination and mass mobilisation, and its 
scope covers every medium concerned with the transmission of information, ranging from print 
and electronic media to various educational institutions, cultural facilities, products and 
activities. Essentially, the CCP Propaganda Department2 has the capacity to censor and crack 
down on content that is believed to run counter to the official ideological line. Apart from this 
active intervention, the Propaganda Department also exercises passive control in the form of 
self-censorship – meaning that individuals engaged with creative activities know the bottom 
line of the Party-state and try to avoid crossing the ‘red line’. More regularly, it adopts proactive 
or positive propaganda strategies – i.e. using propaganda as a proactive tool in educating the 
masses and shaping society (Shambaugh, 2007: 29). It is thus obvious that propaganda work 
in socialist China takes various forms and does not necessarily carry negative connotations in 
the Chinese context. Most importantly, it has been normalised as long-term activity of the CCP, 
given that political and thought work is treated as the ‘life-blood’ of all the other work of the 
Party, including economic development. 3  Yet this does not suggest that the foci and 
effectiveness of the Party’s propaganda work have remained the same all the time.  
 
 
 
2 The full name is Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee (Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuanbu, 
abbreviated as Zhongxuanbu in Chinese and the Central Publicity/Propaganda Department in English, see 
Shambaugh (2007: 33). In order to minimise the negative connotations associated with the English word 
‘propaganda’, it is now named the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee in official CCP English-
language documents.  
3 This sentence is from the works of the former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin (2006: 74). The original 
wording in Chinese is ‘Sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo shi jingji gongzuo he qita yiqie gongzuo de shengmingxian’. 
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3.1.1 Class struggle in the pre-reform era 
Throughout the post-1949 era, different foci of propaganda work have existed to suit 
different historical and political realities, which were also characterised by the leadership of 
different political leaders. In the Mao era (1949-1976), the goal of constructing a socialist 
industrial country was established as the primary focus of propaganda and thought work; this 
was laid down by the Central Propaganda Department in December 1953 (Zhonggong 
Dangshiwang, 2016). In this period, the CCP based its legitimacy to rule, in the terminology of 
Marxism-Leninism, on the dictatorship of the proletariat; the ensuing political campaigns 
served to indoctrinate the populace and search for class enemies of the state (Brady, 2008:3).  
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), however, the propaganda system essentially 
became a weapon of Mao and his close associates, used for attacking Mao’s ideological 
enemies (Brady 2008: 37-38). The propaganda system at the time was also tasked with 
promoting the personality cult of Chairman Mao (Griffith, 1980). In this political environment, 
media systems either ceased to operate or operated at reduced levels, often limiting 
themselves to exaggerated accounts of the achievements of the Cultural Revolution (Brady, 
2008:38). Cultural production was focused on the eight ‘revolutionary model plays’4 promoted 
by Jiang Qing, Mao’s last wife. Major provincial television stations were either suspended or 
became an instrument of factional political struggles; news and cultural programming was 
subject to the vicissitudes of political necessity (Zhao and Guo, 2005: 523). As mentioned in 
chapter 2, Chinese television shut its door to both the Western world and the Soviet Union 
between the 1960s and 1970s, maintaining limited level of cooperation with Cuba, North Korea 
and Vietnam. It is therefore reasonable to say that the propaganda campaigns of this period, 
while perhaps successful in winnowing out Mao’s ideological enemies, greatly deviated from 
the original trajectory of socialist modernisation. Television programmes were filled with 
political slogans, serving as ideological weapons of political and class struggle.  
 
3.1.2 Short-term relaxation of control in the 1980s 
It was not until 1978 that the economic construction of a socialist modernity was back on 
the track. In December 1978, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress initiated 
China’s economic reform and opening to the West. At this milestone conference, the CCP 
decided to withdraw from class struggle and shift its focus to boosting national economic 
development. Following this reorientation of the Party line, the newly appointed political 
leaders, notably Zhao Ziyang, tended to loosen ideological control whilst focusing on economic 
reform, which sent the signal that the leaders of the 1980s were generally tolerating debate 
 
4 The eight ‘revolutionary model plays’ (geming yangbanxi) were the eight most famous theatrical plays and 
musical pieces spreading revolutionary ideology during the Cultural Revolution. They include five Peking operas, 
two ballets and one symphony. 
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and criticism (both within the Party and within society) for the sake of encouraging the 
development of a modern economy (Brady, 2008: 41). The relaxation of ideological control to 
certain extents had allowed for a temporary period of cultural and political liberalisation, in 
which Western liberal democratic thoughts began flocking to the public sphere of China – but 
it should be noted that political campaigns against spiritual pollution from the West and against 
bourgeois liberalism (1983) also occurred during the same period. Nevertheless, the economic 
reforms had brought in new forms of art, literature, and pop music, which resulted in the 
evolution in the cultural field and simultaneously pushed for the debate on the Party’s policies 
of literature and art (wenyi zhengce) between 1978 and 1980. As a result of the debate, the 
Central Committee of the CCP released a new ideological guideline that ‘literature and art 
serve the people and socialism’5, which replaced Mao Zedong’s old assertion that ‘literature 
and art are subordinate to politics’6 (Xu, 2004). 
 Following these changes in propaganda work and in the fields of literature and art, 
television gradually became a powerful forum for promoting the liberal ideas favoured by an 
increasing number of reform-minded intellectual elites. These people attempted to explore 
television as a serious medium of political communication (Zhao and Guo, 2005: 525). This 
era of cultural fermentation was best exemplified by the six-part documentary River Elegy 
(Heshang, 1988), which harshly criticised China’s conservative, river-based, agricultural 
civilisation while eagerly advocating Western democratic civilisation and China’s further 
integration with global capitalism (ibid.). All these aspects of ideological relaxation eventually 
led to demands for political change, and hence the confrontation between government 
hardliners and the country’s progressive forces came to a head at Tiananmen Square in 1989. 
It is worth noting that during this period, the government did not completely control even the 
most mainstream media. Chinese journalists and television producers enjoyed their highest 
degrees of freedom ever, their coverage of the demonstrations increasingly showing sympathy 
and support for the student movement. In turn, students and demonstrators began to use the 
domestic media, especially television, to their advantage (Lull, 1991: 188-189).  
 
3.1.3 Advancing the market economy and nationalism in the 1990s  
From this political turmoil, the CCP leadership drew the lesson that propaganda and thought 
work could not be weakened in the quest for economic development. After the crackdown of 
the Tiananmen Square protest, the CCP further retightened political control over the flow of 
information, particularly over the media sector, and emphasised the need for strengthening 
 
5 The full sentence in Chinese is Wenyi wei renmin fuwu, wei shehuizhuyi fuwu, which was officially announced 
in an editorial by People’s Daily on 26 July 1980. 
6 This slogan was put forward by Mao Zedong in his Yan’an talk in 1942, where he asserted that literary and 
artistic works are subordinate to politics and serve for socialist workers, peasants and soldiers. 
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political thought work. The ‘core leader’ at the time, Deng Xiaoping, reiterated the slogan that 
had been heard throughout the 1980s: ‘seize with both hands, both hands holding tight 
(liangshou zhua, liangshou douyao ying)’ (see Brady, 2008: 44-45). This articulation was then 
brought forward again at the CCP’s Fourteenth National Congress in 1992, which stressed 
the importance of balancing the construction of ‘material civilisation’ (wuzhi wenming) and 
‘spiritual civilisation’ (jingshen wenming), in other words, revitalising the national economy 
while at the same time re-emphasising political thought work (Yang, 2011).  
Also at the Fourteenth Party Congress, the third generation of the CCP leaders, with Jiang 
Zemin as the new General Secretary, established a ‘socialist market economy’ as the strategic 
goal. This set the new agenda for propaganda and thought work, which was harnessed to 
facilitate the institutional transformation from a planned economy to a market economy. As a 
result of this new agenda, the media played a significant educational role to help Chinese 
people adjust to the challenges of a market economy (Brady, 2008: 49). This meant greater 
freedoms in economic-related propaganda work. But in political matters, Jiang Zemin put 
much emphasis on the propagandist role of the media in correctly guiding public opinion. In a 
visit to People’s Daily, the so-called ‘mouthpiece’ of the Party, he reiterated the guideline that 
news media (as with literature and art) must serve the people and serve socialism, complying 
closely with the Party ideology (Renminwang, 1996).  
Throughout the 1990s, the CCP was also facing an issue of legitimacy as a result of the 
1989 incident. This revolved around the question how to transform a revolutionary party to a 
‘party in power’ with the goal of maintaining its ruling status and the political system it led (see 
Brady, 2008: 47). As a result of relevant debates, Jiang Zemin proposed the Three 
Represents7 in 2000, particularly in response to inquiries about the integration of the private 
economy with the socialist market economy, as well as the legal status of newly emerged 
social groups associated with the multiple economic model. As Tsao and Yeh (2012) note, 
this shift in the Party line signified that the CCP began to evolve from a proletarian party to a 
governmental party, so as to unite a diverse range of social groups (including capitalists) to 
advance the state’s project of economic reform.  
Another important theme correlating with the process of legitimisation was the construction 
of nationalism and mobilisation of patriotism. Since the Fourteenth Party Congress, the Party 
has launched propaganda campaigns for patriotic education that specifically targeted China’s 
youth, including establishing patriotic education sites and strengthening patriotic education in 
schools (Brady, 2008: 49-51). The official discourse on nationalism and patriotism proved to 
be extremely effective in creating social unity and cohesion for post-1989 China, in particular 
 
7  ‘Three Represents’ refers to what the CCP currently stands for: it represents the development trends of 
advanced productive forces; it represents the orientations of an advanced culture; it represents the fundamental 
interests of the overwhelming majority of the people of China. See People’s Daily Online (2006). 
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during major events such as the ‘handover’ of Hong Kong and Macau. Within this discursive 
framework, television has played a significant role in transmitting national cultural symbols into 
Chinese households, staging political and cultural spectacles, invoking popular sentiments 
and rallying viewers under the national flag (Zhao and Guo, 2005: 531). 
 
3.1.4 Building a harmonious society as the remedy to ease social problems 
At the CCP’s Sixteenth National Congress in 2002, Hu Jintao took over from Jiang Zemin 
as the new General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee. Although controls over the 
propaganda system remained in place, the focus of the propaganda work nevertheless shifted 
to suit new situations. Due to overt obsession with economic growth under Deng’s and Jiang’s 
leadership, there had emerged a series of social problems such as corruption, massive 
unemployment amidst the process of state-owned enterprises (SOE) reform, widening 
regional disparities and rising environmental concerns. The outbreak of these conflicts 
required Hu Jintao to come up with new guidelines and measures in order to balance 
economic growth and an increasingly disparate society (Zheng and Tok, 2007). Within this 
context, Hu put forward his ‘scientific outlook on development’ (kexue fazhanguan) in 2003 
that is devoted to the creation of comprehensive, scientifically-designed and sustainable 
development (see Fewsmith, 2001).  
In February 2005, Hu Jintao instructed the country's leading officials and Party cadres at a 
workshop to place ‘building a harmonious society’ at the top on their working agenda, which 
was specifically aimed at tackling social inequalities caused by reform and economic 
development. This political vision later became institutionalised at the Sixth Plenum of the 
Sixteenth Party Congress in 2006. It should be noted that the articulation of a harmonious 
society drew inspiration from Confucian ideals on how to rule a country, which indicated a 
revival of Confucianism in the CCP’s leadership, in combination with clear nationalist appeals. 
Under the slogan of building a harmonious socialist society, new propaganda campaigns were 
launched to strengthen ideological control over culture, media and education, including the 
suppression of dissident or ‘inharmonious’ information appearing in the media in order to 
ensure that ‘only the government’s perspective got out to domestic and foreign audiences’ 
(Brady, 2017: 134). Besides, propaganda work also incorporated active promotion of 
Confucianism-related conferences, projects, and state-sponsored research centres. Despite 
critical remarks that the adoption of Confucianism is more a pragmatic strategy for 
consolidating the Party’s leadership (Wu, 2015), it is rather evident that in Hu’s term of office 
(2002-2012), Confucianism, acting as a new source of the CCP’s legitimising strategies, 
began to serve the goal of nation building.  
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3.1.5 Tightened media control to promote the ‘Chinese dream’ in the 2010s 
In November 2012, Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as the General Secretary of the CCP. 
While continuing to draw on traditional cultural values (i.e. Confucianism) and nationalist 
narratives, the new paramount leader of China began to articulate the new political slogan of 
a ‘Chinese dream’ that entailed the goal of achieving the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation’ (Xinhua, 2012). In March 2013 at the First Plenary Session of the Twelfth National 
People's Congress, Xi further elaborated on this initiative; he connected the fulfilment of 
individual dreams to the prerequisite of achieving the collective national dream (China Daily, 
2014). This slogan then gave rise to a set of new initiatives centring around ‘building a socialist 
cultural superpower’ while at the same time seeking increased international influence 
(Shambaugh, 2015).  
Underlying these new initiatives were the strengthening of CCP ideological leadership and 
the tightening of media control (Shambaugh, 2015; Brady, 2017). The ‘red lines’ in the CCP’s 
propaganda and thought work have always been in place; what is new in the Xi Jinping era is 
the updated repressive measures that specifically target the Internet and cyberspace. In 
general, the ideological guidelines for traditional media remained largely the same: they are 
expected to focus on positive news stories that uphold unity and stability and are encouraging 
(Brady, 2017: 136). With regard to new media, however, the Xi Jinping government initiated a 
thorough reconfiguration of Internet governance, including the establishment of a new Central 
Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatisation8 in February 2014, which is under direct 
control of Xi Jinping and has exclusive responsibility for regulating online content (Creemers, 
2017). In January 2016 a new cyber law came into effect authorising the government to close 
down Internet access in China during ‘major emergencies’ (Brady, 2017: 137). These 
measures demonstrated a stronger hand in censoring content on the Internet. Apart from the 
repressive measures, new visual tactics and media forms that embrace Internet popular 
culture have been used to build a positive image of the CCP and to fortify Xi Jinping’s personal 
authority as a political idol (Chang and Ren, 2018). Such methods include animated 
propaganda cartoons and comics in the form of online promotional videos; they were 
particularly attractive to the young generations who make up a big portion of the online 
communities and are used to getting information, having fun and making connections on the 
Internet (ibid.: 9). As such, the proactive propaganda strategies are much different from the 
patriotic education campaigns of the 1990s and have positively bridged the distance between 
the paramount leader and young Chinese generations. The latter point is of great importance 
 
8 The Chinese name is Zhongyang Wangluo Anquan He Xinxihua Lingdao Xiaozu. But this Leading Group has later 
changed its name to the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, Zhongyang Wangluo Anquan He Xinxihua 
Weiyuanhui. 
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to the Party’s current propaganda work, because educating the young Chinese generation is 
considered the top priority of the propagandists (see Xinhua, 2018). 
From the above overview of CCP propaganda work at different historical periods, we have 
seen that while the emphasis on propaganda work has been persistent in the post-1989 period, 
the content and goals of propaganda work kept changing. By and large, in the reform era, the 
previous focus on class struggle has given way to promoting economic development, and from 
the 1990s onwards, more emphasis has been given to the building of nationalism and 
patriotism, so as to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule over China. Despite the slight 
loosening of media control in the 1980s, ideological and political control over the media sector 
has constantly been tightened since the 1990s and still persists to this day. In terms of the 
effectiveness of the propaganda and thought work, Daniel Lynch (1999) holds the view that it 
has decreased dramatically during the post-Mao era. The author explains that two decades of 
‘reform and opening’ have transformed the setting – administrative, economic, and 
technological – in which Chinese people construct their symbolic environment, which was 
previously dominated by the Party. In the new context, various communication methods and 
technologies have empowered media users to establish their own communication networks 
and share ideas, which was not necessarily desired by the Party (ibid.:3-4). In this regard, the 
effectiveness of central Party control over thought work in general and the media sphere in 
particular has been undermined. This viewpoint is certainly still valid in terms of acknowledging 
contextual changes that have brought new challenges to the CCP’s propaganda work. Yet, in 
this project, I am inclined to adopt Brady’s (2008; 2017) view that the CCP tends to actively 
absorb new propaganda strategies and persuasion techniques from a wider global context to 
serve its political purposes. The recent online propaganda campaigns aimed at promoting the 
personal authority of Xi Jinping are a case in point.  
 
3.1.6 De-politicisation of Chinese television? 
Chinese television has experienced instrumental usage in the Mao era, short-lived freedom 
in the 1980s, and retightened ideological control since the 1990s. Media scholar Lee Chin-
Chuan (1990) has noted the relative ‘de-emphasis of ideology’ in televised content in the post-
Mao era, due to the shift in focus of the Party’s work from class struggle to economic 
development and the subsequent commercial reforms, which allowed television viewing not 
to be limited to political content. However, as Hong and Xu (2018) point out, the commercial 
reform of Chinese television did not necessarily weaken the ideological role or lead to the ‘de-
politicisation’ of Chinese television. For one thing, the Party-state seeks to improve the 
effectiveness of its propaganda work by softening the ideological tone in state-sponsored 
programmes, while allowing a certain degree of creative freedom for more effective persuasion; 
for another, television practitioners know exactly how to tread the fine line between serving 
40 
 
the Party and satisfying audience interests at the same time (Hong and Xu, 2018: 315). Also, 
as noted in chapter 1, state power and market forces in the Chinese television sector are not 
necessarily two antagonistic forces, and in most cases, they can work together to realise both 
political and commercial goals: commercially successful strategies can be utilised to promote 
propaganda work or, more generally, the Party-state’s official agenda. In the next section, we 
pay closer attention to the evolvement of Chinese television industry in the context of 
economic reform, with a focus on the conditional creative freedom granted by the Party-state 
to this industry.  
 
3.2 Market reform and the evolution of Chinese television industry  
As Lynch (1999:30-31) has noted, the development of Chinese television was considered 
especially important in the early years of reform both to help the Party-state attain its goals in 
thought work, and to serve as an excellent medium for revitalising the advertising industry, 
thereby contributing to the socialist ‘commodity economy’ (shangpin jingji, an earlier wording 
for ‘market economy’, shichang jingji). We have seen from the above that Chinese television 
faced a series of disruptions in the Mao era, which somehow prevented it from generating 
greater social impact. Yet this situation has largely changed along with the economic reforms 
and China’s opening up to the world since 1978. In this section, I begin with an introduction to 
the industrial development of Chinese television, with a focus on major structural and 
operational transformations initiated by the Party-state, as well as their political implications. 
This is followed by an overview of how Chinese television producers have negotiated between 
the state’s ideological control and the commercial imperatives.  
 
3.2.1 Industrial development of Chinese television in the reform era 
From 1978 onwards, the Chinese government has released a set of policies and regulatory 
guidelines instructing the media how to engage in economic reforms. In 1978, the Ministry of 
Finance endorsed the introduction of enterprise management (qiyehua guanli) to eight news 
media units (danwei), enabling these administrative units (shiye danwei) to operate as 
enterprises (shiye danwei qiyehua guanli). This policy encouraged these media to extract part 
of their revenue for the use of increasing employee income and, more importantly, for investing 
in further development; the latter point prefigured the subsequent commercial operation within 
the media system (Yang, 2008). In January 1979, the first Chinese TV advertisement was 
broadcast by Shanghai television station, signifying the commencement of the market 
economy (Renminwang, 2008). In October 1980, at the Tenth National Broadcasting Work 
Conference, the long-established role of TV broadcasting as a tool of class struggle and 
proletarian dictatorship was denounced and replaced by a new orientation of radio and 
television propaganda towards the service of economic reconstruction (Guo, 2005: 256). This 
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initiative considerably released Chinese television from the Party’s strict ideological control, 
which then partially contributed to the aforementioned ‘temporary freedom’ enjoyed by 
television producers of the 1980s. It is also worth mentioning that, even though the 
development of Chinese television had stagnated in the pre-reform era, the need for 
propaganda work ensured that there was still great advancement in television technology, 
which provided a good basis for the subsequent expansion of national television networks.  
Throughout the 1980s, the development of the television industry was characterised by 
processes of de-centralisation and commercialisation. At the 1983 National Radio and 
Television Work Conference, it was announced that Chinese television industry would adopt 
the strategy of ‘running television on four levels’ (siji ban dianshi), namely television stations 
on the central, provincial, municipal and county levels – before 1983, Chinese television had 
operated at the central and provincial levels only. This new strategy aimed to rapidly expand 
the national broadcasting network and to speed up the process of television development. 
Apart from this, the 1983 conference also called on various social funds to invest in the 
development of television industry (Yang, 2008). The need for absorbing social funds was 
mainly because the central government lacked the resources necessary to finance its aim of 
rapidly developing television (Lynch, 1999:32; Yang, 2008). As a result, television stations at 
all levels developed quickly, from less than 20 municipal-level TV stations in 1982 to 172 city 
and county TV stations in 1985 (Guo, 2005: 270). However, this rapid expansion led to 
difficulties of maintaining central control at local levels. For instance, in order to fill increased 
broadcasting time and to attract advertising fees, local television stations began broadcasting 
large amounts of low-quality entertainment TV programmes, which directly occupied the time 
slots of news and cultural programmes produced by the central television stations; 
consequently, the Ministry of Radio and Television issued Notice (Tongzhi) No. 224 in 1984, 
that required city and county TV stations to primarily transmit central and provincial 
programmes, and banned them from originating entertainment programmes (ibid.: 271). By 
the mid-1980s, Chinese mass media generally embarked on the path of enterprise 
management, and Chinese television was not excluded from this process. With the advent of 
TV commercials on the screen, advertising fees became a crucial part of television revenue. 
However, an increasing reliance on advertising resulted in the preference of commercial 
interests among publicly owned television stations; this reflected the ambiguity in the social 
role of Chinese television, that encompassed public service, commercial and propaganda 
functions at the same time (Guo, 2005: 278-280).  
From 1992 onwards, market forces quickly swept through the Chinese media system and 
transformed it from the inside out (Zhao, 1998). As part of the plan to accelerate market-
oriented development in the media system, Party officials redefined the mass media and other 
traditionally state-subsidised ideological and cultural institutions as part of a tertiary industry 
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to be run according to the principles of self-financing (i.e. market-based financing) and profit-
making (Zhao and Guo, 2005: 527). Profit and advertising fees thus increasingly became 
important driving forces for Chinese television production and broadcasting. As mentioned in 
the previous section, after the 1989 Tiananmen turmoil, the Party-state retightened ideological 
control over the media system, including television. In this case, how to ensure TV stations 
attractive to various funding agencies while at the same time retain ideological supervision 
over content production became the primary concern of government regulators.  
In September 1999, the State Council issued Notice No. 82 (entitled ‘Opinions on 
Enhancing the Construction and Regulation of Broadcasting and Cable Networks’). This 
guideline aimed to better structure and coordinate various media institutions, and to ensure 
that commercial operation does not affect the propaganda role of TV broadcasting. Specifically, 
it requested the restructuring of media institutions and the launch of media conglomerates at 
the provincial level9 that should merge radio and television stations, cable TV and satellite TV. 
In the restructured media system, the government sought to separate politics from business, 
propaganda from commercial operation, by means of separating state-owned property for 
commercial operation from those for public service and political usage; moreover, for non-
news programmes, it suggested to split content production and broadcasting (see Zhao, 2015: 
120). In the past, state-owned television stations operated as both producers and 
broadcasters because the Party-state insisted on maintaining a direct control over the entire 
TV system; since this new policy was issued, private production units have been granted 
permission for the independent production of TV programmes (Hong and Xu, 2018: 303). The 
consolidation of media groups was brought forward partially in response to the duplicate 
construction since the ‘four-level’ television system, that had resulted in deficient management 
structures and unclear responsibilities at each level of media institutions, and partially to assist 
the state-run broadcasting network to better adapt to a market economy. The government 
expected that, through these guidelines, state-owned media institutions could more efficiently 
engage in market competition, particularly in the face of a global market after China’s 
admission to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001.  
As outlined in this document, Chinese television underwent a set of structural reform from 
the early 2000s and by 2003, most provinces – including autonomous regions and directly-
governed municipalities having the same rank as provinces – had established their integrated 
media groups. In 2003, echoing the central government’s call for boosting the development of 
a cultural industry, the television sector initiated the ‘separation of production from 
 
9 These media conglomerates are generally headquartered in the capital city of provinces and autonomous 
regions, or in municipalities that are under the direct administration of the central government (zhixiashi, e.g. 
Shanghai). In 2004, however, Shenzhen, a city of Guangdong Province was granted permission to launch a 
satellite TV channel that can reach a national audience.  
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broadcasting’ (zhi bo fenli). As stated by Yin Hong and Li Degang (2004), the overall aim of 
this strategy is to incorporate the mechanism of market competition into television 
programming. Following this logic, TV broadcasters at every level started to establish media 
enterprises that were affiliated to them. In so doing, they could delegate duties of content 
production in terms of TV dramas, variety shows and other entertainment programmes to 
these companies. Some of these companies were listed on stock markets in order to absorb 
various sources of capital, including foreign ones. Some TV broadcasters tried out commercial 
operation styles on sports- and science-oriented TV channels (ibid.:246). Among these 
broadcasters, China Central Television (CCTV) was one of the first to take on this challenge. 
Zhao Huayong, director of CCTV at the time, proposed to transform all CCTV channels, 
excluding the news channels, into thematic TV channels that operate on a commercial basis, 
reliant on advertising fees. This strategy meant in fact a separation of ownership and operation 
within the state-owned TV systems, which allowed privately-owned media companies to join 
the production of television programmes. However, for quite a long time, private producers 
were in a subservient position to TV stations, because it was the latter who finally determined 
whether the former’s programmes could be purchased and broadcast on TV (Sun, 2014).  
The period from 2003 to 2004 also saw the trend of TV channel specialisation among major 
provincial satellite television. Satellite TV broadcasting in mainland China started in 1989 when 
the first provincial-level satellite TV channel (Xizang STV) was launched in Tibet. In the 1990s, 
other provincial-level TV stations (including those in autonomous regions and directly-
governed municipalities) began to launch their own satellite broadcasting services, and 
according to the regulation rules, only one satellite TV channel can be launched in each 
province.10 By 2004, there had existed 51 satellite TV channels, 18 at the central level, 32 at 
the provincial level and one, Shenzhen STV, at the city level. Most of these could reach 
national audiences (Li and Jin, 2006). In order to stand out from the national TV market and 
more effectively compete with CCTV and other national broadcasters, provincial satellite TV 
stations successively developed distinctive brands for their flagship channels. The most 
popular ones include Hunan TV, known for ‘entertainment and information’, and Jiangsu 
Satellite TV, known for its focus on the ‘affective dimension’ of human life. It should be noted 
that their satellite TV signals can only be received in each household via local cable TV 
network. Hence satellite TV broadcasting in China is in fact a combination of satellite and 
cable television services. 
In the following years, more specialised satellite TV channels (e.g. Beijing TV’s Kaku Kids 
Channel) were launched, which further intensified the competition. In August 2009, SARFT 
 
10 Aside from one flagship satellite TV channel established in each province, major cities (i.e. Beijing, Shenzhen) 
have been permitted to launch another specialised satellite channel or a city-level satellite channel in the 
following years. 
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issued another guidance (SARFT, 2009) instructing the television network how to separate 
production and broadcasting. This required central and provincial television stations to focus 
more on public service programming and continue to produce news programmes, political 
interviews and social investigation programmes, whilst withdrawing from entertainment-
oriented productions. However, they may still purchase TV dramas and entertainment 
programmes from independent production companies. On the one hand, this policy was 
another attempt to strengthen the party’s ideological control over the television, by once again 
emphasising the propaganda and educational function of television (Meng, 2015: 674). On the 
other, it boosted the development of private media companies, laying the foundation for them 
to take bigger market share in producing entertainment TV in the next decade.  
From 2012 onwards, Chinese television experienced more intensive commercialisation 
than ever before, characterised by a rising number of market players participating in 
entertainment production. The broadcast of the 2012 TV show ‘Voice of China’ (Zhongguo 
hao shengyin) was considered the first ‘real practice’ of a separation of production from 
broadcasting, because the show was jointly produced by Zhejiang Satellite TV and Star 
China’s Canxing Productions, 11  and both parties received equal shares from the huge 
commercial return generated from this show (Sun, 2014). This result signified that China’s 
private media companies were no longer in a weaker position, and that satellite TV 
broadcasters and independent content providers started to build cooperative relationships. In 
addition, it was found that the success of this show also led to a new phenomenon, where an 
increasing amount of resources including personnel and funding was funnelled into private 
companies for the purpose of producing entertainment-oriented programmes that are popular 
with audiences and have a high commercial return. This move obviously stimulated the 
development in entertainment production. 
In addition to the rising prominence of private production companies from the late 2000s to 
the early 2010s, the rapid expansion of digital media also accelerated the evolution of the 
Chinese television industry (Keane, 2015: 13). The new players in the television market 
included various online content providers, such as Youku, iQiyi, LeTV (i.e. the Chinese 
equivalent of YouTube). The advent of these online video sites – lots of them formed their 
Internet companies later – has profoundly changed viewing practices, moving a large part of 
the audience away from the television screen with rich database of serials, galas, and news 
programmes (ibid.:146). As Keane (2015: 146-147) has noted, the online video world was 
initially loosely regulated, but starting from December 2007, new legislation was implemented 
 
11 Canxing Productions (Canxing Zhizuo), full name Shanghai Canxing Cultural and Broadcast Company, was 
founded in 2010 as a subsidiary of Star China Media Corporation, a joint venture of Twenty-First Century Fox and 
China Media Capital. But in 2014, Twenty-First Century Fox sold its minority stake in the broadcaster Star China 
TV to China Media Capital, making the latter owner of Star China TV. See Williams (2014).  
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to both deal with copyright issues triggered by privately held online video websites and extend 
domestic ideological control online. In 2013, the State Council announced plans to merge 
SARFT with the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) and form a new 
State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT).12 The 
amalgamation of these two regulatory bodies was intended to streamline the licensing of any 
content-related products and services, and hence the SAPPRFT is considered the ‘ultimate 
content gatekeeper’ responsible for the approval of many aspects of production, including 
issuing and revoking permits (Keane, 2015: 14).  
In recent years, online video sites, each having established their own production divisions13 
or relying on parent company’s production company (e.g. Tencent Pictures), began investing 
in the creation of original programmes and selling them to TV stations. The participation of 
these Internet companies in content production has greatly changed existing patterns and 
hierarchies in film and television production. Previously, large media corporations held 
financial and human resources and hence dominated production; but ever since the Internet 
companies joined the market and opted to cooperate with small-sized production units, those 
small production groups and well-known directors-led team have been able to absorb quality 
social resources and grow bigger (Zhang, 2018). To better regulate the practices of the 
Internet companies, in 2017, SAPPRFT issued a censorship guideline through the China 
Association of Online Audio-visual Programming Services (Zhongguo Wangluo Shiting Jiemu 
Fuwu Xiehui). The guideline detailed the basic rules of making online audio-visual 
programmes and insisted on ‘correct’ political, aesthetic and social value orientation in these 
programmes (Xinhua, 2017). Basically, the production and release of Internet-broadcast 
programmes must go through a similar censorship mechanism as productions for TV 
broadcasting. It can be argued that in recent years, the control applied in the online video 
productions has echoed Xi Jinping’s above-mentioned initiatives of regulating the cyberspace.  
 
3.2.2 The reconciliation between political supervision and commercial interest 
We have seen that market-oriented television reforms opened up space for private media 
companies (including online content providers) to take part in the creation of TV programmes. 
At the same time, the government has constantly issued regulations to ensure the ‘correct’ 
political, social and cultural orientation of these cultural products, thereby maintaining the 
 
12 SAPPRFT was abolished in March 2018. A newly established National Radio and Television Administration 
(NRTA) began overseeing the movie and television industries. For consistency and clarity in writing, I continue to 
use the old and best-known name, SARFT, to refer to the governing body of the television sector. 
13 For instance, LeEco (a Chinese multinational conglomerate corporation established in 2011 on the basis of 
Le.com, formerly LeTV) launched Le Vision Pictures (leshi yingye), a private film production company dedicated 
to the production of entertainment, film and TV drama.  
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ideological function of television within the Party’s propaganda work. As a result, Chinese 
television producers have to reconcile market rules with political supervision. To explain how 
they manage to do so, I look at the reality of Chinese television programming.  
As maintained by Anthony Fung (2009: 181), there has been a dual system of television 
programming in China following the market reform: first, the core programmes explicitly 
planned for nationalistic and other political purposes; and second, entertainment programmes 
inspired by globally popular genres. As Fung goes on to note, the former are a more orthodox 
format, featuring the theme of the ‘main rhythm’ (also known as ‘main melody’ or ‘mainstream 
melody’, to be discussed in the following section) programmes – historical or modern dramas 
with a very positive national and didactic theme; these programmes have a monopoly on prime 
time. Outside that timeslot, television stations are quite free to amuse the audience with a 
variety of entertainment programmes (ibid.). Prime time in Chinese TV broadcasting is better 
known as the ‘golden time slot’ (huangjin shijian), lasting from 7 to 10 pm and conventionally 
consisting of two parts. The first thirty minutes – namely from 7.00 to 7.30 pm, sometimes 
extendable when major events take place – are crucially important, because the central 
television uses this timeslot to broadcast its flagship programme News Bulletin (Xinwen lianbo) 
on CCTV-1, and all provincial satellite TV channels are required to transmit this programme 
simultaneously as well. After the news programme, most television stations broadcast TV 
dramas from around 8 o’clock. Fung’s observation is largely helpful in that he notices varied 
degrees of political supervision for different timeslots and TV genres.  
Yet, it is worth noting that not all prime-time TV programmes have an explicit propaganda 
purpose or didactic tone. Commercial interests and entertainment are also taken into 
consideration in TV programming. Directors and producers of national television stations have 
developed their own programming strategies because this timeslot has not only political but 
also enormous economic significance. In general, prime-time programmes in China, as in 
other countries, have the largest audiences, which bring in profitable advertising revenue. 
Nevertheless, another significant aspect is that varying degrees of political supervision are 
found at different levels of television stations, which enables television producers to balance 
state interests and commercial interests. In particular, CCTV-1, as the flagship channel of 
China Central Television, falls under direct supervision of the SARFT, receiving the highest 
degree of supervision from the Party’s Central Propaganda Department. By contrast, regional 
television stations are run by local SARFT bureaus and supervised by the local branches of 
the Propaganda Department. Compared to CCTV-1, provincial satellite TV producers 
‘generally have greater scope for negotiation and a higher degree of freedom’ (Zeng and 
Sparks, 2019: 55; see also Wang, 2002). This differentiation is best exemplified by the case 
of Hunan TV. Producers in Hunan TV have preferred to explore new formats and genres in 
prime-time programmes, by either developing them in-house or borrowing experiences from 
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abroad, in order to attract larger audiences (see chapters 5 and 9). As noted earlier, provincial 
satellite channels were encouraged to brand themselves to target niche audiences for better 
engaging in national competition. But Hunan TV has often outright transgressed the state’s 
guiding rules. Their entertainment-oriented experiments have frequently drawn criticism from 
the central broadcasting authorities for an ‘excessive tendency towards entertainment’ (guodu 
yulehua) that provided ‘unfavourable values’ for young audiences (see Sina News, 2018). 
Therefore, this television station has constantly had to revise their programming strategies, 
specific content or language in programmes, as demanded by the authorities. In contrast with 
Hunan TV, most Chinese television makers deliberately avoid producing problematic 
programmes at the most profitable timeslot, and seek to negotiate with various agencies on 
safe ground.14  
The reasons why regional-level television producers can have extra negotiating space are 
that, on the one hand, ‘the standard of censorship is not fixed’ (Zeng and Sparks, 2019: 62).  
Producers generally follow the basic political criteria and use their professional knowledge to 
try out creative ideas; if the supervising authority – senior staff in most cases – finds anything 
sensitive (politically, culturally or socially), the producers will make revisions accordingly and 
present more acceptable material. On the other hand, the supervising authorities allow a 
degree of flexibility as long as the political bottom line of upholding the Party’s legitimacy to 
rule is not challenged. The fundamental reason lies in the fact that, the central government is 
simultaneously pursuing the two conflicting aims of promoting the development of television 
as well as cultural industry and maintaining ideological conformity in entertainment (ibid.:65).  
Therefore, we can find multidimensional negotiations among TV producers, advertisers, 
supervising bodies, as well as programme participants and audiences. In this sense, Chinese 
television practitioners are by no means passively taking orders from above but acting as 
‘cultural mediators’ and actively seeking to transform institutional constraints (Bai, 2012). This 
observation conforms to Imre’s findings (2016) about the television producers of former state 
socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly their negotiations between 
satisfying viewers’ wishes to be entertained and broadcasters’ political missions to educate 
and propagandise. To sum up, although Chinese television stations have to operate within 
state-sanctioned discourses, television producers still have plenty of room to navigate, 
seeking to achieve both professional objectives and commercial aspirations.   
 
14 As Zeng and Sparks (2019) suggest, the reason why Hunan TV producers were able to convince their provincial 
government (Hunan province) in extending the limits is that Hunan TV makes a big economic contribution to its 
province and hence has more economic, and possibly discursive power. However, this argument is based on the 
view of an insider working at Zhejiang Satellite TV (a competitor of Hunan TV), and thus may not include all 
possible explanations. It nevertheless indicates that there is always room for negotiations between television 
producers and the governing bodies in China. For further details about the operation of Hunan TV, see chapter 
5.  
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3.3 Making the mainstream in the era of popular culture  
The shift in the Party line from class struggle to economic development has not only 
facilitated the transformation of Chinese television in the economic sphere, but also led to a 
series of changes in the socio-cultural sphere, notably the formation of popular culture in the 
1990s, which then gave rise to contemporary Chinese television entertainment culture. From 
the above analysis, we have found that the organising principles of Chinese television were 
not only about totalitarian control, but also stressed the development of the cultural industry. 
Of the latter aim, television entertainment has formed a crucial part, whilst being intertwined 
with the commercial interests of television stations seeking for advertising revenues. In this 
section, I examine the cultural context of the evolution of Chinese television, taking into 
account both internal and external factors. After this, I pay special attention to the political 
significance of television entertainment in China and the promotion of the ‘mainstream melody’ 
works by the Party-state as cultural propaganda.  
 
3.3.1 The formation of popular culture in China 
As noted by Chinese media scholar Yin Hong (2004), the defining feature of the Chinese 
cultural sphere in the reform era was the emergence of popular culture. Prior to that, during 
the Mao-era, the cultural sphere was characterised by the political enthusiasm for class 
struggle. From the late 1970s to mid-1980s, there emerged an ‘enlightenment culture’ 
featuring intellectual-led, critical reflections on the previous era, humanitarian thoughts 
deriving from such reflections, and urgent aspirations for Western civilisation. As a contrast, 
from the mid-1980s onward, neither the political enthusiasm nor the intellectual enlightenment 
could compete with the wave of popular culture. As Yin (ibid.: 38-41) argues, five factors 
mainly contributed to the formation of China’s popular culture. First and foremost were the 
economic reforms, which provided the basic driving force. The shift towards market orientation 
and profit in the cultural sector has transformed cultural production to a simple mode of 
economic practices in exchange for profits. As a result of this process, it was the cultural tastes 
and consumption power of the masses rather than those of the elites that shaped cultural 
production.  
Secondly, the formation of an urban culture since the 1980s has provided the necessary 
condition for the emergence of popular culture. When purging class enemies was no longer at 
the focus of people’s everyday routines, living an abundant, happy life seemed to be more 
pertinent. At the same time, the advent of easily accessible mass media gave the growing 
population in the cities more opportunities to develop a shared urban culture. This was, of 
course, enabled by the third important factor – electronic media including audio-visual ones. 
These media forms, represented most effectively by television, excelled in providing moving 
images to attract a large audience who need not have literacy skills. Consequently, those who 
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previously could not understand elite culture were now able to satisfy their own cultural needs. 
The fourth factor noted by Yin was the loosening of ideological control in the cultural field. As 
we have seen from the political context discussed in the first section, the new ideological line 
of the 1980s required ‘literature and art [to] serve the people and serve socialism’. This slogan 
allowed for the ‘pluralism’ of the development of Chinese culture, and the emergence of 
popular culture was even treated as an achievement of the socialist ‘spiritual civilisation’. The 
last contributing factor to the formation of popular culture was the rise of a mass consumption 
society in China. According to Yin (ibid.: 37), popular culture is fundamentally a consumer 
culture, because the former is a cultural form that provides satisfaction to the public’s aesthetic 
and entertainment needs in exchange for profits. In this regard, the consumer society that 
evolved around a commodity economy and in turn endorsed the ‘commodification’ of cultural 
works, provided a conducive social environment for China’s popular culture.  
Due to these factors, China’s cultural sector entered an era of popular culture in the 1990s, 
which indicated both a weakening of political or enlightenment culture and the rising 
importance of mass audiences. In this popular culture, the political and cognitive functions, 
educative and aesthetic components of the culture have given way to entertainment and 
consumption. Yin (ibid.: 33-34) further observes that what popular culture offers the audience 
are merely beautiful illusions which do not involve any profound thinking but aim to create 
excitement, pure enjoyment and a kind of cultural game. In the self-contained texts of such 
cultural games, any conflicts rooted in real life are turned into binary oppositions, and all social 
and historical experiences are simplified into dramatic plots that focus on ‘conflict and 
resolution’. To consume such cultural texts, the audiences only need to follow the storyline, to 
experience the simplicities of binary oppositions such as love and hatred, success and failure, 
life and death, and afterwards receive a sense of satisfaction when all conflicts are resolved. 
Hence the consumption process is not much of a cognitive experience or intellectual activity, 
but an entertainment activity seeking for symbolic satisfaction. Yin also notes that these 
characteristics of China’s popular culture resemble many of the characters of the ‘culture 
industry’ described by Horkheimer and Adorno in the book Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972), which highlighted the large-scale, standardised production 
of cultural goods driven by a logic of consumption. While Yin’s articulation of popular culture 
has reflected this elitist concern over the potentially negative impact of popular culture on the 
human society, it nevertheless has predicted some of the key features of contemporary 
China’s television entertainment culture, notably the increasing pursuit of audiences’ 
consumption and enjoyment of TV programmes.  
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3.3.2 The political significance of Chinese television entertainment 
It was from the late 1980s that Chinese television gradually replaced books and films and 
became the most influential mass medium in China (Yin, 2002; Zhu, 2008; Zhong, X., 2010). 
Television has also become the primary carrier and transmitter of popular culture and hence 
an important means of popular entertainment. Although watching television for entertainment 
values was not a novel thing either in the 1980s or early 1990s, it was not until the late 1990s 
that television entertainment became institutionalised in China (Bai, 2005: 3). This was largely 
because the market-oriented restructuring of the media system provided institutional 
conditions and commercial models to justify entertainment activities. Prior to the 1990s, the 
term ‘entertainment’ (yule) was barely used. Instead, the political authorities spoke of ‘literature 
and art’ (wenyi) to refer to aesthetic and leisure activities. For this reason, wenyi has another 
important political function apart from providing amusement for the public, which is ‘uplifting 
the public’s aesthetic sensibilities or unifying the nation under the Chinese Communist Party’s 
rule’ (ibid.: 4). In this sense, ‘literature and art’ seems more associated with the political and 
elite culture mentioned earlier – belonging to a kind of socialist ‘high culture’ and having an 
educative or enlightening function, whereas ‘entertainment’ comes as a product of popular 
culture, deriving from and catering for the cultural tastes of the masses.  
Taking the general features of popular culture and its difference with other types of culture 
into account, it is not difficult to understand the new phenomena that have emerged in Chinese 
television programmes since the 1990s. As Bai (ibid.: 2) observes, the boundary between 
entertainment and traditionally non-entertainment programmes is increasingly becoming 
blurred: in news programmes, dramatic storylines and human interest angles were often 
integrated in news reporting; in weather forecast programmes, visually appealing female 
presenters were shown making erotic gestures and voices; the appearance of TV commercials 
became frequent between TV programmes; and various entertaining shows, games and TV 
serial dramas began taking up much of the broadcasting time. In one word, the makers of TV 
programmes began to value their consumption functions, by means of creating sensational 
material to attract audiences in exchange for advertising revenues. Bai (2005) attributes this 
trend of television entertainment primarily to the commercial forms of operation adopted by 
those television stations. This is largely true, if we understand China’s contemporary television 
entertainment culture as part of the market reform, and particularly as a result of the 
restructuring processes since the late 1990s. However, aside from these internal factors, we 
should also pay sufficient attention to the external influences that came with China’s opening 
to the West, as well as to other regions and countries all over the world. 
The trend of television as entertainment started to become prominent along with Chinese 
television’s growing international contact and exchange activities with the outside world from 
the 1980s onwards. As Hong (1998: 60-69) has summarised, China largely increased its 
51 
 
television programme importation ‘not only in volume and speed but also in substance and 
scale’ in the reform period, which resulted in a surge of imported education and entertainment 
programmes, such as English-language education programmes from Britain, TV series and 
entertainment shows from the US, Japan, Hong Kong and Brazil. Among these programmes, 
the most popular genres were Western television serials. Noticeably, the international and 
transregional importation was marked by a change in the provenance of imported content over 
time: while Western countries became a major resource for Chinese television stations in the 
1980s, recent decades have seen a rise of imports from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and 
South Korea (Zhu, 2008: 99). The popularity of foreign TV programmes led to a marked growth 
in the domestic production of entertainment content. As noted by Michael Keane (2002a; 
2008), Chinese television’s engagement with entertainment programming went through a 
stage of copying foreign formats and genres without permission, and then moved from 
imitation and adaptation of international TV programmes to recent attempts of creating original 
content in order to develop overseas sales. In this process, popular TV programmes of either 
Western or East Asian origin provided Chinese television producers with both ready-made 
formats and creative inspirations (discussed in further detail in chapter 9).  
Yet the influence of external factors on the broadcast content of Chinese television should 
be understood in the light of domestic transformations in Chinese politics, economy and class 
structure. Especially since the ‘institutionalisation’ of China’s television entertainment in the 
late 1990s, the cultural industry has increasingly demonstrated a tendency to please urban 
consumers. Whereas the entertainment TV programmes of the 1990s were seen targeting a 
general public regardless of specificities, television entertainment in the next two decades has 
shown greater awareness of market segments differentiated by social class and gender. For 
one thing, the Party-state started articulating a new form of citizenship alongside the promotion 
of the cultural industry in the early 2000s – the middle class, which is ‘endowed with high 
cultural capital and the power to consume’ (Anagnost, 2008: 499). A growing middle class was 
considered helpful to social stability. Echoing this official discourse, television programming 
was increasingly designed to celebrate the lifestyle and to satisfy the cultural tastes of the 
urban middle classes (Zhao and Wu, 2014). For another, new television genres, represented 
by the so-called ‘pink dramas’ (fenhong dianshiju) that depict the cosmopolitan lifestyle and 
interpersonal world of urban consumers, were created for urban young female professionals 
with consuming power (Keane, 2005; Zhu, 2008: 94). Therefore, it is evident that Chinese 
entertainment TV programmes have become further commercialised and target-specific since 
the new millennium. Being granted more creative freedom, Chinese television producers 
ceaselessly experimented with new formats and genres by means of both borrowing from 
abroad and relying on self-innovation. An inevitable consequence of this trend of television 
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entertainment was the highlighting of the middle-class culture, along with an emphasis on 
consumption as a key element of citizenship.  
The commercial trend in the cultural field quickly drew the attention of the government. As 
discussed in chapter 2, entertainment media have the potential to shape the political opinions 
and behaviour of the public. The government of China has long realised this point. They are 
particularly concerned with the political significance of popular cultural genres such as films 
and TV dramas. In order to instruct on the content production, government officials coined the 
term ‘mainstream melody’ (zhuxuanlü, also known as ‘main melody’, or ‘main rhythm’) to refer 
to cultural works that directly embody the Party’s will. It was generally believed that this term 
was first introduced to filmmakers at the 1987 National Conference for Cinematic Production, 
and promptly taken up by propaganda and cultural departments, the literary establishment 
and television producers (Zhang, 1994, cited in Keane, 1999: 254). At the commemorating 
ceremony of the CCP’s seventieth birthday in July 1991, Jiang Zemin further clarified the 
official definition of mainstream melody works, emphasising the positive direction of these 
works which must reflect the spirit of the socialist era (Conceison, 1994: 193). While this 
definition remained vague and ambiguous, Keane (2002b: 124) explains that mainstream 
melody works are supposed to convey what the political authorities consider as important to 
the people and to offer a positive social message. In principle, the socialist mainstream melody 
work ‘defines itself against those commercial products by promoting nationalism, collectivism 
and socialism to its audiences’ (Hong and Xu, 2018: 309). The advantage of making such 
programmes are evident. They receive financial support from the government and have 
designated distribution channels. The government seeks to ensure that mainstream melody 
TV dramas are broadcast on China Central Television and provincial satellite TV channels at 
evening prime time (Yin, 2002). Moreover, government awards are frequently given to 
mainstream melody films, documentaries and TV dramas, as a gesture of state approval.  
For the cultural workers, to produce mainstream melody works is no easy task. On one 
hand, as mentioned earlier, the official guidelines to cultural works are generally abstract, so 
that the producers need to rely on their interpretation of the Party’s will and their professional 
knowledge to create such works. On the other hand, the comparatively conservative, didactic 
messages embedded in mainstream melody works are not necessarily what audiences like. 
When the central authority imposes its own content preferences upon producers, following the 
official requirements may thus lead to a loss in profits (Hong and Xu, 2018: 309). Even under 
such difficult conditions, cultural producers in China have cultivated a method to mitigate the 
conflict between commercial and political interests, especially in recent years, when 
independent production companies joined in the production of mainstream melody works. 
Knowing more about market conditions, they attempted to repackage propaganda using 
commercially successful elements, including depictions of non-traditional anti-heroes, the 
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integration of greater complexities into plots and characterisations, as well as Hollywoodised 
creative strategies such as popularised political narratives and myth-making (Ma, 2014; Hong 
and Xu, 2018: 311). According to Yu Dong, founder of China’s prestigious production company, 
Bona Film Group Limited, the integration of commercial components with mainstream melody 
works must consider three key elements: famous actors, production techniques and 
experienced production teams (Zhang, 2018). It should be noted that in the recent decade, 
not only have the production methods progressed, but the topic of mainstream melody 
narratives has greatly diversified, incorporating not only traditional themes such as the 
revolutionary history of the Party, but also more realistic themes that reflect the contemporary 
life of ordinary Chinese people. Nevertheless, they are still created to promote the mainstream 
political and ideological goals such as patriotism, nationalism and loyalty to the Party-state. 
In sum, the prevalence of popular culture has empowered the audiences in terms of shaping 
the cultural products that meet their demand of entertainment. This bottom-up approach has 
seemingly challenged the Party’s control over content production. However, as Brady (2008) 
has insisted on, the Party-state is agile in capturing various new conditions and updating its 
propaganda strategies. Facing the increasingly commercialised cultural sphere, it has 
‘rejuvenated its capacity, via the market, to affect the agenda of popular culture’ (Wang, 2001: 
71). Such efforts include the promotion of mainstream melody works. To engage with the 
production of these works, Chinese cultural producers have to strike a fine balance between 
presenting mainstream melody spirits and satisfying popular cultural tastes.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined the changing political, economic and cultural context in 
which the transformation of Chinese television took place. In the post-1978 period, along with 
the shifting focus of the Party line from class struggle to economic development, there have 
been dramatic changes in the television sector: the first is the development of a television 
industry, owing to the establishment of a market economy, domestic technological 
advancement, and exchange of TV programmes and broadcast techniques with the outside 
world; the second aspect features the growing commercialisation in television production and 
consumption, which was facilitated by the triumph of the television entertainment culture from 
the late 1990s. Through these changes, Chinese television has departed from its role as a 
propaganda instrument and evolved into a multi-functional industry that needs to balance the 
Party’s purpose of using television for ideological guidance, the producers’ creative freedom 
and obligation to make profits, and the audiences’ demand for entertainment. By and large, 
the production of TV programmes has changed from a top-down, one-way model to a multi-
way system that involves a negotiation between political and commercial interests.  
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These changes in the last four decades, generally termed the marketisation of Chinese 
television, ostensibly suggest a decline in the Party’s ideological control or even a ‘de-
politicisation’ of the television. But if we explore the dynamics of the marketisation of Chinese 
television, we immediately find that the whole process was proceeding under the close 
guidance and supervision of the Party-state. In fact, after a short period of ideological 
relaxation in the 1980s, the Party-state has strengthened its control of the media from the early 
1990s onwards, and has proactively promoted its own agenda of socialist construction that 
essentially involves an emphasis on nationalism, patriotism and collectivism. These findings 
conform to Sun and Zhao’s (2009: 98) observation of Chinese media transformation, which 
they characterise as ‘an ambiguous and paradoxical process’ that has witnessed the 
progressive applications of neoliberal strategies on the one hand, and the continuing and 
indeed intensified (re)articulation of China’s socialist legacies on the other. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to point out the long-established socialist traditions pervading in the transformation 
of Chinese television, and to emphasise that there is no clear-cut boundary between the 
political missions and entertainment functions with regard to Chinese television. In the next 
chapter, I propose a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to examine TV 
dramas, a popular genre with great political significance, so as to shed light on the dynamics, 
conflicts, negotiations and continuities of Chinese television. 
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Chapter 4  
Methodological Approach: Quantitative and Qualitative  
Analyses of Chinese TV Dramas 
 
In previous chapters, we have seen the continuing influence of socialist traditions in the 
transformation of Chinese television. Central to this influence is the CCP’s ongoing emphasis 
on the propaganda mission of Chinese television, which is set to promote the Party-desired 
socialist values, such as nationalism, patriotism, collectivism, as well as the need to embrace 
a market economy and consumerism. In the transformation, we have also noted the tension 
and negotiation between the political use of television and the aspirations for more creative 
freedom and entertainment productions. This situation shapes both the form and content of 
Chinese television programmes. From this chapter onwards, we begin taking a closer look into 
the dynamics and content change in Chinese television programming, so as to facilitate a 
thorough and timely understanding of the status of and transformation in Chinese television.  
To this end, I use this chapter to describe the methods I employ for the goal of giving a 
systematic micro-analysis of the nuanced changes in television content. Specifically, I propose 
an approach that combines quantitative and qualitative methods to examine TV dramas, a 
popular genre in China with great political significance. The advantages of combining 
quantitative and qualitative research are readily demonstrated by the benefits that such mixed 
methods research can offer: the combination of quantitative and qualitative research is able 
to triangulate or illustrate findings deriving from one approach, to offset the weakness of 
quantitative or qualitative components, and to bring out a more comprehensive account of the 
area of inquiry (for more information of the ways in which the two approaches are combined, 
see Bryman, 2012: 633-634). Building on the strengths of mixed methods research, this 
project aims to answer two sets of research questions:  
1) What are the subtle changes and possible continuities in television content, as a result 
of the negotiations between propaganda and entertainment; 
2) Why have these changes or continuities occurred?  
In order to address these questions, this project first employs a quantitative content analysis 
to delineate long-term trends in a particular genre of television programmes (in this case, TV 
drama), and facilitate the sampling of cases for in-depth qualitative investigation. Secondly, 
drawing on the selection of TV dramas based on the quantitative findings, these qualitative 
case studies will provide a more detailed and intensive understanding of the transformations 
that have occurred in Chinese television over the sample period. In the following parts of this 
chapter, I first introduce the reason why I have chosen to analyse TV dramas and highlight 
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the significance of this genre in the Chinese context. Next, I discuss the quantitative and 
qualitative methods adopted in this project, including sampling strategies, data collection and 
analytical procedures. This chapter then concludes with a reflection on the strength and 
limitation of mixed methods research. 
 
4.1 Researching Chinese TV dramas: A politically significant genre 
As the goal of this project is looking into the nuanced changes and continuities in television 
content, which are viewed as the result of the ongoing negotiations between propaganda and 
entertainment, the research object must be TV programmes reflecting both purposes. Hence, 
any analysis should focus on a popular genre that has the potential to entertain viewers but 
also has a political obligation that is tied to the purpose of educating and influencing the people, 
either explicitly or implicitly. By this measure, TV news and current affairs are excluded, as 
they are normally loaded with explicit political messages and didactic undertones. Furthermore, 
it is in general less likely that audiences choose to watch daily news for amusement – although 
this does not rule out the possibility that entertainment elements are increasingly seen in news 
programmes, and that some audiences indeed watch soft news as part of their entertainment 
activities. For similar reasons, Chinese entertainment TV shows, reality-based documentaries 
and lifestyle programmes are not ideally suited to this analysis because they usually do not 
have a clearly defined political mission in their content and production. Compared to these TV 
programmes, China’s domestically produced TV dramas, especially those broadcast at prime 
time by central and provincial TV stations, are demonstrably of greater importance in balancing 
propaganda, pedagogical and entertainment considerations. 
It should be emphasised that Chinese TV dramas show similarities to and also noticeable 
differences from TV dramas in other contexts, particularly the Western context. With respect 
to narrative forms, Western TV dramas are often classified as either TV series or serials. 
Television series adopt a narrative mode that has a narrative closure concluding the main plot 
at the end of each episode (Corner, 1999: 57). By contrast, a television serial conventionally 
has a complete storyline that unfolds from the first episode and develops throughout the whole 
serials, with a cliffhanger at the end of each episode, which requires audiences to watch all 
episodes in order to follow the story (Dunn, 2005). According to this differentiation, Chinese 
TV dramas, particularly those broadcast during evening prime time, are mostly serials 
(lianxuju), running daily from Monday to Friday (sometimes to Sunday) and then continuing 
through the following weeks until the last episode. A TV serial broadcast in the early 1990s 
normally contained twenty to thirty episodes on average, but this number has risen to over fifty 
episodes in recent years, owning to improved production abilities and increased budgets. 
These TV dramas have continuous narratives from one episode to another, a fixed group of 
characters and a closed storyline. What is distinct about Chinese TV dramas is their production 
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and distribution context. As with other TV programmes, the production and distribution 
processes are subject to strict censorship procedures. A TV drama script has to pass an initial 
proposal review by the afore-mentioned SARFT, so as to move on to the production stage; 
after that, the complete TV drama needs to go through an ‘end-product’ check by the SARFT 
again, so as to receive a distribution license (Zhu, 2008: 11). Even after the drama begins 
broadcasting, the State Administration retains the right to take it off the air, if the programme 
is believed to run counter to the official ideological line.  
The significance of Chinese TV dramas is twofold. First, Chinese TV dramas have enjoyed 
large viewership and long-lasting popularity among Chinese audiences, regardless of their 
ages, educational levels and professions (Zhu, 2008), and for this reason Party officials 
believe that this narrative genre has noticeable ‘political significance and impact’ (Yin, 2002: 
32). Second, the popularity of the TV dramas in China provides a profitable and stable market 
to the industry, and hence an indispensable resource for television entertainment. As noted 
by Keane (2005), serialised narrative techniques adopted by the dramas, their relevance to 
real-life experience and the development of characters and plots, are all key elements to 
attract and preserve audience interest. These advantages in turn form the basis of using TV 
dramas to facilitate Party propaganda and social education.  
This instrumental use of TV drama has been associated with the Party’s policies on 
television broadcasting in general, and on drama production in particular. Chinese TV drama 
has been involved in the grand project of constructing socialism since the first day it was 
produced. The first TV drama, A Mouthful of Vegetable Cake (Yi kou caibingzi, 1958), was a 
single-episode play created to promote the official agenda on saving food, and hence has a 
noticeable function of political education (Zhu, Keane and Bai, 2008b: 4). After a period of 
turbulence in television broadcasting caused by the Cultural Revolution, more TV dramas in 
the reform era are believed to have incorporated propaganda messages. Relevant examples 
include Yearnings (Kewang, 1990), which represents the effort of the Party to reconstruct 
socialist moral standards (see Rofel, 1994, and chapter 8 of this thesis). Some historical-
political dramas are also highlighted by scholars (Zhu, 2008; Bai, 2008; Bai, 2014) for their 
contribution to the legitimisation of the Party’s leadership, by either envisioning an ideal image 
of political leaders or directly depicting the Party’s devotion to addressing social issues. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, Party elites began promoting the so-called ‘mainstream melody works’ 
from the late 1980s, including TV dramas as above in order to navigate popular entertainment 
productions towards the direction desired by the Party. Mainstream melody TV dramas, either 
reflecting the revolutionary history of the Party or representing the contemporary socialist good 
life, make up the majority of the prime-time TV dramas aired on national TV channels, 
including central TV channels such as CCTV-1, and provincial-level TV channels like Hunan 
TV.  
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As noted in chapter 3, national broadcasters have worked on developing their unique 
programming strategies since the early 2000s, in order to secure an advanced position in the 
national TV market. This suggests that the dramas selected and broadcast by these TV 
stations will be indicative of different extents of political supervision, commercial 
considerations, as well as different concessions to audience interests. In the next two sections, 
I will elaborate on how I selected TV dramas for quantitative and qualitative studies, and detail 
the analytical methods I have used.  
 
4.2 Quantitative content analysis  
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the first research question is designed to map 
the long-term trends and patterns in television content through a systematic investigation of 
prime-time TV dramas. Quantitative content analysis is useful for quantifying messages and 
identifying the trends, patterns and changes within them (Neuendorf, 2002), which makes it a 
good option to deal with the first research question. The statistical results generated by this 
method can reveal the evolution and dynamics of the content of TV dramas, which will help 
infer the relations between television dramas and the wider political, economic and cultural 
contexts – thereby addressing the second research question outlined previously.  
For the quantitative content analysis, the aim is to examine how Chinese prime-time TV 
dramas have disseminated the messages desired by the Party as part of the duty to fulfil the 
propaganda function of television, and at the same time have committed to providing 
entertainment. Given that different levels of TV stations might adopt varying programming 
strategies, and that entertainment production has become an irresistible trend in the recent 
production and consumption of Chinese television, the overarching question can be split into 
specific sub-questions: 
• Do TV dramas broadcast by different TV stations demonstrate different patterns and 
how do these differences map onto differing political and economic positions within the 
Chinese TV system (e.g. between those channels that have a more commercial 
orientation and those that have the strongest ties to the Chinese state)? 
• Do certain TV channels with ties to the central government display more explicitly 
political content than provincial ones? 
• Is there a trend indicating an increase in entertainment production? 
 
4.2.1 Sampling strategies 
The prime-time TV dramas for the quantitative study were sampled from CCTV-1 and 
Hunan TV. Following the overview of Chinese television in chapter 3, it is obvious that these 
two TV channels are both run by state-owned national broadcasters, subject to two 
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interlocking supervision systems – the Party’s ideological control and government regulation, 
but operate as enterprises that seek for advertising revenue. They are both satellite TV 
channels whose TV programmes can reach the cohort of national audience from the same 
geographical location in mainland China. Also, as noted in chapter 3, the main differences 
between the two TV channels lie in the varying degrees of political supervision of their content 
production and their respective branding strategies. As the flagship TV channel of the central 
television, CCTV-1 has been the main site of facilitating the Party’s propaganda work. By 
comparison, Hunan TV has sought to build its brand by featuring entertainment production 
ever since it was founded in 1997. Based on this distinction, the two TV channels are supposed 
to have different imperatives in selecting programmes for evening prime time. To sample 
prime-time TV dramas from each thus provides an opportunity to examine how the supposedly 
different programming strategies have led to varying dynamics, tensions and compromises 
between television propaganda and entertainment.  
The sampling period starts on 1 January 1992 and ends on 31 December 2017, for the 
purpose of conducting a long-term investigation. I have taken 1992 as the starting point 
because the socialist market economy was officially established in this year. Since then, the 
marketisation process has initiated the formation of a double identity of Chinese television as 
both a politicised mouthpiece and a player on the economic market. Although such a transition 
was not immediately effective, scholars generally consider 1992 to have been ‘a dividing point 
in the Chinese reform movement’, which included media reform (Winfield and Peng, 2005: 
256). As Hunan TV was not launched until January 1997, the starting date for sampling Hunan 
TV dramas is set on 1 January 1997, so as to reflect the long-term change on this TV channel 
since the first day its programmes went on air.  
To map the whole picture of the trends and patterns, the sample included all prime-time TV 
dramas aired on either channel during the respective sampling periods. Documentary series 
were excluded from this sample, due to the consideration that this project only investigates 
TV dramas that deal with fictional stories or artistic representations of non-fictional people and 
events. Following this strategy, I collected the titles of TV dramas in the sampling dates from 
China TV Guide (Zhongguo dianshibao, published by China Central Television) during my 
field trips to China. Although there are occasional discrepancies between the schedules 
printed on the TV guide and programmes broadcast in real time, these are not of a scale to 
undermine seriously the validity of the research sample. 
 
4.2.2 Units of analysis 
The complete sample consists of a total of 1018 prime-time TV dramas from the two TV 
channels. In this sample, each TV drama is treated as a unit of analysis. It should be noted 
that a majority of these units are long drama serials containing more than ten episodes. 
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However, there also appeared a small number of mini serials (less than ten episodes) and 
one-episode dramas among the sampling units, particularly in the 1990s. This was due to the 
limited production capacity at that time. To produce mini serials and one-episode dramas was 
more feasible for Chinese TV producers than to make long drama serials. Hence the former 
two genres filled in a great proportion of the evening prime-time slots before 1998. However, 
from 1998 onwards, both CCTV-1 and Hunan TV tended to broadcast only long serial dramas, 
such as the 44-episode TV serial Yongzheng Dynasty (Yongzheng wangchao), aired on 
CCTV-1 in 1999.  
 
4.2.3 Coding scheme  
Each drama is coded in terms of a number of features, such as the broadcasting platform 
(CCTV-1 or Hunan TV), main theme, producer, period setting of the drama etc. Among the 
variables listed above, I am particularly interested in the themes. What theme each TV drama 
is centred on largely predicts what function the TV drama is expected to fulfil. For instance, 
Keane (2005) observes that Chinese television entertainment in the twenty-first century has 
incubated new popular drama genres which centre on interpersonal relationships. According 
to this observation, it is possible to presume that dramas revolving around love and romance 
are dedicated to entertainment purposes, whereas dramas dealing with explicitly political 
issues, such as the Chinese revolution led by the CCP, are produced primarily for 
propagandistic purposes.  
To identify the theme of TV dramas, I drew on SARFT’s categorisation of domestic TV serial 
dramas (SARFT, 2008). This official categorisation is provided for national TV producers, 
when they prepare to submit a TV drama script for an initial review by the SARFT. This 
categorising method involves two dimensions of categories – period setting and main theme. 
The first dimension measures the historical setting of each drama, according to their narrated 
historical period: 
1. Contemporary era (dangdai) – from the economic reform in 1978 to present 
2. Modern era (xiandai) – from the founding of the PRC in 1949 to 1978 
3. Republican era (jindai, from Xinhai Revolution in 1911 to 1949) 
4. Ancient times (gudai, before Xinhai Revolution) 
The second dimension measures the main theme of dramas. In this categorisation, dramas 
are differentiated in terms of the subject matter represented by them. For instance, dramas 
depicting the development of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the modern era 
(1949-1978) are labelled ‘military themes in the modern era’ (xiandai junlü ticai); dramas 
reflecting the development of people’s life in rural areas since the reform era are labelled ‘rural 
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themes in the contemporary period’ (dangdai nongcun ticai). There are also other categories 
to describe the main theme of dramas, such as ‘love and romance’, ‘family’ etc., which are 
listed below. Among these themes, there is a unique category labelled ‘important theme’ 
(zhongda ticai). This category specifically refers to the politically important theme prescribed 
by the SARFT, namely the revolutionary history of the CCP. Therefore, in my categorisations, 
I integrated the ‘important theme’ of the revolution with other themes identified from the official 
guideline, and retained ‘period setting’ as a separate measurement. Main themes include: 
1. The revolution led by the CCP before the founding of the PRC 
2. Military development – reflecting the development of Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) 
3. Rural life – the construction and development of the rural/remote areas in China  
4. Biopics of role models recommended by the CCP, including political leaders, Party 
members, and other important historical figures 
5. Love and romance – focusing on romantic relationships and courtships 
6. Family – reflecting family ethics and the relationship between family members 
7. Children/student life – focusing on school education and the growing up of children  
8. Crime – including anti-corruption drama and cop drama 
9. Economic reforms – reflecting enterprise reform and entrepreneurship in the post-1978 
era 
10. Dynasty drama set in the imperial courts of ancient China 
11. Martial arts  
12. Other  
However, as Bryman (2012: 297) maintains, ‘while such categorisations are often relatively 
straightforward, when the process of coding is thematic, a more interpretative approach needs 
to be taken.’ This would require the analyst to ‘probe beneath the surface’ so as to make 
judgements (ibid.). In my case, each drama usually contains more than one theme – one might 
be dominant and others subsidiary. For instance, while some TV dramas are devoted to the 
representation of the revolutionary history, they also have a focus on depicting love and 
romance among the revolutionaries, which seems equally important for the storyline (see 
chapters 6 and 7). In such cases, in order to minimise the uncertainty about which category to 
employ, each drama was assigned to two categories according to the primary or secondary 
theme demonstrated by them. For other variables in this content analysis, the reader can find 
a full version of the coding schedule and coding manual attached in Appendix 1. 
All data were processed using a computer programme – SPSS. While quantitative content 
analysis has often been criticised for only providing descriptive information, it nevertheless 
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offers clear trends and propositions regarding the patterns embedded in the text of TV dramas. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, the two TV channels have their own preferred themes 
when selecting dramas: the theme of love tops the prime-time dramas on Hunan TV, whereas 
CCTV-1 has screened a considerable amount of dramas concerned with revolution. These 
findings, discussed in further detail in chapter 5, have provided useful guidance to the selection 
of TV dramas for case studies.  
 
4.3 Qualitative case studies 
In order to provide an intensive and extensive analysis that could take us beyond a 
schematic overview of long-term trends, I have adopted qualitative case studies. The method 
of case study is especially useful in analysing the relationship of a phenomenon and its context 
(Yin, 2003). In this sense, while the quantitative analysis of TV dramas has provided evidence 
to capture the general trends, changes and patterns, the qualitative case studies aim to give 
in-depth analyses that cover the content, production and reception of selected TV dramas. 
Specifically, I approached to each case with a central focus on the relationship between 
aspects of plot and characterisation and their relations to the prevailing socio-political context 
of the times they were produced in. This was supported by a range of textual analysis 
techniques (e.g. narrative analysis) and approaches additionally used where of particular 
relevance to specific programmes (e.g. soap opera and gender approaches in the love and 
romance dramas). Key questions included the representation of propaganda messages, and 
the utilisation of popular elements and entertainment formulas in the programmes. Similar to 
the quantitative content analysis, the case studies were conducted in a comparative approach, 
in an attempt to identify continuities and changes over time. 
 
4.3.1 Case selection 
First, the selection of cases drew on the quantitative findings. As will be shown in more 
detail in chapter 5, the quantitative analysis has identified two prominent themes in prime-time 
TV dramas – love and revolution, which represent two important directions of Chinese 
television propaganda and entertainment in the last twenty-six years. The theme of revolution 
can best embody the propaganda imperatives of the Party, in the sense that dramas depicting 
the revolutionary past are expected to contribute to the legitimacy of the Party’s rule over 
China. On the other hand, love-themed dramas reflecting the interpersonal relationships 
between lovers have been viewed as an essential part of television entertainment. In these 
regards, I selected two sets of TV dramas having either revolution or love as their dominant 
main theme. What needs to be emphasised is the possibility that, as noted in the previous 
section, a TV drama representing the revolutionary history may also incorporate extensively 
romantic plots as one of its narrative threads. This situation precisely conforms to the 
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phenomenon identified in chapter 2, which entails the intertwining process of propaganda with 
entertainment (see chapters 6 and 7).  
The second criterion for case selection is periodisation. I roughly divided the sampling 
period into three periods of time: 1992-2002, 2003-2012, 2013-2017; and then selected one 
TV drama with the main theme of revolution or love from each of the three periods. The three 
phases were established in relation to the leadership transitions and hence to different Party 
lines; also, the three periods mirror the paramount leaderships of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and 
Xi Jinping. As outlined in chapter 3, the period from 1992 to 2002 saw rapid development of 
the market economy and the emergence of its associated social issues; the period 2003-2012 
featured the propagation of a socialist harmonious society and a resurgence of Chinese 
traditional culture, particularly Confucianism; from the end of 2012 to present, the official 
ideological line has been oriented towards realising the ‘Chinese dream’ of national 
rejuvenation. These changes in the political context have set the backdrop for China’s media 
reform in general, and for the transformation of Chinese television in particular. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to explore whether TV shows produced in different periods demonstrate distinct 
temporal features.  
Aside from the factor of political change, the years around 2002 and 2012 also marked 
important moments of media change. By 2003, most provincial-level television stations had 
transformed into media conglomerates, for better engaging in transnational competitions after 
China's admission to the WTO. In the domestic TV market, the fierce competition forced 
provincial satellite TV channels to develop branding strategies and find their niche markets. 
Following this change, the production and distribution of TV dramas from the early 2000s, 
became more profit-driven and entertainment-oriented than before. A decade later in the early 
2010s, online streaming services had begun to severely affect traditional TV consumption. TV 
sets were no longer the only platform for watching TV content. More audiences flocked into 
online streaming platforms for all kinds of programmes. Consequently, competing for audience 
attention had become a top priority for all national TV stations and their producers, which 
further intensified the trend of commercialisation and entertainment. Given these changes in 
the media sector, choosing dramas from different periods is also important to understand the 
nuanced dynamics of television production and consumption.  
The third criterion for case selection is representativeness. The dramas selected have 
received either official recognition or widespread popular interest. I refer here to two 
prestigious Chinese TV drama awards – the Feitian Award, a government award granted by 
SARFT, and the Jinying Award, which is based on audience votes. It should be noted that 
from 2000 onwards, the Jinying Award came to be jointly organised by the Chinese Federation 
of Literary and Art Circles, the government of Hunan Province, SARFT’s Hunan bureau, 
Hunan TV, as well as other supervisory bodies. This indicates that the decision on Jinying 
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Awards is eventually the result of a negotiation between official expectations and audience 
preferences. Nevertheless, the Jinying Award to a great extent reflects the popularity of TV 
dramas. There are also some dramas which did not garner Jinying Awards but were very 
popular with wider audiences. I also included these, as indicators of audience interest.  
Based on the above discussion, I have selected eleven TV serial dramas for in-depth case 
studies (Table 4.1). It should be noted that the English titles included in this table are the ones 
used by the producers, distributors, programme schedulers, etc. Some of them might not be 
the best translation, e.g. War of China’s Fate – a more accurate translation of the Chinese title 
would be ‘Decisive Battles over China’s Future’. However, considering the former has already 
been used for international promotions and appeared in International Movie Database (IMDb), 
I decided to use the best-known English names.   
 
 Revolution Love 
CCTV-1 Hunan TV CCTV-1 Hunan TV 
1992-
2002 
War of China’s 
Fate (Zhongguo 
mingyun de 
juezhan, 199915) 
N/A Holding Hands 
(Qianshou,  
1999) 
Women in Beijing 
(Beijing nüren, 
2000) 
2003-
2012 
Eighth Route 
Army (Balujun,  
2005) 
Struggles in an 
Ancient City 
(Yehuo chunfeng 
dou gucheng, 2005) 
My Youthfulness  
(Wo de qingchun 
shui zuozhu,  
2009) 
Meteor Shower: 
Season 2  
(Yiqi youkan 
liuxingyu, 2010) 
2013-
2017 
On the Taihang 
Mountains 
(Taihangshan 
shang, 2015) 
The Disguiser 
(Weizhuangzhe, 
2015) 
My Year of 1997  
(Wo de 1997,  
2017) 
The Interpreters 
(Qin’ai de 
fanyiguan,  
2016) 
 Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3 Case Study 4 
Table 4.1: Eleven TV dramas for in-depth case studies 
 
As we see from this table, there are only two dramas featuring the theme of revolution on 
Hunan TV, respectively selected from the latter two periods, 2003-2012 and 2013-2017; no 
revolutionary drama comes from the first period (1992-2002). This is due to the limited number 
of revolutionary dramas aired on Hunan TV during this period. Of only four dramas regarding 
the revolution between 1997 and 2002, two had been previously broadcast by CCTV-1, and 
 
15 The year enclosed in the brackets represents the year the programme was premiered on relevant TV channels. 
Besides, the Chinese names of the TV dramas are also included here for readers’ information.  
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the copies of the other two are not available to track. Hence, I decided to skip the first period 
and only focus on the latter two periods.  
These eleven TV dramas are either award winners or hit dramas with high viewing ratings. 
The viewing ratings were retrieved from information released by CSM Media Research – a 
specialised company dedicated to TV and radio audience research in mainland China and 
Hong Kong.16 While these cases are representatives of successful TV productions blessed by 
the government, critics and/or audiences, they also belong to a large number of prime-time 
TV dramas watched by Chinese audiences every day. None of them triggered government 
censorship or was forcefully taken off the air. It is reasonable to say that these programmes 
have been running in politically sanctioned discourses. In this sense, a qualitative study of 
them can provide insights into the sanctioned content of Chinese television throughout the last 
twenty-six years. The general information of these TV dramas (including the director, 
production year, original work, adaptation information, storyline etc.) will be given in empirical 
chapters 6-9. Meanwhile, readers can also find a filmography attached in Appendix 2.  
 
4.3.2 Analytical procedures 
The analytical methods in the case studies combine narrative analysis procedures and 
propaganda analysis, facilitated by not only the textual information of the programme, but also 
a variety of secondary sources that offer insights into the relationship between the texts and 
their production and reception context. Particularly, I wish to identify the ideology and meaning 
embedded in the texts of TV dramas, thereby establishing links between aspects of plots and 
characterisation and the dominant political and cultural contexts in which the dramas were 
created.  
The case studies aim to inquire into how a prime-time TV drama fulfils the multi-dimensional 
purposes of satisfying the state, making profits and entertaining the audience. There are four 
case studies in total, encompassing all eleven TV dramas selected (as in Table 4.1): the first 
case is concerned with revolutionary dramas aired on CCTV-1 (chapter 6); the second case 
study works on revolutionary dramas broadcast by Hunan TV (chapter 7); the third one looks 
at love-themed dramas on CCTV-1 (chapter 8); and the last case study is about examples of 
the same genre on Hunan TV (chapter 9). 
For each case study, I started from a narrative analysis of the basic structural elements in 
the TV dramas: characters. I paid attention to different types of characters (e.g. protagonists, 
antagonists, third parties etc.), analysing how their actions drive the plot and inform the 
 
16 CSM Media Research, commonly known as Yangshi suofurui, is a joint venture mainly co-funded by CTR Market 
Research (Yangshi shichang yanjiu) and Kantar Media. It provides real-time rating information for mainland 
Chinese television stations, and these data are sometimes published and retrievable at mainstream websites in 
China, such as Sina Entertainment (Xinlang yule).   
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audience about certain messages. As Vladimir Propp (1984) noted in his Morphology of the 
Folktale, character actions and the function of these actions serve as the basic units to tell a 
story. Analytical concepts from structuralist narratology, e.g. Lévi-Strauss’s binary-opposition 
model, were also used to analyse different types of character. But unlike the structuralist 
approaches that focus more on the text, I intended to establish connections between the text 
and the wider context. As stated by Fulton (2005: 110), characters in TV serials are normally 
modelled on particular types of people existing in reality, so that an analysis of their behaviour 
and action can shed light on the social context and their position within the society. In this way, 
the analysis of characters and plots would serve as a springboard to access more information 
with regard to the political purpose, commercial consideration and institutional strains 
associated with a TV programme.  
In principle, the narrative analysis was conducted for the purpose of facilitating propaganda 
analysis. Hence, the analytical focus was on the ideological function of characters and plot. 
Through an interpretation of the ideological dilemmas encountered by the characters and their 
choices, I would be able to identify the meaning embedded in this particular representation, 
thereby inferring the messages disseminated by the producer or the propagandist. For 
instance, I am interested in the way a Communist leader was portrayed in order to draw 
empathy from the audience; I am also attentive to details where special techniques were used 
to maximise the effect, such as the increased proportion of depicting the human side of political 
leaders in the TV drama (more details in chapter 6).  
Certainly, propaganda analysis cannot work well without making reference to the contextual 
factors outlined in chapter 3. For each case study, I extensively drew on secondary information 
from various news media, websites, online databases, official documents, as well as important 
yearbooks, so as to explain the particular development of plot and characters. In addition to 
identifying potential propaganda purposes in the drama, I also worked on teasing out temporal 
changes and/or continuities in narrative forms and showing their links to the trend of popular 
entertainment. Besides, I applied some analytical methods from gender studies and literature 
on other TV genres to my case studies, in an attempt to map out the influences of various TV 
genres and popular formats on Chinese TV dramas (see my discussions on soap opera and 
gender dimensions in chapters 8-9).  
In sum, the four case studies were grounded in China’s political, economic and cultural 
transformations over the last few decades, aimed for connecting specific TV programmes to 
the uniqueness of the period in which they were produced. The corresponding four chapters 
are not isolated from each other, but rather are organised in a comparative way and with a 
historical perspective in mind. This means in the case studies, I not only compared the 
differences between the two TV channels in broadcasting the same theme, but also examined 
the development in the narrative forms of one theme within the three periods discussed above. 
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While much focus was given to the differences and changes in TV dramas, I was also attentive 
to similarities and continuities. In so doing, I would be able to demonstrate where the enduring 
emphasis of the socialist-style Chinese television lies.  
 
4.4 Conclusion: Strengths and limitations of mixed-methods research 
In this chapter, I have highlighted the two research questions of this project, illustrated the 
importance of analysing Chinese prime-time TV dramas, and introduced the methodological 
approaches. Because the research questions examine two dimensions, one concerned with 
the changes and continuities in Chinese TV dramas on the textual level, the other in relation 
to contextual settings, I have opted for a mixed-method investigation which comprises a 
quantitative content analysis and four qualitative case studies. The content analysis aims to 
quantify prime-time TV dramas aired on CCTV-1 and Hunan TV from 1992 to 2017, in an effort 
to identify key trends and patterns embedded in the main themes of the dramas. The 
quantitative findings invite a closer inquiry into the internal dynamics between production, 
representation and consumption, and the four qualitative case studies of eleven TV dramas 
have been designed for this purpose.  
The advantage of this research design is that, as mentioned at the outset, mixed methods 
can compensate for the limitation of using one approach. In this project, qualitative case 
studies can provide more evidence to support and explain the results generated from the 
quantitative content analysis. At the same time, the quantitative findings also provide a 
rationale for selecting cases for the in-depth case studies. Overall, the two approaches 
contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the transformation in Chinese prime-time TV 
dramas throughout the last two decades and a half.  
However, it is important to acknowledge that ‘mixed methods research is not intrinsically 
superior to mono-method or mono-strategy research’ (Bryman, 2012: 649). Especially when it 
comes to the consumption of time and resources, mixed-methods research runs the risk of 
investing lots of time and efforts while getting unrelated results. To avoid situations like this, I 
had to make sure that the process of data collection and analysis only served to answer the 
research questions, so as to prevent from wasting time in searching or processing 
unnecessary information. Besides, employing mixed methods in a project would also confront 
the question of how to best integrate the quantitative and qualitative findings. Rather than 
separating the two components, as suggested by Bryman (ibid.), the researcher is expected 
to make them speak to each other throughout the project and bring the findings together. To 
tackle this issue, I have managed to present and discuss my quantitative and qualitative 
findings in an interrelated way in the following chapters and particularly the concluding chapter.  
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Chapter 5  
Revolution and Love: Two Prominent Themes 
on Prime-time Chinese Television 
 
In this chapter, I present and discuss the findings of my quantitative content analysis. The 
key importance of the content analysis is to chart change and continuities over time, so as to 
demonstrate the evolvement of Chinese television from a micro perspective. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, I sampled prime-time TV dramas broadcast on CCTV-1 and Hunan TV 
from 1992 to 2017, and treated each specific TV drama, regardless of the number of episodes, 
as a unit of analysis. Hence in this chapter, the central question is how the content of these 
dramas has changed over the sampling period. In delineating the trends and patterns in 
television dramas, I also seek to make a temporal comparison between the two TV channels, 
and then map the findings against the complex framework of television propaganda, education 
and entertainment in China. In the following parts of this chapter, I first highlight the differences 
in the political and economic positions of the two TV channels and thus predict the possible 
trends in their programming strategies. This is followed by a presentation of the quantitative 
findings, with a special focus on the annual patterns of revolution- and love-themed dramas. 
Next, I draw on the theoretical and contextual information outlined in chapters 2 and 3 to 
explain these findings, and as a conclusion highlight the necessity of conducting in-depth case 
studies.  
 
5.1 CCTV-1 VS Hunan TV: Political, economic positions and programming  
From previous discussions about the structure of Chinese television system and its recent 
commercialisation, we find that different levels of TV stations have varying degrees of freedom 
to pursue commercial interests, even though ideological supervision and government 
regulation are always in place. In such situations, negotiations between the political interests 
of the Party-state and the commercial interests of TV stations constantly occur as part of the 
day-to-day routines of Chinese TV practitioners, which may lead to shifting programming 
strategies and affect the delivery of television content. Based on this observation, I have 
compared the content of TV dramas on two different levels of national broadcaster – CCTV-
1, the central, and Hunan TV, the regional, to shed light on the nuances and complexities 
within Chinese television system. Before turning to the results of content analysis, I first outline 
the unique political and economic positions of the two TV channels, thereby providing 
hypotheses on their potential differences in programming.  
 
5.1.1 CCTV-1: A political apparatus and government enterprise  
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As noted in chapter 3, CCTV-1 is the flagship channel of China Central Television, placed 
under direct ideological supervision of the state administration and the CCP’s Central 
Propaganda Department. Hence it is positioned first and foremost within the political apparatus 
of the Party-state, set at the forefront of serving the Party’s national propaganda work. This 
means that market reforms within CCTV-1 must be carried out in an extremely careful manner. 
As recalled by Yang Weiguang, former director of CCTV, in the early 1990s, even attaching a 
TV commercial to News Bulletin was no easy task, running the risk of being criticised for 
commercialising serious news programmes (Zhu, 2012: 29).  
Yet in recent years, this situation has changed significantly due to the powerful influences 
from marketisation in nearly every aspect of Chinese society. As mentioned in chapter 3, 
market reforms at CCTV in the early 2000s nurtured a series of specialised CCTV channels 
working on a typical commercial modus operandi: they are allowed to purchase non-news 
programmes from the national TV market; and the broadcasting of TV programmes is financed 
through advertising revenue. That said, CCTV operates not only as a political institution but 
also as a government enterprise: specifically, CCTV’s business and commercial activities are 
managed through its wholly owned commercial entity, China International Television 
Corporation (CITC). The market-oriented units of CCTV have formed several subsidiaries of 
CCTV/CITC, including a listed company, China Television Media Ltd (CTM) (Zhong, Y., 2010). 
But it should be noted that this listed company, while jointly owned by many investors including 
China Agriculture Bank, China Foreign Trade Trust etc., is placed at the bottom of CCTV’s 
organisational hierarchy and thus does not have any chance to intervene into the operation of 
CCTV channels (ibid.: 655).  
Obviously, what has been excluded from the commercial operation system were CCTV’s 
news centre and public service units. These latter components are fully owned by the Party-
state; and the production of news programmes is still closely controlled by the government, 
continuing to serve the traditional propaganda and educational functions. CCTV has therefore 
transformed into a mixture of ‘a commercial entity and a state-controlled national network with 
a cultural mandate’ (Zhu, 2012: 38). However, despite the frequent measures of ‘separating 
production and broadcasting’ within the television sector, the boundaries between ownership 
and operation, between public service and market-oriented sectors have remained blurry at 
CCTV until the present day (ibid.: 33). For this reason, the cultural tastes and interest of 
CCTV’s audiences also remained largely subordinate to the state’s interests and priorities.  
Compared to news programmes, the selection and broadcasting of prime-time TV dramas 
generally confront less political constraints, yet still need to avoid transgressing the official 
ideological line. The ground rule of selecting prime-time dramas for CCTV-1 is that the chosen 
programmes must promote the mainstream melody, spread positive social views and embody 
the socialist core values (Liang, 2015: 10). This means, these programmes have to meet the 
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criteria of the afore-mentioned ‘mainstream melody dramas’. Although such requirements still 
seem vague, CCTV producers have managed to make programming plans several years in 
advance, which estimate the amount and approximate broadcast time of several politically 
important themes (ibid.). These themes closely coincide with national commemoration days, 
such as the founding anniversary of the CCP. The programming schedule released 
beforehand is aimed at attracting qualified drama productions from within the industry. Apart 
from these ‘customised’ TV dramas for specific political purposes, CCTV-1 also transmits 
other themed dramas during prime time, such as historical dramas set in imperial China and 
romantic themes.  
Since CCTV-1 continues to be characterised as the mouthpiece of the Party-state, one 
would expect that dramas aired on CCTV-1 are heavily associated with propaganda purposes 
by showcasing large amounts of politically relevant dramas. At the same time, Chinese media 
scholars (e.g. Bai, 2005) have also noted that while the trend of popular entertainment is 
sweeping through the Chinese television system, CCTV-1, arguably the least entertainment-
oriented channel, has started developing promotional strategies to attract more audiences, 
such as moving the scheduled broadcast time for prime-time dramas to earlier time slots, as 
well as purchasing and producing audience-favoured genres. In this case, it is reasonable to 
explore whether such promotional strategies adopted by the CCTV have also been reflected 
in the changing pattern of broadcast content. Based on these hypotheses, the first set of 
questions regarding CCTV-1 are elaborated as follows: 
(1) Are dramas broadcast on CCTV-1 more likely to contribute to political 17  agenda-
setting, by representing a considerable amount of politically relevant content? 
(2) Among the TV dramas on CCTV-1, is there a trend indicating an increase in audience-
favoured themes that are not explicitly propagandistic? 
 
5.1.2 Hunan TV: A ‘real commercial’ broadcasting system 
As discussed in chapter 3, Hunan TV, as a provincial satellite TV channel and part of the 
Hunan Broadcasting System (HBS), is subject to the regulation of the Provincial Radio TV 
Bureau in Hunan and receives ideological guidance from the provincial branches of the Party’s 
Propaganda Department. Hence in comparison to the Central Television, it is only remotely 
 
17 In the field of political communications, there has been a growing academic interest recently in extending the 
range of ‘politics’ – which was conventionally associated with public affairs, into the private sphere, such as 
feminist theorists’ argument that ‘the personal is political too’ (Blumler and Gurevitch, 2005). However, it should 
be noted here, the ‘political’ agenda mentioned in this thesis refers to issues falling into the conventional 
definition of the political realm, such as the promotion of socialism and nationalism, the justification of 
government policies, etc.  In chapter 8, I will discuss in further detail how the private sphere in the Chinese TV 
dramas has also been linked to the socio-political issues in the public realm.   
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supervised by state-level governing bodies. Besides, when this satellite TV channel went on 
air in 1997, entertainment immediately became the key element in its branding strategy 
(Keane and Zhao, 2015). It is thus less likely to be tied to national political missions. These 
aspects have prepared conditions for Hunan TV to adopt a model of utterly commercial 
operations.  
Indeed, the economic interests of Hunan TV have been placed at the heart of its operation. 
Similar to CCTV-1, the market-oriented business of Hunan TV is managed by a designated 
media company, Hunan TV & Broadcast Intermediary Co Ltd (HTBI). However, where this 
operational model differs from CCTV-1 is in the relationship between Hunan TV and HTBI, a 
company that has been listed on the Shenzhen Exchange since 1999. As mentioned earlier, 
CTM, the CCTV-controlled listed company has extremely limited access to CCTV content. By 
contrast, HTBI controls and manages all core business of Hunan TV, notably content (esp. 
drama) production and trading (Zhong, Y., 2010: 661-662). Although the largest share of HTBI 
belongs to the Provincial Radio TV Bureau, a majority of the stock (56.51%) is owned by other 
commercial investors which theoretically have the power to ally against the interests of the 
provincial government bureau (ibid.: 659-660). This ownership structure of Hunan TV 
suggests that government control of this TV channel needs to make more room for commercial 
interests, and thus far less prominent than that in CCTV-1. Therefore, Hunan TV has been 
identified as ‘a real commercial television broadcaster in communist China’ that has nation-
wide reach and influence (ibid.: 666).  
The reason why Hunan TV is allowed to adopt such a flexible operational model, whilst 
comparatively less bounded by political control, is generally believed to relate to the geo-
economic status of Hunan province (Zhong, Y., 2010; Huang, 2006). This province is located 
in the less-developed area of southern-central China, and thus its TV station is permitted extra 
autonomy to conduct an experiment with wholesale marketisation, so as to contribute to the 
revenue of the state-owned broadcasting system, and more importantly, build a strong media 
group that can compete with foreign media flows (see Huang, 2006). 
In terms of content, Hunan TV places great emphasis on the commercial return gained 
through content innovation. As Ouyang Changlin, president of Hunan TV once noted, content 
innovation is the lifeline of Hunan TV (Zhu, 2012: 208). In order to create original programmes 
that can generate enormous commercial returns, Hunan TV has extensively borrowed foreign 
formats and TV genres, even though such efforts were often accused of infringing copyright 
(more details in chapter 9). Following this strategy, Hunan TV originated a series of highly 
popular entertainment TV shows in China, such as Happy Camps (Kuaile Dabenying, 1997-
present), Super Girls (Chaoji Nüsheng, 2005-2006). The success of Hunan TV not only lies in 
its creative spirit and commercial experiments, but also in the ways that these moves have 
shaped the directions of national television entertainment culture. Hence, Hunan TV is 
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arguably the pioneer of Chinese entertainment television, which makes it a strong competitor 
to CCTV-1 on the national TV market.   
The commercial strategy of Hunan TV has determined its mode of engaging the audience. 
Unlike CCTV-1, which has to prioritise the Party’s political imperatives, Hunan TV operates on 
the basis of the entertainment pursuits of the audience. In 2003, it further refined its branding 
and launched the project of ‘Happy China’ (Kuaile zhongguo), aiming to provide entertainment 
content specifically to the young generation across China. From then on, ‘youth, entertainment 
and the national market’ have become three important dimensions in their commercial 
considerations and programming strategies (Zhu, 2012: 204). 
In previous chapters, we have seen that Chinese television entertainment in the new 
century incubated new drama genres focusing on the cosmopolitan lifestyle and interpersonal 
relationships of the emerging urban middle class. Most of these TV dramas are particularly 
dedicated to young female audiences by depicting romantic relationships and emotional 
pursuits. Such romantic drama genres should be absorbed into Hunan TV’s programming 
strategy as a consequence of their popularity with the niche audience. On the other hand, 
Hunan TV does not operate in a vacuum. As mentioned in chapter 3, its experiment with 
commercial operations often draws criticism from Beijing regulators, which leads to constant 
revisions of programme content and the continuing exploration of new formats. Therefore, it 
is important to examine if and how this entertainment provider adjusts itself to the Party’s 
political control and propaganda imperatives. Here are the two questions associated with 
Hunan TV: 
(3) Are dramas on Hunan TV primarily centred on entertaining audiences by showing lots 
of romantic themes?  
(4) Are there any propaganda-related themes on Hunan TV; and if yes, how are they 
distributed on this TV channel? 
 
5.2 Sampling, coding and intercoder reliability  
As discussed in chapter 4, the sampling period for the content analysis starts from 1992 
which marked the starting point of the market-oriented reforms in Chinese media system. 
Moreover, since Hunan TV was founded in January 1997, the sampling on this channel 
commences from 1997. The key rationale for the sampling was to facilitate the analysis of how 
different levels of Chinese TV channels began to embrace the market in the post 1992-period, 
while at the same time coping with control from the political authorities.  
The sample included 574 prime-time TV dramas from CCTV-1 and 444 from Hunan TV. As 
introduced in chapter 4, each drama is treated as a basic unit of analysis; and the theme of 
the entire drama is my primary concern for coding and analysis. This is because the theme of 
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a prime-time TV drama largely determines what functions the programme is expected to fulfil. 
Drawing on the thematic categorisations given by the SARFT, in my coding process, I have 
identified eleven categories (see chapter 4 and below) to measure the theme of each drama. 
In order to assign the dramas into categories, I collected the basic information of the sampled 
TV dramas from relevant websites, TV Guides and newspapers. Based on the main 
description of each drama from these recourses, and also according to my own experience of 
watching those dramas, I was able to put the dramas into different categories of theme. It 
should be noted that each drama has had the opportunity to be assigned to two categories 
(coded twice), in accordance with the dominant and subsidiary theme demonstrated in the 
drama. When there was no clearly secondary theme in the drama, it has been coded once. 
For instance, dramas depicting the revolutionary struggles led by the CCP were put into the 
category ‘revolution’; in the meantime, if the revolutionary drama involved depictions of 
protracted military conflict, as well as the development of the CCP-led army, it was also put 
into the category of ‘military development’. By and large, most of the dramas falling into the 
latter group were about the People’s Liberation Army in the post-1949 era.  
Furthermore, ‘rural life’ referred to dramas reflecting the development of rural areas in China, 
mostly set in the countryside. The category ‘role model’ was for those biographical dramas 
with a real-life figure as its central character, in which his/her good deeds or historical 
achievements were highly praised by the Party-state. ‘Love and romance’ referred to dramas 
adopting a large amount of romantic plot and revolving around the romantic entanglements 
between the leading characters. Family dramas focused on family ethics and relationships in 
domestic settings. In the event that love dramas involve extensive depictions of family relations, 
and family dramas show abundant depictions of the romantic love, these dramas were coded 
twice and put into both the two categories.  
Next, dramas reflecting children’s life and their schooling experience were labelled 
‘children/student’. The category ‘crime’ included both anti-corruption drama and cop drama. 
The theme ‘economic reform’ referred to the dramas (gaigeju) displaying enterprise reform 
and the emergence of entrepreneurship in the post-1978 era. ‘Dynasty’ drama – also known 
as wangchaoju, or gongtingju – is a specific drama genre with the story set in the imperial 
courts of ancient China. This term is interchangeable with ‘historical period drama’, or 
‘costume drama’, but the Chinese TV genre has its period setting specifically tied to the feudal 
times in Chinese history and features emperors and empresses. The last theme ‘martial arts’ 
was used to describe dramas having martial arts as their central plot and main selling point. 
Most of the martial-arts dramas (wuxiaju) in this sample adopt the form of costume drama and 
are set in a past time period.  
For the purpose of evaluating the reliability of this categorisation, an inter-coder reliability 
test was conducted on fifty-five dramas randomly extracted from the sample. This subset was 
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coded twice by me with a two-month interval. Krippendorff’s Alpha for two coders showed a 
high level of agreement for the variable ‘theme 1’ (dominant theme): 92.7%, α=0.918; and a 
comparatively lower level of agreement for the variable ‘theme 2’ (subsidiary theme): 83.6%, 
α=0.809. The latter was primarily due to the confusion about whether or not I should assign a 
secondary theme to some of the TV dramas. But overall, the results of the test have suggested 
the reliability of this coding.  
 
5.3 Key findings of the content analysis 
Following are two sets of analysis with regard to the distribution of these themes over the 
sampling period. As I will show in the analysis, I not only compare the distinct distribution of 
different themes on CCTV-1 and Hunan TV, but also delineate the trends and fluctuations of 
selected themes on a yearly basis, notably the themes of revolution and love. 
 
5.3.1 Distribution of different themes 
As Figure 5.1 shows, the first thing to note regarding the distribution of different themes is 
the strikingly high percentage of TV dramas with romantic themes, not only on Hunan TV 
(64.41%, n=286), but also on CCTV-1 (36.06%, n=207). 18  This finding already indicates that 
 
18 The percentage in Figure 5.1 was calculated on the basis of the number of themes appeared in TV dramas. For 
example, the number of love themes counted from Hunan TV was 286, meaning that a sum of 286 TV dramas 
had the theme ‘love/romance’ against the total 444 prime-time dramas sampled on Hunan TV from 1997 to 2017. 
Hence the percentage for ‘love’ on Hunan TV shows 64.41%. In addition, because each drama might have more 
than one theme, the 268 love themes included the amount of both dominant and secondary themes. For further 
details about the number and percentage of themes, see Table 5.2 on the following page. 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of different themes on CCTV-1 and Hunan TV, 1992-2017 
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even though CCTV-1 is closely tied to the Party-state’s propaganda mission, it has still 
allocated the largest proportion of the prime time to broadcasting dramas with the theme of 
love and romance. This is at least consistent with the predominant function of TV drama, which 
is to entertain the audience using popular formats and themes.  
Despite this shared feature, differences in the distribution of the other themes are also 
evident. Table 5.2 shows the specific number and corresponding percentage of each theme 
on the two TV channels. Among the dramas broadcast at CCTV-1’s prime time from 1992 to 
2017, those depicting the revolution led by the CCP and the biopics of role models account 
for the second- and third-largest proportions – 22.13% (n=127) for revolution and 21.08% 
(n=121) for role models. Since these two themes are closely tied to the Party’s propagandistic 
agenda of commemorating the revolution and praising Communist role models, this result 
conforms to our expectations of the propagandistic use of this TV channel.  
In contrast to CCTV-1, the distribution of themes in Hunan TV prime-time dramas shows 
marked differences: apart from the romantic theme, the other two most prominent themes 
include ‘family’ and ‘dynasty’ (Table 5.2). This is to say, from 1997 to 2017, there have been 
23.20 percent (n=103) of the dramas focusing on family life, and 12.16 percent (n=54) of the 
dramas revolving around the struggles and conspiracies in ancient dynasties of China.  
 
Furthermore, revolution and role model dramas on Hunan TV have taken up much smaller 
proportions than those on CCTV-1, with only 5.18% (n=23) featuring the revolution and 1.80% 
CCTV-1 (1992-2017) Hunan TV (1997-2017) 
Themes in 
descending order 
n % n % Themes in 
descending order 
1 Love/romance 207 36.06 286 64.41 Love/romance 1 
2 Revolution 127 22.13 103 23.20 Family  2 
3 Role model 121 21.08 54 12.16 Dynasty 3 
4 Family 116 20.21 51 11.49 Crime 4 
5 Rural life 88 15.33 40 9.01 Martial arts 5 
6 Economic reform 82 14.29 37 8.33 Economic reform 6 
7 Military  69 12.02 23 5.18 Military 7 
8 Crime  55 9.58 23 5.18 Revolution  7 
9 Dynasty  36 6.27 11 2.48 Children/student 9 
10 Children/student 26 4.53 8 1.80 Role model 10 
11 Martial arts 7 1.22 5 1.13 Rural life 11 
Table 5.2: The number and percentage of themes on CCTV-1 and Hunan TV, 1992-2017 
(n= the number of times a theme appeared in TV dramas; up to two themes could be coded per drama) 
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(n=8) focusing on biopics of role models (Table 5.2). This result suggests that dramas showing 
clear propagandistic agenda – by either glorifying the revolutionary past of the CCP or praising 
the role models, have been among the least popular, and possibly least profitable themes on 
Hunan TV. Thus, it becomes evident that programming on this TV channel was mostly centred 
on providing light entertainment rather than disseminating political messages.  
The overall pattern in Figure 5.1 also shows that the percentages of different themes on 
CCTV-1 were comparatively evenly distributed – possibly for the purpose of balancing the 
needs for TV entertainment, Party propaganda and social education. By contrast, those on 
Hunan TV show an overwhelming preference of love themes, whereas proportions of other 
themes were considerably lower. It suggests that programming on this channel is more 
blatantly driven by the popularity and consequently, commercial values of TV dramas. 
 
5.3.2 Annual patterns of different themes 
The temporal comparison of trends shows a more complex picture. From the analysis above, 
we noted that the varying proportions of different themes were generally consistent with the 
differing political and economic positions of the two TV channels. In order to further highlight 
the contrast and potential similarities between CCTV-1 and Hunan TV over time, I have 
chosen the themes of revolution and love to conduct a longitudinal analysis. This comparison 
is also facilitated by the annual patterns of other prominent themes, such as role model, family 
and rural life on CCTV-1.  
As showed in Figure 5.3, the two trendlines suggest that love and revolutionary dramas 
aired on CCTV-1 have both seen a moderate growth in their yearly percentages before 2015, 
which implies that the proportion of other themes have declined correspondingly during the 
same period. This assumption is somehow supported by results in Figure 5.4, where we can 
see a downwards trend particularly in the themes of role model and rural life.   
In Figure 5.3, it is worth noting the relative dominance of love themes to ‘revolution’ in the 
period 1992-1997 and the period 2000-2009. This shows the popularity of love-themed 
dramas in both the two periods on CCTV-1. The high percentage of love themes in the first 
period can be linked to a genuine public interest in the dramas depicting the emotional life of 
people. As we shall see in chapter 8, such a fervour for love themes initiated from a 1990 
serial drama Yearnings (Kewang, also known as Aspirations), which was arguably the first 
Chinese domestic TV drama centred on the love experiences of ordinary people. The 
sensation caused by this drama has encouraged the production of many similar dramas in the 
early 1990s. The dominance of love themes between 2000 and 2009 suggested the continuing 
influence and great market potential of this popular genre, especially in the phase of market-
oriented media reforms. 
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Equally important in Figure 5.3 is the annual pattern of the revolutionary theme. Even though 
dramas with romantic themes accounted for larger proportions in most of the twenty-six years, 
the percentages of revolutionary dramas surpassed the former or saw a significant surge in 
certain years (i.e. 1999, 2005, 2010 and 2015). These dynamics precisely coincided with the 
Party’s propagandistic agenda of building nationalism and patriotism in these politically 
important years: 1999 was the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the PRC, and the years 
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Figure 5.3: Yearly percentages of love and revolutionary dramas on CCTV-1, 1992-2017 
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Figure 5.4：Yearly percentages of ‘role model’, ‘family’ and ‘rural life’ dramas on CCTV-1, 
1992-2017 
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2005, 2010 and 2015 respectively marked the sixtieth, sixty-fifth and seventieth anniversaries 
of China’s victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945, also known as Anti-
Japanese War and World Anti-Fascist War in mainland China). It thus becomes evident that 
CCTV-1 particularly preferred to broadcast large amounts of revolutionary dramas in these 
years, in order to contribute to both the Party’s propagandistic agenda and national 
commemorative events.  
Last but not least, in Figure 5.3 we can also find the collapse of ‘love’ then ‘revolution’ in the 
years 2016-2017. For revolutionary dramas, this periodic drop in their yearly percentages was 
not uncommon throughout the twenty-six years. Yet the vertiginous decrease in love themes 
might reflect a change in the programme strategy of this channel in recent years. Notably, as 
Figure 5.4 shows, the decrease in the themes of revolution and love from 2015 onward was 
accompanied by a mild increase in the percentages of role model and rural life dramas. This 
can be seen a consequence of the tightened media control, as well as government’s emphasis 
on the propaganda and educational function of central and provincial television stations in the 
2010s. 
On Hunan TV, the yearly percentages of revolutionary and love dramas have shown marked 
differences over the sampling period (Figure 5.5). The paucity of revolutionary content on 
Hunan TV relative to CCTV-1 is quite prominent. Despite the vastly different proportions, this 
graph also shows similar patterns to CCTV-1: there has been an overall upwards trend in the 
percentage of both love and revolutionary dramas over the sampling period. Besides, as with 
CCTV-1, during particular periods, notably in 2005, the percentage of love-themed dramas 
declined, whereas the proportion of revolutionary dramas increased. This fluctuation likewise 
indicated the influence of the propaganda imperatives set by the Party, even though Hunan 
TV has conventionally given priority to broadcasting romantic serials rather than political 
themes. After 2005, the percentage of love dramas returned to its previous high levels and 
correspondingly, the revolutionary theme went back to its low proportions.   
Yet, it is also noticeable that from 2010 onwards, dramas with love themes have seen a 
gradual decline in the annual proportions (Figure 5.5). Comparatively, there have been steady 
proportions of revolution-themed dramas broadcast on this TV channel throughout the 2010s. 
This dynamic also seems to relate to the increasingly tight political control over the media 
system during this period, and particularly to the criticism drawn by Hunan TV for its ‘excessive 
entertainment tendency’, as discussed in chapter 3. The change in the political and media 
context very likely had an impact on the programming strategies of Hunan TV and thus led to 
the adjusted proportions of different subject matters.     
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On the whole, the breakdown of the two themes by year has demonstrated an important 
common feature between CCTV-1 and Hunan TV, which reflects the difference between 
everyday broadcasting and particular programming strategies in politically important periods. 
Although the Communist revolution is possibly not an ideal programme type to help Hunan TV 
increase advertising revenue, this TV channel still attempted to broadcast small amounts of 
revolutionary dramas in order to comply with the Party’s propagandistic agenda – this trend 
has been especially obvious in the recent decade. By contrast, CCTV-1 has made more 
contributions to promoting the revolutionary achievements of the CCP throughout the 
sampling period. This pattern reflects the overall impact of the Party-state’s propaganda 
requirements on TV programming in the Chinese television system, though its effectiveness 
seems to vary from central TV channels to regional channels. Moreover, it is also evident that 
love dramas have become a long-lasting popular genre favoured by both the two TV channels, 
which has been demonstrated through the higher percentages of love dramas during most of 
the sampling period. Despite this, we have also noticed a downwards trend of love themes in 
the 2010s. In the next section, we turn to a detailed discussion of the quantitative results with 
reference to the background information outlined in previous chapters, so as to answer the 
questions listed at the outset of this chapter.  
 
5.4 Discussion: Differences and similarities between CCTV-1 and Hunan TV  
Prime-time television arguably occupies the most valuable time slot in a day for either 
recreational purposes or the timely indoctrination through political ideas. As the results 
presented above demonstrate, the two TV channels have utilised prime-time TV dramas for 
both purposes. To what extent did the two TV channels with varying political and economic 
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Figure 5.5: Yearly percentages of love and revolutionary dramas on Hunan TV, 1997-2017 
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agendas devote to the Party’s propaganda work and/or commit to providing entertainment? 
The comparative analysis above has demonstrated remarkable differences but also similar 
trends between CCTV-1 and Hunan TV.  
The most prominent difference lies in their programming orientations. This is demonstrated 
through the different proportions of variously themed TV dramas on the two channels. As we 
find in the statistical overview, CCTV-1 has tended to broadcast a larger number of politically 
relevant content (e.g. the CCP’s revolutionary history and role models to be emulated), 
whereas Hunan TV has given priorities to themes that were popular with the (young) audience 
(e.g. romantic love, family life, and conspiracies in imperial courts). These results confirm the 
hypotheses in relation to questions (1) and (3) in that CCTV-1 has proved to be the main site 
for Party propaganda, whereas Hunan TV has primarily been an entertainment provider.  
This differentiation between CCTV-1 and Hunan TV is not simply because of the divergent 
branding strategies adopted by these satellite TV channels or because of their different areas 
of specialisation. Rather, it reflects the impact of marketisation on the Chinese media system, 
as well as the varying degrees of political supervision and creative freedom that result from 
the negotiation between Party control and market forces. Hence, the above contrast between 
CCTV-1 and Hunan TV also embodies the contradictory transformation of Chinese television: 
the central government sought to boost the development of the Chinese television industry by 
making concessions to certain managerial and creative liberties, while also trying to maintain 
political control over the television sector (see Zeng and Sparks, 2019: 65). Besides, my 
findings have reflected the multifaceted functions of Chinese television in the post-reform era. 
Despite being a politicised propaganda tool, it can also entertain the audience, while at the 
same time generating enormous financial profits. This observation also resonates well with 
Colin Sparks’s (1997; 1998) analysis of the media systems in socialist Central and Eastern 
Europe, where loosened state control, advertising activities and more entertainment content 
were observed in the socialist media systems in the face of the influences from market reforms 
and foreign broadcast signals. 
The quantitative analysis also shows several common patterns and trends between CCTV-
1 and Hunan TV. The first similarity is the high proportion of love-themed dramas broadcast 
on both channels. Even though revolution and role models have been two prominent themes, 
taking up high percentages on CCTV-1, the percentages of love themes were remarkably 
higher during most of the period since 1992. Particularly, the annual breakdown of love dramas 
on CCTV-1 showed an overall increasing trend in their percentages. This suggests the 
consistent popularity of love themes since they were made in the early 1990s. These results 
have important implications not only in terms of the pressures placed upon CCTV-1’s 
producers by the market, but also for our understanding of the all-encompassing influence of 
popular entertainment culture in post-1990 China.  
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As noted earlier, the producers of CCTV-1 need to run the channel as an enterprise and 
make it more profitable, particularly through non-news programmes like prime-time TV drama. 
Aside from being politically correct, the content of CCTV-1 prime-time dramas must thus be 
attractive to the audience. Otherwise the viewing figures would decrease, which would 
potentially undermine the competitive strength of the central government’s medium. One 
important tactic to attract audiences is to incorporate entertainment content that offers 
excitement, enjoyment and satisfaction into the prime time. As discussed in chapter 3, China 
began embracing a consumer culture in the 1990s, wherein the political and educational 
functions of high culture have given way to the entertainment function that was widely 
accepted by the Chinese public. A key feature of this entertainment culture is its indulgence 
in enjoyment and provision of satisfaction. The love-themed dramas produced since the early 
1990s have shown much relevance to the real-life experiences of audiences, but represented 
them in dramatic forms based on binary conflicts between love and hatred, success and failure. 
This would provide audiences with symbolic satisfactions in terms of issues that could not be 
solved in real life. This function of the love-themed dramas thus precisely echoed the traits of 
contemporary entertainment culture. It also explains why TV dramas depicting the emotional 
life and romance, rather than those filled with propagandistic or educative content, were more 
likely to grab the audiences’ attention and resonate with them. Although from the findings 
above, we did see clear drops in the percentage of love themes on both channels in recent 
years, it was more likely affected by tightened political control rather than decreased audience 
interest in this subject. Therefore, these findings largely confirm the hypothesis in question (2): 
there was indeed a notable increase in themes favoured by the audiences (especially love) 
that are not explicitly propagandistic among the CCTV-1 dramas. 
The second significant similarity between CCTV-1 and Hunan TV is the changing pattern in 
the proportions of revolution-themed dramas over time. On both CCTV-1 and Hunan TV, we 
can spot occasionally sharp increases in the percentage of such dramas – and 
correspondingly, reductions in the proportion of love dramas. This was often the consequence 
of responding to the Party’s propaganda imperatives in certain, politically important years. For 
instance, in May 2005, the CCP Central Committee issued a notice on commemorating the 
sixtieth anniversary of China’s victory in the Anti-Japanese War (Renminwang, 2005). Apart 
from proposing to organise nation-wide ceremonies, themed exhibitions, and group visits to 
historical sites, the Party also required the media sector to showcase selected films, television 
programmes, and literary works, which centre on upholding patriotism and nationalism, 
promoting the significance of the victory of the Chinese people, and acclaiming the great 
historical achievement of the CCP in leading the Chinese people to victory. Thus, the 
broadcasting of abnormally large proportions of prime-time revolutionary dramas can be 
considered part of these celebrations. Similar commemorative events initiated by the Party’s 
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Central Committee were also prominent in 2015, when the country celebrated the seventieth 
anniversary of the victory. It is worth noting that, four revolutionary dramas in the following 
case studies were selected from 2005 and 2015 respectively.  
Furthermore, this similar pattern of responding to political influence also suggests that 
Hunan TV, a regional TV channel committed to providing entertainment content, likewise 
needs to align itself with the Party’s propaganda initiatives by showcasing explicitly 
propagandistic content, at least during the commemorative periods. This finding provides an 
answer to question (4). While Hunan TV has been granted a larger extent of autonomy, it is 
obliged to respond to the political control from Beijing regulators and meet the Party’s 
propaganda goals – otherwise it would trigger censorship and thereby disturb the normal 
running of this profitable TV channel. This reflects the bottom line of adopting a thorough 
commercial operation within the Chinese television system.  
At the same time, the contrast between everyday broadcasting and ‘festive’ programming 
during special commemorative periods has demonstrated distinctly socialist television 
temporalities, and hence bears a resemblance with the temporal features found in the socialist 
televisions of Central and Eastern Europe. As noted by Mihelj and Huxtable (2016), the rhythm 
of socialist festive programming was primarily tied to secular holidays, such as New Year, 
rather than religious holidays like Christmas. More prominently, festive programming was also 
a feature of politically important holidays that were specifically linked to the communist vision 
of history and progress, such as Red Army and Navy Day (February 23) and Victory Day (May 
8) in the Soviet Union (ibid.: 345). During these festivals, television schedules in the (former) 
socialist states were combined with a significantly greater proportion of programmes designed 
to commemorate the revolutionary achievements of the past and anticipate the glorious future 
(ibid.). As we find from the above quantitative results, similar scheduling practices have also 
been prominent in contemporary socialist China: while CCTV-1 and Hunan TV have both 
shown a long-lasting interest in broadcasting romantic themes at the evening prime time, they 
have also increased the proportion of revolutionary dramas in response to major state 
celebrations. Although this research does not provide a detailed analysis of the festive 
programming over a calendar year among Chinese television channels, the existing analysis 
nevertheless has shown the distinct temporalities of socialist TV, which were closely related 
to the political agendas of the party-state. In this regard, it is plausible to argue that the 
temporal preferences seen from Chinese television in many ways coincide with those of other 
(former) socialist television systems.   
Overall, the above comparative analysis between CCTV-1 and Hunan TV has suggested 
the different degrees of political control, commercialisation and freedom of production existing 
in the Chinese television system. Through the analysis, we find that Party control placed upon 
regional television stations, such as Hunan TV, is comparatively flexible, due to the increasing 
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pressures from market forces and, of course, due to the central government’s insisting on the 
development of the television industry. Yet, such a relaxation in Party control does not lead to 
a retreat of the Party-state from the television sector. Rather, as suggested by the case of 
Hunan TV, the precondition of extensively adopting commercial operations within Chinese 
television sectors is sticking to the bottom line of the Party-state by being subservient to the 
Party’s political needs. At the same time, we cannot ignore either the economic pressures on 
television practitioners or the power of popular entertainment in recent decades, which have 
largely enriched the programming of a widely-known mouthpiece – CCTV-1. Because of the 
continuing intertwining of Party logic and market logic within the Chinese media system (Zhao, 
1998), Party propaganda and popular entertainment, as embodied by the revolution- and love-
themed prime-time dramas, have become more than ever juxtaposed on Chinese television. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated the results of my content analysis, which delineate the 
proportions and annual trends in the prime-time TV dramas with various subject matters. 
Particularly, I have focused on two themes – revolution and love, because they are seen to be 
the most prominent themes across the entire sample. In the meantime, they represent two 
explicit orientations of television stations in relation to the tension between propaganda and 
entertainment. In so doing, I intended to map the programming of CCTV-1 and Hunan TV onto 
their distinct political and economic positions. The quantitative findings have fleshed out the 
intertwining process of Party propaganda and popular entertainment in television 
programming: while CCTV-1 has abided by its political mission by broadcasting large amounts 
of revolution-themed TV dramas, there has also been a trade-off between its political 
obligations and commercial interests; while Hunan TV has been granted more autonomy in its 
commercial operations, and its programming has primarily centred on providing audience-
friendly entertainment, it has also shown allegiance to the Party’s propaganda work by 
promoting nationalist themes during politically important commemorative periods.  
The quantitative findings thus not only offer a temporal comparison within the Chinese 
television sectors, illustrating varying degrees of political supervision, commercial operation 
and concessions made to popular entertainment, but are also helpful in linking the differences, 
similarities and changing patterns found from the two TV channels to the wider political, 
economic and cultural transformations taking place in China in recent decades. Furthermore, 
the results of the analysis also correspond to recent research on socialist television in Central 
and Eastern Europe, and I have noted intriguing similarities between Chinese television and 
other (former) socialist television systems.   
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However, the quantitative results only allow conclusions as to general trends and dynamics. 
They cannot reveal the nature of propaganda and/or entertainment messages delivered 
through TV drama. Besides, the quantitative analysis so far has been premised on considering 
revolution and love as two distinct indicators of propaganda and entertainment. This has ruled 
out the possibility that revolutionary TV dramas also have the potential to become 
entertainment by incorporating more entertaining elements in its narratives and promotional 
strategies, and the assumption that romantic dramas are sometimes injected with implicitly 
propagandistic meanings. As the quantitative analysis only tells us so much, we will turn to 
the qualitative case studies to further examine how the plot, characterisation and narrative 
forms of the selected dramas navigate between propaganda and entertainment.  
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Chapter 6 
 Patriotism, Nationalism and Historical Figures:  
Revolutionary Dramas in CCTV-1 
 
Serial television dramas reflecting the revolutionary history of the CCP have long been 
favoured by the political elites of mainland China as a crucial part of the Party’s propaganda 
work that aims to legitimise Party leadership. Most of these TV dramas are set in the historical 
periods of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the subsequent Chinese Civil War 
(1945-1949) fought between the CCP and the KMT19 led by Chiang Kai-shek. In Chinese 
history, there were two phases of the Chinese Civil War. The first one lasted from 1927 to 1937, 
ending with the formation of a united front between the CCP and KMT to fight the Japanese 
invaders. The second phase of civil war lasted from 1945 to 1949, finishing at the 
establishment of the PRC by the CCP and the retreat of the KMT troops to Taiwan, hence also 
known as the Chinese Communist Revolution.20 Because establishing a ‘new China’ means 
such a significant military and political achievement for the CCP, the second phase of civil war 
thus more often became the main theme of state-sponsored propaganda works.  
The revolution-themed dramas mainly depict the political leaders of the CCP and the 
‘revolutionary masses’ at war, with a focus on the efforts and sacrifices that the Party made to 
establish the Communist regime. Since TV drama became one of the most popular narrative 
forms in the 1990s, the revolutionary history has been an indispensable theme on the screen. 
As noted in chapters 3 and 4, some of these TV dramas belong to the genre of ‘mainstream 
melody works’ that are sponsored by the Party-state through financial backing and guaranteed 
broadcasting platforms. These drama productions are called ‘significant revolutionary and 
historical themes’ (zhongda geming lishi ticai), specifically designed to meet the propaganda 
imperatives of the Party-state during periods of national celebration (e.g. National Day on 1 
October and anniversaries of the CCP’s founding day). As CCTV-1 still plays the role of Party 
mouthpiece, it has become the main site to air these dramas.   
In this chapter, we focus on a selection of this type of domestically-made revolutionary 
dramas which were broadcast on CCTV-1 during different periods: War of China’s Fate (1999), 
Eighth Route Army (2005), and On the Taihang Mountains (2015). As noted in previous 
 
19  KMT is short for Kuomintang of China, which literally means Chinese Nationalist Party. In mandarin, 
Kuomintang is also spelled as Guomindang, abbreviated as GMD. For consistency in writing, I use KMT to refer 
to Chinese Nationalist Party throughout this thesis. After losing the civil war, the KMT retreated to Taiwan, 
becoming the dominant political party until democratisation in the late 1980s, and remained one of the major 
ruling parties in Taiwan until present.  
20 It should also be noted that due to different political positions in the civil war, mainland China and Taiwan 
name the war differently. According to the official media in mainland China, the second phase of the civil war is 
called ‘War of Liberation’ (Jiefang zhanzheng).  
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chapters, the objective of conducting qualitative case studies is to provide a more detailed and 
intensive understanding of the transformations and possible continuities that have occurred in 
Chinese television over the sampling period. Based on the three dramas, this chapter aims to 
explore how state-initiated, ideologically supervised propaganda dramas represent the 
revolutionary history in order to disseminate the Party’s propaganda messages. At the same 
time, in a longitudinal perspective, this chapter also examines what changes have taken place 
in the television content because of the profound economic, political and cultural 
transformations. In what follows, I will first introduce the background of the mediated 
revolutionary discourse associated with the Party’s propaganda work, illustrating its particular 
narrative conventions, and then turn to an in-depth analysis of the selected revolutionary 
dramas, with a special focus on the unique features demonstrated by those broadcast on 
CCTV-1.  
 
6.1 The revolutionary discourse and Chinese TV drama 
The construction of a revolutionary discourse can be seen in many media forms in China 
and has been a long-lasting strategy employed by the CCP to legitimise its power and 
leadership. In times of war, secret pamphlets and posters were the primary media for 
persuading peasants and workers to overthrow their landlords and the capitalists, thereby 
joining the revolution. Artistic forms were equally important for the revolutionary mobilisation 
at the time, including theatrical performances, singing, cross-talks (xiangsheng), rhythmic 
comic talks (kuaibanr) (Cai, 2016b; Xie, 2016). These artistic performances not only provided 
leisure time and relaxation to the soldiers, but more importantly, they explained to peasants 
what class struggle was and why it was necessary, as well as envisioned a bright and 
victorious future, which could encourage the soldiers and the revolutionary masses to devote 
themselves to the war.  
After the foundation of the PRC, propaganda films and literary works – termed ‘Red 
Classics’21 (hongse jingdian) in the reform era – became the primary means of utilising the 
revolutionary legacies to promote Chinese socialist values. By representing the revolutionary 
history, the ‘Red Classics’ were devoted to delivering the messages that ‘only the CCP can 
save China’, and that ‘only socialism can develop China’ (Yu, 2013: 168). For the people who 
lived in the 1950s and the 1960s, these cinematic and literary works largely shaped their 
identities and collective memories regarding the country’s history (Cai, 2013). Even in the post-
reform period, when the newly introduced discourse of marketisation seemingly undermined 
 
21 The Red Classics loosely refer to a set of artistic works produced in response to Mao’s Yan’an talk in 1942. 
These include literary and cinematic works, songs, etc. which mainly reflect the life of socialist workers, peasants 
and soldiers through the depiction of the revolutionary movements led by the CCP. Of these, the most famous 
ones are the eight ‘Revolutionary Model Plays’ (geming yangbanxi, more details in chapter 7).  
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the revolutionary discourse, the revolution remained a solid resource for the Party’s claim to 
legitimacy. As Zhao (2011, cited in Veg, 2012: 42) observes, the Party continues to draw 
inspiration from the revolutionary legacy and uses it strategically for contemporary politics, 
despite embracing market reforms in the meantime. This strategy seems especially useful 
when the market reforms reached a stage where various social conflicts were exposed and 
threatened to undermine the CCP’s leadership. At such points in time, the revolutionary 
narrative was believed to be able to bring the people back to the symbolic moment when ‘the 
CCP saved China’, and thus remind them of the achievements of the Party. In this way, any 
drawbacks in contemporary politics can be downplayed by emphasising the Party’s past merits. 
Therefore, the revolutionary discourse was not only necessary during war time, but has 
continued to serve as a key mechanism for alleviating contemporary conflicts and sustaining 
the Party’s rule.  
As discussed in chapter 4, Chinese TV dramas have a long history of serving propaganda 
purposes. However, because of the interruption in Chinese television broadcasting during the 
Cultural Revolution, it was not until the early 1980s that the Central Television stations restored 
the production of TV dramas and launched the first domestically made TV serial, Eighteen 
Years in the Enemy Camp (Diying shiba nian, 1981). This nine-episode TV serial was also the 
first drama production adopting the revolutionary narrative and thus containing propagandistic 
elements. It depicts the heroic deeds of a Communist Party member, Jiang Bo, who has 
secretly worked as an undercover agent in the KMT camp and provided important military 
intelligence to the CCP, thereby contributing to the Communist takeover of mainland China. 
Although this topic shows strong alignment with the Party’s propagandistic agenda, at the time 
the drama received criticism from the political authorities for its tendency towards 
entertainment, notably its dramatic tension and excitement – which in the eye of the political 
authorities were something related to ‘capitalist spiritual pollution’ (Yin, 2002: 30).  As noted in 
chapter 3, the political control over Chinese media system became comparatively relaxed in 
the 1980s, and foreign imports began appearing on the Chinese TV screen; however, the 
political authorities remained anxious about potential negative consequences brought by the 
TV programmes from abroad, particularly the West. It was also because of this concern that 
the Party-state launched the aforementioned ‘mainstream melody works’ in the late 1980s. 
This state initiative can therefore be viewed as a measure to re-adjust political control in the 
film and television sectors on the one hand, and a tactic to make the demand for entertainment 
beneficial to the Party’s leadership on the other hand.  
The early ‘mainstream melody’ films and TV dramas that followed the revolutionary narrative 
include The Birth of New China (Kaiguo dadian, 1989) and The Death of Qiubai (Qiubai zhi si, 
1987). These productions either focus on depicting milestone events in the Party-state’s 
historical development or pay tribute to the Communist Party leaders and important Party 
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members. According to Cai (2013), they have provided a hegemonic reading of history and of 
the collective memory of the revolutionary past for national audiences. Because these 
productions are concerned with the history of the Party-state, they are subject to stricter 
ideological control and supervision by SARFT’s special leading team (led by members of the 
CCP Central Propaganda Department) than other TV and film productions. 
However, these state-promoted revolutionary narratives have become increasingly at odds 
with the trend towards popular entertainment since the 1990s. As noted in chapter 3, a key 
change in the television culture from the 1980s to the 1990s was the waning of the political 
and educational function of Chinese television and the emerging emphasis on television’s 
entertainment value. Following such changes, the presentation of the revolutionary past in a 
propagandist and didactic tone seemed incompatible with the tastes of contemporary 
audiences, especially the young generations, who prefer entertaining, exciting materials rather 
than serious political topics. In addition to the discrepancy between the Party’s goals and the 
audiences’ interests, the main site for broadcasting the revolutionary dramas, prime-time 
television, is gradually losing its power in gathering audiences due to the advancement of 
digital technology. That audiences are now equipped with various portable devices to watch 
TV at any time poses another threat to the effectiveness of propaganda through revolutionary 
TV dramas. As Keane (2015) observes, most Chinese audiences nowadays enjoy online 
binge-watching, whereas fewer continue to look at television screens. Therefore, the telling of 
revolutionary stories in a serial, daily form on prime-time TV competes with various online 
platforms and resources, which further increases the difficulties in producing and promoting 
such ‘mainstream melody’ works.  
As a result of the new situation brought about by the market economy, the Party’s 
propaganda strategies have become increasingly flexible and adaptable to the new media 
environment (see chapter 3). This has given Chinese media practitioners and creative 
producers ample autonomy to engage in media and artistic creations and, notably, to 
repackage propaganda works using popular elements. Consequently, there have been 
prominent examples in recent Chinese cinema retelling revolutionary history and selling it to 
the people, which has not only fostered nationalist sentiment in the country but also provoked 
a growing academic interest. Sebastian Veg (2012) has analysed two state-sponsored 
blockbusters about Mao Zedong (The Founding of a Republic, Jianguo daye, 2009; The 
Founding of a Party, Jiandang weiye, 2011). He finds that both films rely on famous actors 
from Greater China, restructure historical events, and use a combination of revolutionary 
narratives and popular entertainment elements to retell the story of Mao Zedong, thereby 
acknowledging Mao’s contribution to establishing the modern Chinese polity. Judging from 
their commercial success, these two films have mapped out an effective way of speaking to 
contemporary audiences. Cai (2014) has also recognised the positive impact of celebrity 
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participation on the marketing of propaganda films exemplified by The Founding of a Republic. 
It seems that recent ‘mainstream melody’ films have fully recognised the importance of 
integrating popular narrative forms and employing celebrity actors to increase box-office 
revenue. In contrast to the extensive attention paid to the film blockbusters, ‘mainstream 
melody’ TV dramas that are specifically tailored for propaganda purposes through 
representing historical events have received much less academic scrutiny. However, the 
successful model of the ‘mainstream melody’ films makes it plausible that similar narrative 
devices and popular elements can also be incorporated in the revolution-themed dramas 
broadcast by CCTV-1. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we look at three revolutionary dramas of this kind, in order 
to identify key changes and potential continuities in these dramas over time. All the three 
dramas were created in response to state celebrations which marked the historical and 
political achievements of the CCP. War of China’s Fate, broadcast on CCTV-1 in 1999 and 
echoing the fifty-year anniversary of the founding of the PRC, describes the historical progress 
of the civil war between the CCP and KMT. Its narrative covers the period from the end of the 
Second World War to the founding of the PRC. The second drama, Eighth Route Army, aired 
on CCTV-1 in August 2005, corresponded with the sixtieth anniversary of China’s victory 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War by representing how the CCP-led guerrilla warfare has 
effectively resisted the Japanese invasion. The third drama, On the Taihang Mountains, was 
broadcast a decade later in 2015, also in remembrance of China’s victory in the war against 
the Japanese. The narrative in these dramas generally revolves around the military conflict 
between the CCP, KMT and Japanese armies from 1937 to 1949 (more historical background 
is given below). Yet the narrative focus has been primarily on highlighting the CCP’s 
achievements, thus showing explicitly propagandistic content. All three dramas received 
government support during the production process and subsequently won the government-
sponsored Feitian Award, which suggests their cultural and political significance. Furthermore, 
the three dramas were aired on CCTV-1 during different periods, spanning the period from the 
late 1990s to the mid-2010s when transformations in Chinese economy, politics and the 
cultural fields were taking place and shaping the development of Chinese television. A 
diachronic comparison between the three dramas enables us to identify changes and 
continuities in the televised adaptations of the revolutionary narrative and to situate these in 
the changing economic, political and cultural context – in particular, among the process of 
marketisation and the trend towards popular entertainment. In the following sections, I turn to 
in-depth analyses of the three dramas, focusing on key narrative elements regarding main 
characters, plot and settings.  
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6.2 War of China’s Fate: ‘Only the CCP can save China’ 
As noted earlier, War of China’s Fate was especially dedicated to contributing to the fiftieth 
anniversary of the founding of the PRC. It was aired on CCTV-1 from late September to early 
October 1999 to coincide with the celebrations around National Day on 1 October. This thirty-
episode TV serial was produced by China Television Production Centre (CTPC), a drama 
production unit affiliated to CCTV and known as the ‘national team’ (guojia dui) for producing 
TV dramas in China. Although the audience rating of this drama is hard to trace, what can be 
certain is the official recognition and praise of this drama. At the twentieth Feitian Award 
ceremony held in 2001, War of China’s Fate won a Special Excellence award, the highest 
level in the category of long TV serials, which proved the political significance of this drama. 
Therefore, an in-depth analysis of this drama can inform us of the state-endorsed narrative 
conventions of the ‘significant revolutionary themes’ in the 1990s.   
War of China’s Fate focuses on important historical events and political struggles taking 
place in mainland China from the end of Second World War to the founding day of the PRC. 
It aims to address the key question:  who – the CCP or KMT – would legitimately rule China 
after the Japanese invaders had withdrawn from China? This political dualism goes back to 
the time shortly after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Sun Yat-sen played a key role 
in establishing the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912, and in the early 1920s worked towards 
making KMT the rightful ruling party of the ROC, which his successor Chiang Kai-shek 
accomplished in 1927. The CCP was founded in 1921 and from the late 1920s gradually 
expanded its revolutionary base areas, also seeking to enlarge its power whilst fighting against 
the Japanese invaders in a loose united front with the KMT between 1937 and 1945. War of 
China’s Fate is set against this historical background and depicts the civil war between the 
KMT and CCP from August 1945 to October 1949. The main characters can be grouped into 
three camps: the CCP leaders (especially Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai), the chairman of the 
KMT and president of the ROC at the time (Chiang Kai-shek) as well as the Japanese invading 
forces. Apart from the three camps, the narrative of the drama also revolves around revealing 
various domestic and international political forces involved in the fight. The story unfolds from 
the US intervention to support Chiang in establishing a democratic government in mainland 
China, but this financial and military support is later used by Chiang to suppress Mao’s 
revolution. The subsequent narrative focuses on how the CCP’s political leaders resist the 
repression from the KMT, and at the same time unite various national democrats to subvert 
Chiang’s Nationalist Government. 
In the portrayal of the political figures, a binary-opposition model is evident. Lévi-Strauss 
(1955) argues that the conflicts used for driving plots often stem from binary oppositions. 
Therefore, according to him, binary oppositions are key elements in analysing narrative 
structures. In this drama, binary oppositions can be identified between protagonists and 
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antagonists, peace and war, good and evil. The protagonists are Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 
and the main antagonist is Chiang Kai-shek, all played by typecast actors who look exactly 
like the historical models. Mao and his comrades are portrayed as righteous, patriotic, brave, 
optimistic, and real peace-makers, fighting for democratic rule over the country, while at the 
same time opposing Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship and persecution of the democrats. Such 
portrayals are achieved through specific camera angles. Low-angle shots are often used for 
the Communist leaders, in order to show their greatness and power. At the same time, the 
lighting is bright and warm, reinforcing the positive image of them as glorious leaders (see Fig. 
6.1 and 6.2). 
In contrast to the CCP leaders, Chiang Kai-shek is often depicted as a grumpy, greedy and 
selfish dictator. In the narrative, he constantly violates the agreements between different 
political parties and refuses any further 
cooperation between the CCP and KMT. 
He seems rather frustrated at being 
defeated by the CCP in several battles, but 
instead of seeking peace talks with the 
CCP, he sends more of his troops to the 
frontline and speeds up his efforts to make 
a fortune from the war. Whenever he 
appears, the background is suffused with 
cold lighting, which delivers the image of a 
violent and bad-tempered dictator with 
frequent negative moods. Through these 
Figure 6.1: Zhou Enlai (left) and Mao Zedong 
(right). War of China’s Fate (1999) 
Figure 6.2: Mao Zedong is giving a speech. 
War of China’s Fate (1999) 
Figure 6.3: Chiang Kai-shek in 
War of China’s Fate (1999) 
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representations, he is portrayed as the embodiment of the evil, as opposed to the good 
Communist leaders. Obviously, such a binary opposition is created primarily to show the 
superiority of the CCP over the KMT. However, the static representations only provide flat, 
stereotypical images of the characters, without any personal narratives or detailed depictions 
regarding character development. 
The binary oppositions are evident not only in the depiction of characters, but also in the 
background settings. In the narrated world, Chiang Kai-shek is in power whereas the CCP is 
in opposition, so when the leaders of the two camps appear in parallel camera shots, 
contrasting surroundings, costumes and props immediately show the differences. For instance, 
in scenes showing a meeting (Fig. 6.4 and 6.5), the room in Chiang’s presidential palace is 
equipped with classical-style, upscale mahogany furniture and a patterned carpet, whereas 
the CCP’s meeting room is like a randomly-picked cave house filled with desks and chairs of 
a mixed style. Both scenes are designed with outdoor sunlight shining through the window, 
but the backlight in the KMT’s meeting room is so strong that no one can clearly see the faces 
of the characters. Moreover, the strong backlight in Chiang’s room creates a cold and 
ambiguous feeling. By contrast, every subject is lit properly in the CCP’s meeting room, and 
the combination of soft frontal light and mild backlight creates a warm and friendly atmosphere. 
This contrast in the mise en scène suggests an uncertain future to Chiang’s Nationalist 
government, and a bright future for the Communist Party leaders. It also reveals the class 
differences represented by the two camps. Chiang Kai-shek, together with his military 
commanders, constitutes the ruling class that possesses enormous wealth, which distances 
them from ordinary people. By contrast, the political and military leaders of the CCP live with 
villagers and borrow their houses as temporary headquarters, representing the interests of the 
poor. The visual contrasts in these scenes generally give an impression that the CCP are on 
the side of the people and determined to fight for them. 
Figure 6.4: Chiang Kai-shek is holding a meeting 
in his presidential palace. War of China’s Fate 
(1999) 
Figure 6.5: CCP’s meeting room in 
War of China’s Fate (1999) 
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To make the legitimacy of the CCP even clearer, the drama employs a voice-over narrator. 
Rather than describing the war situation from a neutral stance, the voice-over reinforces the 
binary treatment of good and evil and aligns the viewer with the Communist cause. From the 
opening scene of the first episode, the voice-over takes the side of the CCP and identifies it 
as ‘our party’ (wo dang). Whenever there are scenes of battles, the voice-over summarises 
the achievements of ‘our army’ (wo jun) and the losses of the KMT army. In the narration, 
phrases such as ‘our Party’ and ‘our army’ are used frequently as a way to show allegiance to 
the CCP. In contrast to ‘us’, the group identified as ‘others’ mainly refers to Chiang Kai-shek, 
his Nationalist government and army, as well as the American diplomats trying to negotiate a 
coalition government between different political parties in China. As Pickering (2001) argues, 
the construction of nationalist discourse operates through social inclusion and exclusion, 
especially the relegation of ‘Others’: in the process of constructing a negative ‘Other’, the 
discursive ‘we’ will be united. This is particularly the case with regard to the revolutionary 
drama discussed here. Through the binary construction of the good, upright ‘our Party’ and 
the evil KMT force, the audiences can easily unite with the Party as the ‘national Self’. This 
discursive construction of nationalism through revolutionary narratives was in line with the 
propaganda campaigns of the CCP in the 1990s, as noted in chapter 3: After the 1989 turmoil, 
the key strategy to maintain social stability and cohesion was to promote the discourse of 
nationalism and patriotism, alongside the boost for economic development. Hence these 
themes became the primary focus of narratives in the ‘mainstream melody’ works of the 1990s, 
which aimed to reinforce people’s loyalty and allegiance to the Party-state. 
War of China’s Fate mainly stresses how the CCP’s political leaders sought to construct a 
democratic22 government in China. To this end, they are represented as the embodiment of 
peace and democracy, and as the only legitimate leaders of China. By contrast, Chiang Kai-
shek does nothing but to insist on launching a civil war; moreover, he seeks to rely on various 
foreign powers, which could potentially harm China’s sovereignty. Therefore, it seems justified 
for the CCP and the Chinese people to overthrow the KMT regime and thereby establish a 
new one led by the CCP. It should be noted that War of China’s Fate resembles the old 
documentary-style ‘mainstream melody’ films such as the aforementioned The Birth of New 
China (1989) in adopting historical footage from the war. This is combined with actor 
performance in order to represent the real battle fields and deliver a sense of historical reality. 
Apart from these limited war scenes, the remainder of the drama is mainly formed of didactic 
conversations filled with political slogans. Judged by today’s standards, such narrative forms 
 
22 ‘Democratic’ is here understood in the sense of Mao’s ‘New Democracy’. In his essay On New Democracy (Lun 
xin minzhuzhuyi) published in January 1940, Mao ‘assumes that democracy means a government that reflects 
the interests of China's ordinary people; he does not mean elected representative government in the American 
sense.’ (Cheek, 2002: 77). 
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seem repetitive, dull, and lacking entertainment. Yet, given that this drama was produced in 
1998 when the entertainment TV culture had just emerged on provincial satellite TV channels 
such as Hunan TV, it is no surprise that this CCTV propaganda drama only satisfied the taste 
of the political authorities, not necessarily that of the masses. Compared to War of China’s 
Fate, Eighth Route Army, which was made six year later, includes more entertainment 
elements. 
 
6.3 Eighth Route Army: The ‘mass line’ as the key strategy to win the war   
At the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the CCP’s Red Army joined the 
KMT’s National Revolutionary Army in order to establish a united front against Japan, 
changing its name to the Eighth Route Army whilst in practice still being led by the CCP. The 
2005 serial drama Eighth Route Army recounts the historical facts of this period, depicting the 
anti-Japanese revolutionary movement orchestrated by the CCP. This twenty-five episode TV 
serial was jointly produced by CCTV, local CCP Propaganda Department in Shanxi province, 
Shanxi Television Network, and August First Film Studio (Bayi dianying zhipianchang) – a 
state-run production studio belonging to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Such a 
production team already indicates the great political significance of this drama. As noted earlier, 
it was created in response to state celebrations of the sixtieth anniversary of China’s victory in 
the war against the Japanese. It premiered on CCTV-1 in August 2005, also echoing the Army 
Day on 1 August. Remarkably for a propaganda drama, Eighth Route Army garnered not only 
the government-sponsored Feitian Award, but also a Jinying Award for Excellent TV drama, 
which is based on audience votes. This result indicates a more favourable audience reception 
than that of War of China’s Fate. Focusing on the depiction of main characters and plot, I will 
point out the new narrative traits and techniques adopted in this drama and explain them in 
the light of the political and cultural context of the mid-2000s. 
The plot of Eighth Route Army begins with the outbreak of the war in July 1937, when the 
Japanese army invaded Beijing, and concludes with the surrender of the Japanese army to 
the Allied forces in September 1945. Although historically both the KMT and CCP fought the 
Japanese, the storyline mainly revolves around how the Communist Party leader Mao Zedong 
and General Zhu De led the Eighth Route Army and the Chinese nation to final victory. 
Particularly, the ‘mass line’ (qunzhong luxian) developed by the CCP leader, Mao Zedong, 
together with the call for ‘relying on the people’, are emphasised and praised throughout the 
narrative. The ‘mass line’ policy is historically one of the political and organisational principles 
of the CCP and is still in use nowadays. It basically stresses doing everything for the ultimate 
interests of the people, relying on people’s power and listening to people’s needs, and then 
interprets their needs within the framework of Marxism, thereby implementing Party policies. 
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In Eighth Route Army, the producers sought to express the idea that mobilising the people 
and constructing a powerful united front – which included the KMT – were the CCP’s key 
strategies to secure victory in the Sino-Japanese war. Even though such a representation 
exaggerates the contribution of the CCP to the final victory, this is the key message delivered 
by this propaganda drama. For this purpose, the simplified binary treatment of good CCP and 
evil KMT, as in War of China’s Fate, has been discarded by producers of this drama. Instead, 
more complicated depictions of characters have been adopted in Eighth Route Army.  
To the extent that the plot is driven by the fight between the CCP army and the Japanese, 
the binary opposition of ‘hero vs. villain’ still works. The CCP leaders, Mao Zedong and Zhu 
De, are portrayed as wise and benevolent military commanders, devoted to building the united 
front. To this end, they seek to unite any potential associates in China, including KMT military 
leaders, soldiers and even Japanese captives. On the other hand, the antagonists are 
unsurprisingly the Japanese army generals. They are depicted as brutal madmen committing 
massacres in Chinese cities, villages, and even bombing their own compatriots living in China. 
Such a contrast between good and evil is evidently aimed at highlighting the justice and 
greatness represented by the CCP.  
Alongside the binary juxtaposition of China and Japan, the portrayal of the KMT force 
contains more complicated character positioning than that in War of China’s Fate. First, 
several KMT army generals, soldiers, and party members are associated with the good ‘our 
side’. These people, including both real historical figures and fictional characters, are depicted 
in more detail compared with the ordinary revolutionary masses. For instance, Wei Lihuang, 
a KMT general who was historically a former enemy of the CCP’s Red Army in the first phase 
of the civil war (1927-1936) and also appeared in War of China’s Fate on the enemy side, is 
portrayed positively as a close friend of the CCP in Eighth Route Army. For example, in the 
fourth episode, the Eighth Route Army goes to attack a Japanese military airport, which greatly 
relieves the pressure on the KMT’s battlefront. Wei Lihuang feels extremely grateful and 
thanks Zhu De, the CCP army general, in person. After this, the former becomes an admirer 
of the CCP’s military strategies and a trustworthy collaborator. Another example is Hao 
Mengling, a KMT military commander serving under Wei Lihuang's Fourteenth Army Group, 
who was also a historical figure and died in the defence of Xinkou. In this drama, his bravery 
and sacrifices are fully represented and acknowledged through his voice-over soliloquy upon 
his death. In this monologue, he shows his determination to sacrifice himself in defending ‘our 
nation’. Aside from positive depictions of these two historical figures, the portrayal of a fictional 
character, Liu Qianqian, a KMT correspondent, also shows positive recognition. She initially 
works for the KMT newspaper, but later chooses to join the CCP out of admiration for the 
Communist policy of ‘putting the people first’ – a slogan in line with the ‘mass line’ policy. In 
these cases, we find that the characters from the KMT camp are no longer portrayed as 
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‘national Others’, but tend to be represented as members of ‘our side’ – the side of the CCP – 
and ‘our country’. These have shown nuanced changes in the construction of nationalist 
discourse in the new century.  
Not only do the KMT generals and ordinary party members receive positive recognition in 
this drama, but the representation of Chiang Kai-shek becomes more complicated. In Eighth 
Route Army, he is no longer a static, vicious character, but a patriotic ruler facing dilemmas 
(Fig. 6.7). At the outset of the drama, he warmly praises the contribution of the Eighth Route 
Army to defeating the Japanese army (Fig. 6.6). But as the story unfolds, particularly at a point 
where he sees the power of the CCP growing through the guerrilla war and thus feels his rule 
threatened by the Communists, he decides to eliminate them. This development of this 
character and the multifaceted depiction of Chiang Kai-shek imply that the representation of 
the KMT has moved beyond the one-sided narrative convention but includes more nuanced 
representations.   
However, even though the ‘patriotic’ KMT force has been categorised as belonging to ‘our 
side’, this does not mean they are as equally good as the CCP. In specific representations, 
they are still depicted in an inferior position to the CCP leaders. For example, in every frontline 
battle that the KMT’s Revolutionary Army participates in, KMT commanders always need 
support and guidance from the CCP, as we have seen earlier from the case of Wei Lihuang. 
Besides, in the opening introduction given by the voice-over narrator, the CCP is described as 
‘taking the lead’ (shuaixian) to unite the nationals and fight against the enemies, whereas 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government is ‘forced’ (bei po) to agree to the plan of a united 
front. Such narratives highlight the CCP as the only legitimate leading force that represents 
the interests of ‘our people’ and ‘our nation’. 
Through these representations, we find the contrast between the CCP and KMT softened; 
but simultaneously, there is more emphasis on the notion of a united font which entails uniting 
Figure 6.6: Chiang Kai-shek greets a CCP 
general. Eighth Route Army (2005) 
Figure 6.7: Chiang Kai-shek is giving a speech on 
defending China. Eighth Route Army (2005) 
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all Chinese people to fight against the Japanese. This treatment was precisely in line with the 
new focus of the Party’s propaganda campaign from the early 2000s. As discussed in chapter 
3, the CCP faced increasing pressures resulted from the ‘side effect’ of the accelerated market 
reforms from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, including corruption, unemployment, widening 
regional disparities and above all, the issue of legitimacy of a ‘proletarian’ party experimenting 
on a capitalist-style market economy. In order to alleviate social tensions and, more importantly, 
consolidate the CCP’s leadership, Jiang Zemin put forward the Three Represents. These were 
ratified at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, affirming that the Chinese Communist Party 
represents the fundamental interest of the majority of Chinese people. Immediately after the 
promulgation of this ideological guideline, at the National Broadcasting Work Conference in 
the same year, Xu Guangchun, director of SARFT at the time, stressed the requirement that 
national TV broadcasting in the following years must abide by the principles of the Three 
Represents (China Broadcasting and Television Yearbook, 2003: 5). Given that Eighth Route 
Army was produced in 2004, it is reasonable to link its emphasis on the ‘mass line’, which 
entails representing and fighting for the interest of the Chinese people, to the wider political 
context of the time of production. With regard to defining the Chinese people, all patriotic 
Chinese, regardless of party affiliations, can be considered as belonging to the ‘national Self’. 
This representation is also indicative of an increasingly positive attitude towards the KMT from 
mainland China in the early 2000s.  
Apart from the complexities in character positioning, we also find some other new narrative 
traits in this drama, which were not yet evident in War of China’s Fate. Despite Eighth Route 
Army also utilising archival footage to display the reality of the revolutionary past, it integrates 
more fictional plotlines and personal narratives. In addition to depicting important political 
leaders, the producers of this drama designed several fictional characters who serve as 
subordinates and maintain friendly relations with the CCP leaders. They are soldiers, military 
doctors, and war correspondents, witnessing and experiencing the war from the perspective 
of the masses. Hence, aside from representations of leaders’ resolution and determination, 
the narrative focus also includes the daily life of these fictional characters, who live around 
Mao Zedong and Zhu De. Particularly, we find many personal stories with emotional ups and 
downs, and even romantic plots designed for these fictional characters. In relation to this, the 
CCP leaders are portrayed as caring for their subordinates and try to find them girlfriends, 
which shows the human side of the leaders. As discussed in chapter 3, the emergence of the 
popular entertainment culture at the turn of the new century gave rise to the pursuit of 
individual satisfaction and personal development, which rendered the exploration of 
individual’s emotional life a popular theme in TV productions (Keane, 2005). Such themes 
were more often associated with love or family dramas. Nevertheless, concerns for individual 
life and well-being became an irresistible trend affecting television productions of all subject 
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matters, including revolutionary themes. All changes in the cultural context of the early 2000s 
indicated a narrative turn to human interest, which was also reflected in this drama. As we can 
see from both political leaders and fictional characters, more representations of people’s 
internal emotional experiences, personal dilemmas, determination and sacrifice are 
incorporated with the grand narratives of politics and battles, adding a special layer of human 
concern to the cruelty of the revolutionary past.  
Notably, Eighth Route Army was not the only TV production showing this narrative turn. 
Revolution-themed dramas adopting the model of personal narratives and broadcast in the 
same period included other CCTV-1 prime-time dramas as well. Among them, the most well-
known one is Drawing Sword (Liang jian, also known as Unsheathing the Sword, aired on 
CCTV-1 in September 2005), which follows the personal life of a fictional CCP general, Li 
Yunlong, against the background of the Anti-Japanese and Korean Wars (1950-1953). More 
similar cases will be revealed in chapter 7, where the revolutionary dramas broadcast by 
Hunan TV are analysed. Here, it should be noted that the propaganda dramas of the mid-
2000s have already demonstrated new narrative features which were manifestly different from 
those made in the late 1990s. Next, I will analyse a revolutionary drama which retells the same 
historical events as Eighth Route Army, but was produced in the mid-2010s.  
 
6.4 On the Taihang Mountains: Uniting all patriotic forces and building a strong 
wartime base  
Also set in the historical period of the Anti-Japanese War, On the Taihang Mountains 
focuses on two CCP military leaders, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping – the commander and 
political commissar of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army – and recounts their battles 
and revolutionary life in one of CCP’s largest wartime bases, the Taihang Mountains. It is 
hence another piece of ‘mainstream melody’ work featuring the recurrent theme of fighting the 
Japanese; this one was produced specifically for the celebration of the seventieth anniversary 
of China’s victory in the war. It was made in 2013, and broadcast on CCTV-1 from 4 to 19 
August 2015. Inasmuch as this drama features the development of the military force led by 
Liu and Deng, it also echoes Army Day on 1 August, which once again verifies my argument 
in the preceding chapter about the distinctly socialist-style festive programming in Chinese 
television. As with other ‘significant revolutionary theme’ dramas, On the Taihang Mountains 
garnered a Feitian Award in 2015 as Excellent TV drama. At first glance, this drama seems to 
share many similar plot elements with Eighth Route Army. But it was made nearly ten years 
later, and hence shows a development in the narrative techniques and aesthetic forms that 
were in relation to new changes in the wider context.  
The story mainly revolves around the formulation of Liu and Deng’s military strategies, the 
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battles they participated in against the Japanese invaders and, particularly, how they led the 
129th Division to develop the Taihang mountainous area into a strong wartime fortress. While 
still structured on the binary treatment of ‘good’ CCP leaders and ‘bad’ Japanese army 
generals, the drama also incorporates a narrative focus on representing the short-term 
cooperation as well as political competition between the leaders of CCP and KMT. In these 
representations, we also find the same personalised narrative strategies characterising the 
human side of the leading CCP political and military figures, and complexities in depicting the 
KMT leaders, that we saw from Eighth Route Army. Yet, aside from these narrative techniques, 
more personal dilemmas and dramatic tensions have been built into this drama. 
First, the depictions of both CCP and KMT political leaders and military commanders are 
driven by more personal dilemmas. Liu Bocheng, the CCP commander of the 129th Division, 
is portrayed as a kind-hearted and knowledgeable commander who constantly cares for his 
troops. His dilemma thus lies in his wanting to achieve victory but sacrifice as few soldiers as 
possible. Therefore, he calculates the number of casualties every time after battles. Chen 
Geng, another historically important military leader of the CCP, is depicted as living apart from 
his family for safety reasons. He continually needs to choose between fighting for his 
communist beliefs and caring for his family. This dilemma reaches a climax when his wife, 
Wang Genying, also a Communist soldier, loses her life in one of the battles. The producers 
even designed a dramatic plot, in which Chen Geng and Wang Genying have a chance to 
meet each other before Wang dies, talking about their son and their family memories (Fig. 6.8). 
These details were created in order to display the sacrifices people encountered in the 
revolutionary war on the one hand, and to portray the human side of leaders on the other hand. 
The Communist leaders thus are no longer pictured as fighting machines or superior god-like 
figures, but portrayed as ordinary people with successes and failures, gains and losses, which 
make the revolutionary 
narratives more accessible 
for national audiences. 
KMT leaders and military 
commanders have their 
dilemmas as well. While 
Chiang Kai-shek needs to 
acknowledge contributions 
made by the CCP in fighting 
against the enemies, he is 
also worried that the quick 
expansion of the CCP will 
threaten his authoritarian 
Figure 6.8: Wang Genying (left) and Chen Geng are sharing  
a picture of their son. On the Taihang Mountains (2015) 
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rule. On most occasions, he is depicted as a torn character who has political ambitions but 
eventually fails to maintain his rule. The situation faced by his army chief in Shanxi province, 
Yan Xishan, is by no means easier. As a former warlord who has his own troops, he seeks to 
prevent other KMT military forces from tapping into his area to fight the Japanese. As a result, 
Yan is eager to eliminate Japanese invaders from the province of Shanxi, but would rather 
achieve this by relying on the CCP’s guerrillas than on the National Revolutionary Army of the 
KMT. All these representations demonstrate the entangled relationships between different 
political forces during the war, suggesting that the wartime situation is far more complicated 
than any binary opposition allows. Adding these dilemmas to the construction of characters 
not only reveals more details about conspiracies and politics during wartime, but also added 
considerable dramatic tension to the narratives. 
At the same time, we find other dramatic plot created to increase the excitement and 
suspense in the representation of the war. On the side of the ‘good’, Liu Bocheng and Deng 
Xiaoping are portrayed as great military experts who are still modestly studying the techniques 
to achieve victory, rather than stereotypical characters of victorious generals who always win. 
For instance, in a battle with the Japanese army, Liu Bocheng almost loses his life because of 
flaws in his strategy. On the side of the ‘evil’, the commanders of the Japanese army are 
portrayed as less stupid as had been the case in the other two dramas analysed earlier. Rather, 
they tend to be depicted as competent and ferocious opponents of the CCP leaders. In some 
scenes, they also develop smart plans, which help them secure occasional victories over the 
Chinese resistance force. Dramatic plots such as these give viewers an impression of the 
dangerous situations and the unpredictable result of battles, which suggests that the hard-
earned victory over the Japanese was no easy task.  
In order to heighten the intense feeling of danger in the war, the drama employs a sequence 
of combat scenes, including gun battles, explosions, chases and escapes, to give vivid 
depictions of the battlefront (see Fig. 6.9). While such visual techniques are more frequently 
seen in Hollywood war films and recent Chinese propaganda films, they were comparatively 
less employed in Chinese TV dramas, particularly those made in the 1990s, such as War of 
China’s Fate. This situation started to change in the early 2000s, after China’s admission to 
the WTO. On the one hand, Chinese TV producers started to draw inspirations from imported 
Hollywood blockbusters as a result of the increasing cooperation between domestic TV 
producers and foreign production companies (for example, see Ma, 2014). On the other hand, 
as noted in chapter 3, domestic TV producers in the early 2000s began showing greater 
awareness to the differentiation of various niche markets. One unique feature of On the 
Taihang Mountains is its narrative devices modelled on typical Hollywood war films, such as 
visual depictions of the battlefront, detailed explanation of military tactics, as well as tracking 
the emotional development of the people at war. The adoption of these techniques particularly 
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targets domestic audiences who enjoy watching war films and military-themed TV serials. 
Such a multi-perspective representation of war with intense combat scenes and humanistic 
care has largely exceeded the narrative devices we saw in either War of China’s Fate or Eighth 
Route Army.  
 
The development in the narrative techniques of propaganda dramas of the 2010s can be 
considered a fruitful result of exposing state-owned television stations to market forces and 
especially of the ‘separation of production from broadcasting’. As outlined in chapter 3, the 
Chinese television sector started delegating the production of non-news programmes to 
independent media companies in the early 2000s. By 2009, nearly all central and provincial 
television stations had withdrawn from entertainment-oriented production, whilst focusing on 
producing public service programmes only, and purchased TV serial dramas from the market. 
Unlike the two dramas discussed in the preceding two sections, which were still produced in 
full or in part by CCTV, On the Taihang Mountains was primarily produced by a specialised 
media company, Yanzhao Hezhong Culture Media Co. Ltd. The producers received support 
from the Central Propaganda Department’s local branch in Hebei Province, as well as the local 
governments and television stations of the filming sites. Compared with state-owned and 
tightly controlled television stations, independent media companies are more open to market 
competition, and thus sensible to the commercial realities. This means they are more inclined 
to utilise popular narrative forms and entertainment elements to enhance the quality and 
commercial value of their TV products. Therefore, On the Taihang Mountains provides a 
comparatively more exciting depiction of the revolutionary past. Compared with the other two 
dramas, On the Taihang Mountains incorporates more elements that potentially contributed to 
Figure 6.9: The 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army seeks to conquer the County 
of Yushe occupied by the Japanese army. On the Taihang Mountains (2015) 
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the victory of China. In this drama, the elements that lead the CCP army to victory are not 
vague beliefs in democracy and peace (War of China’s Fate), or pure reliance on the people’s 
power (Eighth Route Army), but a combination of many factors, including brilliant military 
strategists, smart political commissars, a highly-disciplined and cohesive Red Army, a 
visionary Party leader, the support of the revolutionary masses, and a strong wartime base. 
In spite of the change in narrative strategies and visual effects, what remains consistent is 
the construction of a national identity. On the Taihang Mountains also adopts an omniscient 
voice-over narrator who aligns the audience with the Communist camp. In the opening episode, 
he first praises the initiative taken by the CCP leaders to build the united front and then 
enthusiastically introduces the army led by Liu and Deng. In the last episode, the voice-over 
once again emphasises the important contribution of the Liu-Deng Army to winning the war. It 
declares that this army represents the interest of the Chinese people, leading them to the 
victory over the Japanese enemy.  
In addition to employing narrative voices to directly describe the good deeds of the national 
‘Selves’, more narrating processes have been accomplished by the lines spoken by the 
characters not belonging to the CCP or the revolutionary masses. These ‘Others’ exist not 
only as opponents of the CCP, but more often as witnesses to the Party’s achievements. For 
instance, a KMT journalist and some army generals who have seen the Red Army fighting on 
the frontline successively acclaim the cohesion and loyalty of this army; the Japanese army 
generals complain about the CCP’s abilities of propaganda and agitation. The perspective of 
the ‘Other’ side successively gives credits to the legitimisation of the CCP’s leadership from a 
‘non-self’ stance. Furthermore, when defending the nation becomes a priority, the CCP seeks 
to unite all national patriotic forces, including KMT military commanders, soldiers, patriotic 
landlords, and even the bandits stationed in the Taihang Mountains. It is worth noting that 
overthrowing feudal landlords used to be an important task of the Communist revolution. But 
in this drama, there is no plot related to obvious class-struggle situations, which, to a 
considerable extent, reflects the historical situation. As Liu and Deng repetitively claim, the 
private properties of patriotic landlords should be protected by the Eighth Route Army so as to 
earn their trust and broaden and consolidate the united front; only those exploiting the labour 
of villagers and peasants are treated as enemies of the people. In this discourse, the bandits 
have also been accepted to ‘our side’, because they are willing to choose the righteous path 
and fight against the Japanese enemy. 
In its construction of nationalism and patriotism, this 2015 drama also highlights the 
importance of the united front. Aside from continuing to emphasise the aspect that the CCP 
represents ‘the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people’ 
(People’s Daily Online, 2006), the connotation of the united front in the mid-2010s can also be 
interpreted in the light of two developments in the Chinese political context. One is concerned 
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with the changes in the cross-strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan. In the past 
few years, the relationship between the CCP and KMT began to resume along with Lien 
Chan’s (former chairman of the KMT) visit to mainland China in 2005. Since the KMT, under 
the leadership of Ma Ying-jeou, won the Taiwanese presidential election in 2008, the cross-
strait relations have improved, and cultural communication and economic cooperation across 
the Taiwan Strait simultaneously increased. This led to the 2015 meeting in Singapore 
between Ma and the CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, which took the two parties 66 years 
to achieve. Although subsequent changes in the leadership of Taiwan affected the 
development in the cross-strait relations, it has not practically changed the official attitudes of 
the CCP towards the KMT.23 Given that both the two parties are advocates of the ‘one China’ 
consensus, it is plausible to predict that the ‘patriotic’ KMT force will continually be portrayed 
as part of the ‘national Self’. As noted by Wolte (2017), such representations are in line with 
the current PRC policy aiming to seek ‘peaceful reunification’ with Taiwan. They are also seen 
from many propaganda films made in mainland China, including The Founding of a Republic. 
On the other hand, the construction of nationalism by means of presenting how Chinese 
people are united to achieve victory, also echoed current president Xi Jiping’s articulation of 
realising the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. As discussed in chapter 3, the official 
ideological line from late 2012 shifted to building a strong socialist superpower and realising 
the ‘Chinese dream’; various artistic and media representations have been used to promote 
this official discourse. As claimed by Xi Jinping at the closing meeting of the First Session of 
the Twelfth National People's Congress in 2013 (China Daily, 2013), an important way of 
pursuing the Chinese dream is to foster the national spirit that centres on patriotism […]; in 
order to achieve this, ‘1.3 billion Chinese people should […] unite as one, and gather into 
invincible force with the wisdom and power’. As previously mentioned, Chinese television 
producers must take into account dominant ideologies when repackaging past events into 
propaganda dramas. It is thus reasonable to argue that the emphasis on building a united front 
in this drama is precisely the embodiment of the dominant political ideology in current China.  
To sum up, On the Taihang Mountains utilises a more dramatic plot, and creates much 
excitement and tension to represent the revolutionary war, for the purpose of satisfying the 
entertainment pursuits of contemporary Chinese audiences. In the meantime, it should be 
noted that all these efforts serve the construction of a collective narrative centred on 
nationalism and patriotism, which is fundamentally aimed at consolidating the CCP’s rule over 
China.  
 
23 The cross-strait relations became deteriorated after Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party of 
Taiwan (also known as Minjindang) won the 2016 Taiwan general elections. This was largely due to Tsai’s refusal 
to affirm the ‘1992 consensus’ which insists on ‘one China’ principle but accepts different interpretations of this 
‘one China’.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
Through the analyses of three revolution-themed dramas aired on CCTV-1 from late 1990s 
to mid-2010s, several narrative turns can be identified. First, the depiction of the CCP and 
KMT leaders and party members has transcended simple binary opposition, and has involved 
more complicated character positioning. Particularly, in the recently-made two dramas, Chiang 
Kai-shek and his troops are no longer simply portrayed as the enemy of the CCP, whom the 
CCP must eliminate, but more as competent opponents and devoted patriots, with whom the 
CCP needs to unite in the fight against the Japanese army. In such representations, the 
sacrifices made by the KMT in the war started to be positively acknowledged, even though 
such an appraisal somehow tends to be offset by Chiang Kai-shek’s provoking of the civil war. 
As the analysis shows, the increasingly softened contrast between the CCP and KMT in the 
latter two dramas are in line with the new change in cross-strait relations, where the CCP has 
sought to show an increasingly welcoming attitude to the KMT across the Taiwan Strait. 
Secondly, alongside the depiction of the revolutionary war, the two dramas made in the new 
millennium have also shown growing interest in representing the life and emotions of people 
living in the turbulent revolutionary era. On the one hand, political leaders from both sides are 
no longer static characters, but exhibit dynamics which demonstrate complicated, entangled 
relationships as well as personal dilemmas. On the other hand, producers have tended to 
create more fictional characters, so as to present their revolutionary spirit and the impact of 
war on ordinary Chinese people. Such a trend towards personal narratives has demonstrated 
the narrative turn to human interest, which were typically embodiment of the emerging urban 
entertainment culture in the early 2000s, that values individual well-being and personal 
development. 
Thirdly, in terms of aesthetic expressions, more combat scenes have appeared in the 
recently-made two dramas, whereas in the 1999 drama, War of China’s Fate, only a limited 
number of war scenes were found. It is also evident that the 2015 drama, On the Taihang 
Mountains, has adopted more dramatic plot elements and suspense techniques that partially 
emulated the narrative forms and visual effects from Hollywood war films to create excitement 
for contemporary audiences. Such development can be understood as the consequence of a 
series of reform measures implemented within the television sector for a shift towards market-
oriented production and international cooperation. 
Yet at the same time, what remained consistent in the representation of the revolutionary 
past is the construction of nationalism and patriotism, as well as the propaganda message 
delivered through the voice-over that only the CCP could have led the Chinese people to 
victory. But it is also obvious that the propaganda messages embedded in each drama have 
echoed the distinct ideological lines articulated in each period. Based on these findings, we 
find that the delivery of propaganda messages via TV drama has been able to utilise new 
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narrative devices to facilitate propaganda and ideological persuasion, which reflects the 
flexibility of the Party’s propaganda strategies on the one hand, and the powerful influence of 
the market economy on Chinese television on the other hand.  
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Chapter 7 
Omnipotent Heroes and Sexy Spies:  
Popular Representations of the Revolutionary Past in Hunan TV 
 
Following last chapter’s discussion of the revolutionary dramas aired on CCTV-1, we now 
look at another set of representations of the revolutionary past on Hunan TV, the provincial 
TV channel that was the first extensively commercialised in China. In the previous chapter, I 
have highlighted the narrative characteristics of the propaganda-oriented revolutionary 
dramas, as well as the new narrative strategies incorporated into for the purpose of 
popularising the revolutionary theme. These were adopted as a result of increasing market 
orientation. It is evident that dramas broadcast on CCTV-1 have been closely tied to the 
mission of political propaganda and social education, and hence make comparatively fewer 
concessions to audience tastes. By contrast, entertaining audiences and bringing amusement 
to young viewers are central to Hunan TV’s branding strategy. It is therefore reasonable to 
hypothesise that the dramas broadcast by Hunan TV provide different representations of the 
revolutionary past than their counterparts on CCTV. In this chapter, I discuss two exemplary 
cases from Hunan TV: Struggles in an Ancient City (2005) and The Disguiser (2015), with the 
aim of examining new kinds of revolutionary narratives. What I am interested in here is to 
identify the narrative techniques which make revolutionary history popular and propaganda 
messages acceptable. Special attention is given to the diachronic comparison of the two cases, 
in order to discern traits of development in the popular narratives. Notably, the two dramas 
represent two popular sub-genres of the revolution-themed TV drama: Struggles in an Ancient 
City is a TV adaptation of a Red Classic (see previously and below); The Disguiser belongs to 
the category of ‘spy drama’ (diezhan ju) that mostly consists of adaptations of spy novels from 
the post-reform era. Before venturing into a detailed textual analysis of the two dramas, I first 
introduce the background and current debates around the two sub-genres of revolutionary TV 
drama.  
 
7.1 Red Classics and spy dramas 
As mentioned in chapter 6, the term ‘Red Classics’ generally refers to a set of revolution-
themed literary and cinematic works promoted by the Party-state from the 1950s to the 1970s, 
which reflect the revolutionary life of Communist soldiers, workers and peasants during the 
pre-PRC period. These works include the eight ‘revolutionary model plays’24 that were highly 
 
24 Among them, Peking opera Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (Zhiqu weihushan), together with its original 
novel Tracks in the Snowy Mountains (Linhai xueyuan) have been adapted to films and TV dramas most frequently 
in recent years. The ballet Red Detachment of Women (Hongse niangzijun) has also been adapted to TV serials 
and received much attention.  
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advocated by Mao Zedong’s wife Jiang Qing during the heyday of the Cultural Revolution; 
however, they were condemned in the post-Mao 1980s by cultural elites and thereafter faded 
away for a while. The new millennium has witnessed the resurgence of the Red Classics in 
mass-cultural production. As Liu (2010) observes, both the state and popular culture sectors 
have facilitated their return. For the Communist regime, these works have served to restore 
the ideological hegemony that the leadership believed was hugely diluted by global capitalism. 
For the public, the revolutionary literature and arts evoked a nostalgic sentiment across China, 
particularly from the older generation who grew up with the revolutionary works.  
In order to attract contemporary young audiences, contemporary adaptations of the Red 
Classics sometimes depart from the collectivist values embedded in the original texts and 
express a more strongly individualistic ethos and orientation. Occasionally the discrepancies 
between contemporary reinventions and their original texts have created conflicts. For 
instance, the increased emphasis on the protagonists’ personal dimension in the drama 
adaptations aired on provincial satellite TV channels has incurred criticism from both the 
government and loyal fans of the original works.25 Criticism from the authorities denounces 
the ‘vulgarisation’ of the canonical texts as the adaptations probe into the sexual relations and 
romantic entanglements of the protagonists, elements that do not feature in the original works 
(Renminwang, 2004). Audiences with deep emotional attachment to the original works are 
dissatisfied with the remakes where these conflict with their own memories. Regarding the 
difference between the established tales and the contemporary remakes, researchers (Zhao, 
2005; Cai, 2013) explain that in the original works, the absence or downplay of gender 
relationships and individual desires mostly resulted from the Mao-era principle that 
Communists would commit more to the revolutionary cause when not involved in any 
emotional entanglements. The purposive suppression of human desires was hence a 
discursive and political strategy to prevent any distraction from the revolutionary movement. 
In the post-reform context, where the revolutionary spirit has decreased, and individual 
pleasures are given greater priority, new interpretations and representations were able to 
emerge. However, some of them have stimulated public controversies and ultimately triggered 
censorship. On 9 April 2004, SARFT released a Notice which urged government agencies at 
various levels to tighten censorship on TV adaptations of the Red Classics (SARFT, 2004). 
The Notice required relevant film and TV production units to adhere to the ‘core spirit’ of the 
 
25  TV adaptations that have raised extensive controversies include the 2004 drama Tracks in the Snowy 
Mountains and the 2005 drama Red Detachment of Women. The former was denounced by state media largely 
in that it created many personal entanglements between the Communist hero, Yang Zirong, and the bandit group 
led by the antagonist, Zuo Shan Diao. According to media critics and the authorities, this reinvention shows 
disrespect for the original works. In a similar way, Red Detachment of Women also received heavy criticism 
because this TV adaptation highlighted the romance between two Communist Party members which was thought 
to be an insignificant element in the original work. See Liu and Yu (2004). 
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original work and value the audience’s pre-existing expectations about the Red Classics; any 
parodies or vulgar alterations of the original texts were strictly prohibited. This regulation 
consequently led to a steep drop in the number of adaptations from the Red-Classics. Only a 
few managed to survive, including the 2005 TV drama analysed in this chapter – Struggles in 
an Ancient City, a remake of the novel (1958) and film (1963) of the same title. In an attempt 
to prevent potential criticism in the first place, director Lian Yiming claimed that this drama 
focused on patriotism (aiguo) rather than love (aiqing) (Sina Entertainment, 2005). It was 
hoped that by holding on to the theme of patriotism and promising to adhere to the original 
storyline, Chinese TV producers would carve out a less controversial path in their reinvention 
and reimagination of the Red Classics.  
Similar debates are also evident in the other TV fictional genre that represents the 
revolutionary war – spy dramas. Having burgeoned since the early 2000s, this genre mostly 
focuses on the intelligence war fought between the CCP, the KMT government and the 
Japanese invaders from the late 1930s to the 1940s. Main characters include CCP undercover 
agents working in the KMT government and the collaborationist governments set up by Japan, 
engaging in intelligence gathering and assassinating Japanese invaders and ‘national traitors’. 
Unlike the Red Classics, which gained momentum in the early 2000s and then met with 
criticism, spy dramas have enjoyed consistent, long-lasting popularity until the present day. 
According to Chinese media scholar Bai Xiaoyi (2010), this is because spy dramas 
demonstrate a successful integration of revolutionary themes with the dramatic plots inherent 
in crime narratives. While crime dramas had been erased from prime time since 2004 due to 
their ‘overt’ exposure of violence and homicide, spy dramas quickly picked up the thrilling 
effects that used to make crime dramas popular. Specifically, they added elements such as 
mystery, suspense and plot twists to the notion of ‘invisible war’, maximising suspense and 
thereby stimulating excitement. Despite the different situations and narrative foci of Red 
Classics and spy dramas, Kong (2012) holds the view that the spy drama belongs to the broad 
category of Red Classics in that it draws inspiration from spy films or dramas produced in the 
‘high socialist’ period (1949-1976) and in that its recent prevalence has also been nurtured by 
the wave of nostalgic sentiments associated with the Red Classics. If the spy drama can be 
considered broadly as part of the Red Classics, it perhaps shares similar problems faced by 
those adaptations, for instance, the conflict between the revolutionary ideals in the collectivist 
period and their contemporary reconfigurations.  
In fact, a great portion of spy-themed TV dramas have been adapted from contemporary 
novels created in the 2000s. The most famous serials include Plotting (Ansuan, 2006), Lurk 
(Qianfu, 2009), and the 2015 hit drama The Disguiser (which forms the other case study of 
this chapter). The novels on which they are based have not been canonised in the same way 
as the Red Classics, so the storylines of these dramas originate from contemporary individual 
109 
 
writer/producer’s understandings of, and speculations about, the revolution. This creates the 
possibility that their narrative focus may more easily diverge from revolutionary ideals than is 
the case with the reimagination of the Red Classics. As Ni Wei (2013) states, current spy 
dramas normally emphasise individual problem-solving skills and hence weaken the role of 
Party organisation, which seems to acknowledge the personal power and agency of 
individuals instead of the significance of the revolutionary collective. In his view, this is a 
misrepresentation of the revolution, as well as of the collective aspirations of the 
revolutionaries. Controversies such as this one invariably revolve around the tensions 
between revolutionary realism in the past and new representations at present, between the 
supposed collectivism of the revolutionary and socialist eras and the individualism of the 
contemporary era. In spite of these tensions, it is equally obvious that the new productions 
provide an ongoing renovation and reimagination of the revolutionary past. By so doing, they 
adopt a new filmic language to retell the seemingly worn-out clichés, and at the same time, 
point to the changes in the current socialist culture.   
    In this chapter, I analyse two dramas that have been comparatively more successful than 
the controversial Red Classics adaptations. In the two cases, I examine the popular elements 
that are being added to representations of the revolutionary war, and then explore the extent 
to which entertainment-oriented national TV stations can depart from the prescribed route of 
orthodox propaganda and still deliver a revolutionary ethos in novel and popular ways without 
being censored. As discussed in chapter 3, the Chinese media sphere has experienced a 
series of market reforms in recent decades, which has made television production increasingly 
sensitive to viewer ratings and audience interest. We have already seen from the revolution-
themed dramas on CCTV-1 that televised political content has recently tended to embrace 
more entertaining elements and shifted the narrative focus towards human nature and 
individual concerns. Since the CCTV-1 dramas substantially centred on the depiction of male, 
historical figures (i.e. the Communist Party leaders) in decisive wars and battles, they left 
comparatively little room for the representation of ordinary revolutionaries, especially women. 
By contrast, the leading characters of the two dramas aired on Hunan TV are fictional 
revolutionaries including outstanding women warriors and spies. They devote themselves to 
struggles set in a totally different environment from the war front. The more narrative space 
given to these female characters in Hunan TV allows us to further look into the gender relations 
in popular representations of the revolutionary war. In the following sections, I focus on how 
the main characters are depicted and on whether there is any evidence of new character 
portrait and visual language derived from the binary opposition of good and evil. If these do 
emerge, I intend to identify the development of popular narratives from early 2000s to mid-
2010s. Struggles in an Ancient City was created in late 2004 and broadcast in 2005, at a time 
when domestic TV producers started to gain more creative freedom to explore consumer 
110 
 
interests in exchange for advertising revenue. The Disguiser was produced and screened a 
decade later, at a time when various online streaming services had entered the TV distribution 
market and drawn part of the audiences’ attention away from the TV screen. The ten-year time 
span allows a diachronic comparison of the relations between television entertainment and 
revolutionary discourse. Furthermore, the in-depth analysis of the two dramas also facilitates 
a comparison between Hunan TV and CCTV-1 in terms of their different foci and articulations 
of Chinese history and politics. It allows us to consider whether they narrate the common 
revolutionary past differently and if so, how the propagandist or educational messages diverge. 
It also allows us to speculate as to what has produced these differences, in particular whether 
these may reveal the greater commercial pressures Hunan TV confronts in attracting and 
maintaining its share of audience.    
 
7.2 Struggles in an Ancient City: Heroes, traitors and the restrained love 
The TV drama Struggles in an Ancient City (hereafter: Struggles) is an adaptation of the 
1958 Red Classics novel that recounts the CCP-led anti-Japanese struggles in an occupied 
city of northern China. The 20-episode drama serial was first aired on 17 May 2005 on 
Jiangsu’s City Channel (Chengshi Pindao), a terrestrial TV channel broadcast within Jiangsu 
Province. Later from August onward, it was successively broadcast daily on three provincial 
satellite TV channels (including Hunan TV) to reach national audiences, as part of the state 
commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of China’s victory in the Anti-Japanese War. Hence 
this drama also facilitates a synchronic comparison with the CCTV-1 drama, Eighth Route 
Army, which was broadcast during the same period for the same commemorative event.  
Unlike other controversial remakes of the Red Classics that had led to government 
censorship in early 2004 (as noted earlier), this drama garnered official recognition after its 
debut, which made the rebroadcasts possible. The survival of this drama is largely down to its 
experienced production team, Hai Run Movies & TV Production Group. With good records of 
producing award-winning TV serials and adaptations of Red Classics,26 this private media 
company had gained considerable experience in treating the politically important topic of 
revolution. Struggles largely follows the storyline of the original novel, which was written by 
military writer and reporter Li Yingru and published in 1958, but also incorporates new plot and 
narrative devices (Zhang, 2004). According to the director, the aim of adding new content was 
to enrich the existing story, create excitement and thereby attract young audiences, but the 
additions by no means alter the political stance, character design or revolutionary love 
reflected in the original work (ibid.). Apart from the slight change in content, this drama also 
 
26 Prior to Struggles in an Ancient City, Hai Run had successfully produced and released two Red-Classics dramas: 
Steel Meets the Fire (Liehuo jingang, 2003) and Little Soldier Zhang Ga (Xiaobing Zhang Ga, 2004). 
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recruited plenty of well-known veteran actors to increase its popularity. It stars Siqin Gaowa, 
Liu Wei, Jiang Wu, as well as the increasingly popular Japanese actor, Koji Yano – best known 
for his acting as an ‘evil’ Japanese military commander in revolutionary films and TV dramas 
made in China. By adhering to the established political principles and revolutionary spirit, the 
production team managed to sell this remake to many municipal and provincial TV channels.  
The drama is set in mid-August of 1945, when the Second World War is coming to an end 
in Europe, whereas in the Far East, the Japanese Army still occupies several major cities in 
North China. In this situation, a CCP agent, Yang Xiaodong, is secretly sent to a Japanese-
occupied city in Hebei Province with the mission to promote an uprising in the local ‘puppet 
government’27 against the Japanese Army. Assisted by Jinhuan and Yinhuan, twin sisters 
working as CCP underground agents, and the Communist guerrilla led by Captain Liang, Yang 
Xiaodong sneaks into the headquarters of the ‘puppet army’, seeking to persuade their 
regimental commander Guan Jingtao to revolt against the Japanese. Eventually, Jinhuan 
sacrifices her own life in order to cover up the fact that Guan Jingtao is working with the CCP, 
and thereby wins over the collaborationist army’s cooperation. With their help, Yang Xiaodong 
defeats Duotian, the maniac Japanese military advisor, and crushes his plan of bombing the 
city. The overall narrative focus of this drama is on how the Communist heroes stage an 
uprising in the city, which is governed by pro-Japanese Chinese officials and army troops.  
This storyline immediately shows differences to the previously discussed CCTV-1 dramas 
which are all set at or near the battlefront and mostly in rural areas. The urban environment in 
Struggles allows closer contacts and more direct violence between opponents, and hence 
allows for more exciting plot designs and a more dramatic depiction of characters. In the 
following paragraphs, I will focus on these characters and their actions, in order to highlight 
the distinct narrative devices adopted to make the fictional revolutionary story popular and 
attractive to contemporary young audiences.  
The first distinct trait demonstrated in Struggles is associated with the conventionally binary 
opposition of good and evil, represented by the Communist secret agent Yang Xiaodong and 
the Japanese military consultant, Duotian. At times this opposition teeters on the boundaries 
of cliché, with Yang depicted as an extraordinary hero who can easily slip into the 
headquarters of the ‘puppet’ troops, and then get out safely. In comparison, the Japanese 
commander is portrayed as a sinister and ferocious enemy, threatening to destroy the city 
using biological weapons. To further demonstrate his villainy, Koji Yano, the actor who plays 
Duotian, wears a fake moustache, which is a typical feature of evil Japanese commanders in 
Chinese films and TV dramas. 
 
27 The term ‘puppet government’ refers to several collaborationist governments established by Imperial Japan, 
beginning in 1934 in Manchuria and existing in many parts of China before Japan's surrender in 1945. 
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Yet, the distinctiveness in this binary treatment of good and evil lies in the dramatic tension 
created between the two opponents. This tension is very different to the front-line battles 
shown in the CCTV-1 dramas. The urban setting in Struggles allows greater proximity in the 
engagement of the forces of good and evil. This opens up a whole host of dramatic possibilities 
– car chases, physical fights and gun battles. We can easily pick up these dramatic devices 
by looking at the confrontations between Yang and Duotian. In one scene, Yang seeks to flee 
from the headquarters of the ‘puppet’ army, driving away Duotian’s car while the latter is still 
inside. A fierce fight between the two ensues in the fast-moving vehicle (see Fig. 7.1): while 
Yang is at the steering wheel, 
Duotian points a gun at 
Yang’s head, trying to make 
him stop in order to make 
good his escape. Yang 
refuses to do so and, instead, 
crashes the car against a 
wall, escapes from the scene, 
and leaves Duotian in the car, 
unconscious. This sequence 
not only displays the intense 
and hostile confrontation 
between the two characters, but also reveals the inferiority of Duotian. It conforms to the 
setting frequently seen from the CCTV-1 dramas that the CCP members are smarter and 
stronger than their Japanese enemies. Moreover, the fights between Yang and Duotian, 
wherein the latter is often defeated, add a layer of personal hatred – mostly on Duotian’s part 
– to the emotion-laden war between their two countries. In these ways, the fight between good 
and evil becomes a means of creating suspense and drama.  
Besides the conventional binary treatment of good and evil, the drama introduces a different 
type of binary opposition, namely that between the brave Communist heroes (heroines) and 
the ridiculous ‘traitors to the nation’ (hanjian), exemplified by the ‘puppet’ troops. Ridiculing 
the traitors opens up spaces for revolutionary fiction to create comic effects and 
simultaneously enriches the strategies of television propaganda and education. The 
contrasting effect between depictions of the ‘brave’ and the ‘weak’ is best illustrated by the 
highly dramatic opening scene, where CCP agent Yang Xiaodong is trying to slip into the city 
at midnight but encounters a ‘puppet’ troop patrol. When alerted to his presence, the patrol 
fires randomly, injuring Yang and nearly capturing him. It is at this critical moment that Captain 
Liang shows up, scares away the puppet troops and saves Yang. In this sequence, Yang 
displays strong personal heroism and courage: when he is in danger, he stays calm and 
Figure 7.1: Duotian (left) points a gun at Yang Xiaodong, forcing 
him to stop. Struggles in an Ancient City (2005) 
113 
 
composed throughout, although he eventually needs a last-minute rescue from his comrade 
Captain Liang. In contrast to the Communist heroes, the ‘puppet’ troops are portrayed as 
ridiculous and cowardly traitors. When they see the face of Captain Liang, they drop their guns 
immediately and surrender to the Communist guerrilla without hesitation (Fig. 7.2). By being 
portrayed as ridiculous, their loyalty to the ‘puppet’ regime and Japanese army is ridiculed as 
well. The drama therefore suggests that the political stance of these ‘traitors to the nation’ has 
no ideological roots. In addition to their problematic behaviour, they also wear ill-fitting 
uniforms and hats, thus looking exceptionally clumsy and messy. In this way, these clown-like 
characters are funnier than the other characters, which adds humorous elements to the 
representation of the conflict. 
 
The comic effects of the puppet troops also fulfil an educational function. Their cowardice 
and fickleness create a contrasting effect between them and the brave, selfless Communist 
heroes with their strong faith and unswerving loyalty. While the above example already 
displays the bravery of CCP agent Yang Xiaodong, this courage and resolute loyalty to the 
revolutionary cause is more pronounced in the actions of the Communist heroine, Jinhuan. In 
contrast to the ‘puppet’ army’s wavering belief in their political stance, Jinhuan takes her own 
life in exchange for the victory of the revolutionary struggles in this city. Her last wish has been 
to save Guan Jingtao, the regimental commander of the ‘puppet’ army, who the CCP agent is 
seeking to work with to stage an uprising from within the Japanese-controlled government. 
From this juxtaposition, the audience can easily tell the difference between the great and the 
small, recognising who is really fighting for ‘our’ nation. It is worth noting that this portrayal of 
traitors was widely used in films produced from the 1950s to 1970s for educational purposes, 
particularly those targeting young audiences, such as The Letter with a Feather (Jimao xin, 
1954) and Little Soldier Zhang Ga (Xiaobing Zhang Ga, 1963). The comic appearance of the 
Figure 7.2: The ‘puppet’ troop surrenders to Captain Liang (right) immediately 
when they see his face. Struggles in an Ancient City (2005) 
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‘traitors’ and their wavering stances in these cinematic productions are visually recognisable, 
indicating that these characters should be denounced by the good Chinese people. In 
contemporary remakes of the Red Classics, such as Struggles, TV producers continue to use 
this stereotypical representation of the ‘traitors to the nation’, thereby simultaneously providing 
amusement and education for the audience. Also, it is noticeable that this type of comic 
depiction and ironic tone of narration is almost completely absent in the epic style of CCTV-
1’s historical war dramas. 
The third significant narrative trait in Struggles is the detailed depiction of two female 
protagonists – Jinhuan and Yinhuan. This serves to praise the heroic actions of female 
revolutionaries on the one hand, and to display romantic relationships between the 
revolutionaries on the other. As shown above, Jinhuan is a highly accomplished underground 
agent, appearing on several occasions as a confident, calm and brave fighter who confronts 
the enemy fearlessly. Yinhuan, on the other hand, mainly assists the work of the guerrilla by 
serving as liaison whilst working as a nurse in the city hospital. This casts her in a 
supplementary and less important role. However, the most foregrounded love relationship 
between leading characters is that between Yang Xiaodong and Yinhuan. In this relationship, 
the male character (Yang) is portrayed as experienced and mature, whereas the female 
character (Yinhuan) is positioned as an admirer of Yang. It is thus evident that the romantic 
plot has allocated relatively conservative gender roles to male and female revolutionaries – 
the men active and outgoing, the women subservient (more details below). It is also obvious 
that the depiction of love relationship becomes entangled with the revolutionary mission. 
As mentioned earlier, wartime romance has been an important narrative dimension placed 
at the heart of contemporary remakes of Red Classics; yet the excessive exploration of 
Communist heroes’ personal romances has drawn criticism from both the state and the public. 
In the case of Struggles, however, criticism for too much romantic narrative has not been found. 
On the contrary, loyal fans of the original works even complained about the insufficient 
depiction of the love between Yang Xiaodong and Yinhuan in the 2005 TV serial, because 
romance between the leading characters was an important dimension in both the 1958 novel 
and 1963 film. In the TV remake, their loving relationship was more like a revolutionary 
friendship between comrades which can be given up for the sake of the revolutionary cause 
(Tang, 2005). Indeed, producers of the 2005 serial sought to downplay the romantic 
entanglements between main characters in order to pass censorship. According to the director, 
this implicit representation of love resulted from his understanding that the romance between 
revolutionaries tends to be subtle, unexpressed and friendship-like; and, above all, that the 
theme of this drama is patriotism, not romance (Sina Entertainment, 2005). We can find that 
the director was trying to adopt an effective strategy to avoid being censored, given that some 
TV adaptations of Red Classics had triggered censorship due to their obsession with depicting 
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love. Therefore, the portrayal of revolutionary women in the 2005 serial is largely focused on 
armed struggles instead of emotional relationships. This once again reflects the efforts 
Chinese TV producers have made to find a balance between commercial interests and political 
control.  
Another issue with the depiction of revolutionary women in the 2005 version of Struggles is 
concerned with the gendered role allocated to these female revolutionaries. As I have 
mentioned earlier, CCTV-1’s revolutionary dramas foreground the achievements of male 
political leaders, which leaves little narrative space for the depiction of revolutionary women. 
Even though the images of female revolutionaries can be seen to have increased in recently 
produced dramas (e.g. in On the Taihang Mountains, 2015), most of the roles include the 
military leaders wives or assistants, nurses and journalists, all of whom play subordinate roles 
in the patriarchal order. In Struggles, the situation of female revolutionaries is a similar one. 
While it is evident that Jinhuan and Yinhuan are given more narrative space and have more 
important responsibilities and roles, their depiction still conforms to a pattern of gender 
inequality commonly found in the CCTV-1 revolutionary dramas. In fact, this pattern seems to 
have been reinforced by popular representations of the revolutionary past. As Gong (2011) 
maintains, the relationship between male and female revolutionaries in commercial 
adaptations of the Red Classics tends to follow a model whereby a Communist hero is often 
accompanied by a young female warrior. This difference in the status of male and female roles 
has led some authors (e.g. Wang, X., 2003: 147) to claim that this gendered representation 
corresponds to the reform-era slang ‘xiaomi bang dakuan’ – which literally means a young 
female secretary dating an older and much richer entrepreneur. Although a notion formed in 
the reform era seems inappropriate to describe a relationship set in the revolutionary period, 
it has emphasised the dominant position of male Communist members and subordinate role 
of revolutionary women.  
Contemporary TV serials tend to reconstruct the past through the lens of the present. We 
can perhaps link the phenomenon of increased representation of women in revolutionary 
dramas to the growing awareness to the consumer power of female audiences from the early 
2000s. We can also connect the gendered representation in the revolutionary stories to the 
female images in other contemporary popular drama genres, notably love-themed TV 
serials/series. Scholars (Huang, 2008: 107-112; Zhu, 2008: 94-98) researching on Chinese 
‘pink dramas’ in the 2000s – that depict the cosmopolitan lifestyle and romantic life of urban 
consumers – have identified a contradictory femininity associated with modern women in 
China. In these trendy dramas, women are depicted as having an independent career while 
still being obedient to Confucian ideals regarding gender roles, by avoid transgressing the 
patriarchal order (more discussions in chapter 9). As with the case of ‘pink dramas’, the efforts 
to make revolutionary dramas attractive to female audiences have not practically changed the 
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nature of female roles and the gendered view towards women. In Struggles, the image of 
Yinhuan not only conforms to the stereotype of revolutionary women, bearing resemblance to 
the depictions of wives and girlfriends in the CCTV-1 dramas, but is also consistent with the 
gendered representation of women in other contemporary popular dramas. 
To summarise, Struggles in an Ancient City shows how contemporary successful 
adaptations of the Red Classics need to remain consistent with the original stories and more 
importantly, with the politically defined collective memory of the revolutionary past. At the same 
time, these contemporary dramas display innovations in the way of presenting characters and 
driving the plot. Within the binary opposition between good and evil, more action scenes 
between individuals are added to create intense feelings and thrilling experiences among 
audiences, as a method of catering to the taste and preferences of contemporary audiences. 
Alongside good and evil characters, a group of comic figures are created for amusing effects 
and also have an educational function. In addition, popular narrative devices also include the 
depiction of romantic love between fictional revolutionaries. But of course, this important 
narrative dimension needs to be treated with caution. This suggests there remains pervasive 
and considerable self-censorship in contemporary TV productions in China, even in the 
commercial sector. Although there is a more extensive representation of women to be found, 
the nature of their roles still tends to reinforce the gendered power relations and patriarchal 
ideology. Revolutionary women either die for the revolutionary cause, or are shown as 
submissive to the male authority figures; they seldom exist as autonomous and empowered 
agents in their own right. 
 
7.3 The Disguiser: Omnipotent communist heroes and the femme fatale 
As one of the most successful TV fictions in 2015, The Disguiser received not only official 
recognition, but also praises from the industry and audiences. It was nominated for the 30th 
Feitian Awards in 2015 in the categories best TV drama and best male actor, and in the same 
year selected by SARFT as an outstanding example to inspire TV drama production in the 
following year (Sina Entertainment, 2016). Besides, this drama also won several awards from 
the National Television Production Association in 2017 (Sina Entertainment, 2017), indicating 
the recognition from within the industry. More importantly, this drama received high ratings 
from both television viewing and online platforms, which suggests that the spy stories 
previously targeting the older generation have received extensive attention from young 
audiences (Renminwang, 2015).  
The success of this drama largely resides in its complex storyline which revolves around 
the Ming siblings’ undercover missions in Shanghai. The story is set in the aftermath of the 
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Battle of Shanghai28 in 1937, when the KMT’s National Revolutionary Army lost Shanghai to 
the Japanese Army.29 After the Japanese Army had gained control of the city, they began to 
recruit pro-Japanese Chinese officials to govern it, which formed a local ‘puppet’ government. 
This triggered various means of struggles and assassinations conducted by the Chinese 
resistance forces, including Communist undercover agents and the KMT’s Juntong30 spies. 
Against this background, The Disguiser tells a dramatic spy story that unfolds between the 
Communists, the KMT, the Japanese Army and its ‘puppet’ regime. The plot centres on the 
powerful Ming family. Ming Lou, the elder of two brothers, serves as the chief financial officer 
of the Shanghai ‘puppet’ government, which makes him a celebrity in this city. He has another 
secret identity as a Juntong spy of the KMT government. But in fact, he is a loyal member of 
the CCP, devoted to eradicating traitors and collecting intelligence for the frontline battles 
against the Japanese army. His younger brother, Ming Tai, is a college student and seemingly 
spoiled playboy who has been secretly recruited by Wang Tianfeng, a KMT Juntong spy and 
trainer, to be a secret agent of Juntong at the outset of the drama. The Ming family’s business 
and assets are managed by their eldest sister, Ming Jing, a capitalist who has been covertly 
financing the CCP-led anti-Japanese movement for years. Unaware of each family member’s 
secret actions, Ming Tai returns to Shanghai with his mission partner, Yu Manli, to engage in 
assassinations and intelligence gathering. Through co-operation between the KMT Juntong 
and CCP undercover agents, the Ming siblings manage to bring down the enemies of the 
‘puppet’ regime and support the CCP in its frontline battles.  
The success of this drama relies on not only an attractive original story, but also an 
experienced production team. It is based on a popular spy novel written by Zhang Yong, who 
also acts as the scriptwriter. The drama was produced and distributed collaboratively by 
Shandong Film and TV Group (a provincial media group, commonly known as Shan Ying) and 
a private corporation – Daylight Entertainment (Zhengwu Yangguang), established by former 
Shan Ying employees in 2011. Shan Ying was one of the earliest influential film and TV 
production institutions in China and has received numerous awards since its foundation in 
1986. Excelling in making quality drama, Shan Ying and Daylight Entertainment have 
nowadays become a widely-favoured brand among Chinese TV audiences. In The Disguiser, 
 
28 The Battle of Shanghai, also known as the Battle of Songhu (Songhu huizhan), was one of the fiercest battles 
fought between the KMT’s National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army. It lasted from August 
to November 1937, at the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and ended with the retreat of the KMT 
army to Nanjing. 
29 After the Battle of Shanghai, those parts used to be controlled by the Nationalist government were lost to the 
Japanese Army. The foreign concessions in Shanghai remained intact until the outbreak of the Pacific War 
initiated by Japan. 
30 Juntong was the abbreviated Chinese name of the military intelligence agency of the Nationalist Government 
before 1946, mainly serving for intelligence gathering and spying operations. Its official name was National 
Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (Military Commission).  
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they employed youth idol Hu Ge and other popular actors so as to attract young audiences, 
which proved to be effective (China News, 2015). The popularity of this drama suggests that 
if packaged in the form of spy stories, the revolutionary discourse has great commercial value 
in the contemporary television market. In the remainder of this section, I will tease out the 
distinct narrative techniques that make this drama popular and its propaganda messages 
acceptable, while also giving attention to the development in narratives as compared to 
Struggles, and to the elements which deviate from the prescribed route of Party propaganda 
seen in CCTV-1.  
The first thing to note is the depiction of personal dilemmas resulting from the complex 
identities of the protagonists. This is signalled clearly in the title of the drama: each key figure 
needs to disguise themselves effectively in order to accomplish their mission for the resistance 
force. While the binary opposition between good Communists and evil Japanese commander 
still persists, the drama places more emphasis on revealing the dilemmas of the people on the 
‘good’ side. Ming Lou is portrayed as an experienced Communist hero who has high political 
consciousness and moral standards. Even though he works in an extremely dangerous 
environment, running the risk of being exposed any time, he is so skilled in disguising himself 
that no one else (apart from his personal assistant, another Communist undercover agent 
named Ming Cheng) knows his real identity (see Fig. 7.3). His only weakness is his affection 
for his younger brother Ming Tai. Knowing the conspiracies and crises of working in such a 
dangerous situation, he is very reluctant to see Ming Tai taking the same route of being an 
undercover agent. Therefore, when Ming Tai becomes a Juntong spy under his command – 
Ming Lou also takes on the role of leader of the KMT spy squad in Shanghai, he has mixed 
feelings of sending his brother on potentially fatal missions.  
In stark contrast to the omnipotent image of Ming Lou, the younger brother Ming Tai is 
portrayed as a carefree playboy at the beginning of the story. However, his character develops 
Figure 7.3: Ming Tai (left) does not know his brother Ming Lou’s (right) 
real identify until the end of this drama. The Disguiser (2015) 
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alongside his experience of several anti-Japanese missions. After the cruel training given by 
Wang Tianfeng, he is sent to Shanghai to conduct anti-Japanese activities. Unlike his brother, 
who remains skilful throughout the drama, Ming Tai cannot even pull the trigger during his first 
assassination mission. With the help of his partners, he finally becomes a capable spy. At the 
same time, Ming Tai becomes aware of the corruption among KMT senior government officials 
and gradually loses faith in the government he works for. By contrast, in the collaboration with 
Communist agents, he comes to appreciate and respect the beliefs of the Communists and 
their devotion to the liberation of his country. Therefore, he needs to make a decision whether 
continuing his mission in the KMT Juntong or joining the CCP. The situation is further 
complicated by the arrival of a female Communist agent, Cheng Jinyun, who is shown to be a 
perfect match with Ming Tai either during collaborative missions or in loving relationships. In 
order to join Cheng Jinyun, Ming Tai must first break up with Yu Manli, who has already 
developed affections for Ming Tai.  
By zooming in on individual lives, The Disguiser interweaves the grand revolutionary 
narrative with personal life and family stories. Not only the Ming brothers face personal 
dilemmas, but their entire family confronts the hard choice between defending the interests of 
family or of nation. As noted earlier, the Ming siblings come from an upper class background, 
owning the Ming Corporation and serving as government officials. Accordingly, they live the 
glamourous lifestyle commonly found among old capitalists in Shanghai of the 1940s: they 
inhabit a mansion inherited from their father, wear tailored suits, drink coffee and wine, and 
play tennis on their private tennis courts. Inside the family house (Fig. 7.4), expensive antique 
furniture can be seen in every room, which are taken good care by servants. The interior 
decorations remind us of Chiang Kai-shek’s president palace in the 1999 CCTV-1 drama War 
Figure 7.4: Interior of the Ming’s family house 
The Disguiser (2015) 
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of China’s Fate. But here in The Disguiser, the narrative stance is totally different. The Ming 
family’s luxurious lifestyle and stable life course ostensibly distance them from their turbulent 
revolutionary career – they seem like those people who enjoy various wartime privileges and 
thus are least likely to engage in revolution. However, the whole family works for the CCP: the 
Ming brothers – including Ming Tai, who chooses to join the CCP after Yu Manli’s death – lurk 
around the Japanese intelligence agency for military information; the eldest sister, Ming Jing, 
is a secret patron of the Communist revolutionary movement. Commenting on why his family 
embarks on this road, Ming Lou stresses that only when the foreign invaders are driven away 
will his family’s happiness be restored. It is apparent that Ming Lou and his siblings are 
portrayed as altruistic Communist role models who prioritise national interest over personal 
and family happiness. By contrasting the Ming’s upper-class status with their risky choice, the 
drama embeds a nationalist discourse and collective ideal of defending ‘our’ country in the life 
story of the Ming siblings. Furthermore, in portraying Shanghai capitalists as Communist 
activists, the drama also reflects the political and social changes of the 1990s and 2000s and 
especially the Three Represents, which paved the way for capitalists to become CCP 
members. 
The depiction of dilemmas around the leading characters – between family and duty, 
between personal choice and collective mission – also brings this drama closer to the 
audience, in the sense that audiences can imagine themselves struggling with similar choices, 
for instance, between family and career, or between personal ideals and institutional pressure. 
Particularly, Ming Lou is portrayed as a powerful figure who can resolve any problems 
emerging from his (espionage) work, quite excelling in disguising his true identity and thereby 
accomplishing the challenging work assigned by his superiors. In this plot design, the 
collective revolutionary movement is used as more of a backdrop to display the personal 
abilities of Ming Lou. In this regard, the personalised spy stories validate the argument made 
by Ni Wei (2013): contemporary spy dramas are inclined to acclaim individual problem-solving 
skills in the workplace, which concurrently weakens the significance of the collective power in 
revolutionary movements.  
However, there is more to The Disguiser than that. This drama draws on the internal 
conflicts in personal lives, in conjunction with popular aesthetic forms, to invite contemporary 
audience to participate in the reimagination of the collective aspirations of the revolutionaries. 
Such aesthetic forms particularly show a hint of bourgeois comfort, demonstrated through the 
lifestyle of the Ming family, which makes this drama vastly different from CCTV-1’s revolution-
themed dramas with their rural setting, and even from Struggles – the Red-Classics drama 
broadcast on the same channel ten years earlier. The urban setting in this drama provides 
ample room for imagining the ‘glamourous’ side of revolutionary struggles, containing 
exquisite clothing, various cocktail parties and grand ceremonies which are interwoven into 
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the social life and intelligence work of the leading characters. These representations not only 
satisfy contemporary audiences’ curiosity about the ‘invisible’ war in occupied Shanghai, but 
also coincide with their cultural tastes. As noted in chapter 3, an important trend of Chinese 
television entertainment in the new century has been the growing interest in celebrating an 
affluent lifestyle and satisfying the cultural aspirations of urban consumers. Popular narratives 
have thus turned to worshipping the rich and the powerful, as well as material comforts 
associated with them. The image of Ming Lou actually resembles the character type of 
successful entrepreneurs in popular romantic dramas. Besides, although The Disguiser is set 
in the 1940s, the costume of the leading characters seems remarkably contemporary (see Fig. 
7.3 and below), which is also designed for satisfying the taste of contemporary audiences. 
While such a narrative trend was not yet evident in the 2005 drama Struggles, representing 
the posh life of urban dwellers has become a key narrative device in The Disguiser. More 
details on this narrative trend will be revealed in my subsequent analyses of love dramas 
(chapters 8 and 9). At this point, I will limit myself to emphasising that the complex identities 
of the Ming family not only set a backdrop for the intelligence war, but are also useful for 
absorbing contemporary popular aesthetic elements into the spy story.  
The second aspect of the distinctiveness of The Disguiser lies in its depiction of KMT 
Juntong spies. This drama is quite nuanced in the way it portrays the KMT government and 
avoids consistent deprecation and condemnation of their motives and operations. Indeed, the 
KMT, particularly its Juntong spies, is depicted in a more positive way when compared with 
other earlier film and TV productions. Prior to this drama, Juntong spies were invariably 
portrayed as vicious, devious enemies, bent on assassinating CCP agents and undermining 
the Communist revolution. Such representations include the notorious Mao Renfeng in the 
state-sponsored blockbuster The Founding of a Republic (2009), and Li Ya in the popular 
drama serial Lurk (2009). In The Disguiser, however, a group of Juntong spies, consisting of 
Ming Tai, Yu Manli and led by Wang Tianfeng, frequently cooperate with CCP agents and 
actively fight against the Japanese forces. Wang Tianfeng is an extremely patriotic soldier, 
who initiates a suicidal plan, attempting to make the Japanese intelligence agency believe the 
false information he has disseminated. Although his plan puts lots of people, including himself, 
in great danger, it eventually proves to be effective, leading to the defeat of the Japanese 
Army on the battlefield. Because of this, Wang Tianfeng, a Juntong spy, receives praise and 
gratitude from the CCP undercover group, an almost unprecedented scene in Chinese 
television or cinema. It is without doubt that the KMT agent Wang Tianfeng is categorised as 
belonging to the patriotic ‘national Self’. But looking further into this character, it is also obvious 
that compared with the powerful Ming Lou, who is more considerate, Wang Tianfeng seems 
too radical and reckless. Through this contrast, the drama clearly signals the superiority of the 
CCP over the KMT in terms of military strategy and care for human lives. This is in line with 
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the attitude shown to KMT patriotic forces in other contemporary cultural products, including 
the CCTV-1 revolutionary dramas.  
Apart from the powerful Communist hero and the problematic KMT spy, three female 
characters are worthy of attention as well. A comparison of the trio demonstrates how CCP 
female warriors are depicted differently to women from other political camps in the intelligence 
war. The three extraordinary female characters are Wang Manchun, director of Department 
76 – the intelligence centre of the Shanghai collaborationist government; Yu Manli, a former 
killer trained to be a Juntong spy; and Cheng Jinyun, a Communist undercover agent who has 
romantic connections with Ming Tai. In The Disguiser, women no longer appear exclusively in 
subordinate roles. As in Struggles, they become specially trained agents who master combat 
skills that enable them to engage in intelligence missions like men. Moreover, in The Disguiser, 
these female fighters are assigned tasks that require them to use their sexual attraction as a 
way of gathering intelligence. The historical record bears this out. As Edwards (2016) has 
noted, due to the ‘natural talents’ associated with sexual characteristics of women, the 
Japanese intelligence agency, the KMT and the CCP all adopted strategies of employing 
female spies to infiltrate each other’s organisations during the war: by setting ‘honey traps’, 
these female special agents could access classified information comparatively easily from 
male authorities. The Disguiser represents these intelligence strategies in dramatic form: the 
above-mentioned female characters are portrayed as having a variety of skills essential to 
carry out their intelligence missions. They possess not only explicitly feminine qualities, such 
as having attractive faces and bodies, being kind and sometimes sentimental which makes 
them look vulnerable and thus easily trusted by men, but also strength and ability traditionally 
associated with men, such as assertiveness, courage, and being competitive, which enable 
them to complete their missions in more efficient ways. 
Figure 7.5: Feng Yulan, a Communist warrior in 
the CCTV-1 drama, Eighth Route Army (2005) 
Figure 7.6: Cheng Jinyun, the Communist 
undercover agent in The Disguiser (2015) 
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In many ways, these depictions are quite unlike CCTV-1’s women warriors, who are often 
designed to be discreet, asexual, and devoid of female characteristics. For instance, they 
normally wear the same military uniforms as men, without attractive makeups or hair styling 
(see Fig. 7.5). By contrast, The Disguiser introduces the image of the sexy female spy, which 
has largely extended the narrative space for female characters. If Cheng Jinyun’s outfit 
remains aligned with the image of Communists as morally decent and sexually pure (Fig. 7.6), 
Yu Manli and Wang Manchun represent the ‘femme fatale’ – quite literally deadly women who 
are sexually attractive and master the art of killing. During her missions, Yu Manli wears 
various fancy dresses with guns hidden underneath, as she needs different identities to cover 
herself as a spy (Fig. 7.7). Wang Manchun, the villain in this drama, is a cruel spymaster who 
often tortures her prisoners to death. In order to present her ‘professionalism’ and cruelty, she 
often wears uniforms and trench coats, coupled with delicate hairstyles and makeups. 
Particularly, her red lips signify that she is sexually attractive but harmful, deceptive and brutal 
(Fig. 7.8).  
The difference between the images of the Communist female warriors and other fighters 
coincides with Edwards’s (2016: 158) observation that the post-war popular representations 
of Chinese history often depict ‘our side’ as immaculate fighters and ‘their side’ as the source 
of ‘dirty tricks’. This assertion is partially true in the aspects that the Communist agent Cheng 
Jinyun is depicted as a morally upright fighter, maintaining a ‘clean’ romantic relationship with 
Ming Tai and remaining devoted to the revolutionary cause, whereas the collaborationist 
spymaster Wang Manchun is a counter-revolutionary schemer who uses her sexuality to both 
undermine Ming Lou’s loyalty to the revolutionary cause and make him loyal to herself. 
However, it would be imprecise to simply label any KMT member as ‘us’ or ‘them’. As we can 
see from Yu Manli, she has a ‘dirty’ past (as a cold-hearted murderer and prisoner), often uses 
her seductive and enchanting appearance to distract the enemy, hence appearing to be 
Figure 7.8: Wang Manchun, Director of 
Department 76. The Disguiser (2015) 
Figure 7.7: Yu Manli, a KMT Juntong spy 
The Disguiser (2015) 
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morally degraded; but, judging by her anti-Japanese stance, she still tends to be on ‘our side’. 
In addition, Yu Manli’s undeclared love for Ming Tai and the courageous sacrifice of her life 
invite the sympathy of the audience. This once again reflects the changing attitude towards 
the KMT in the popular representations of the Anti-Japanese War. Moreover, the female 
characters fight in a spy war dominated by men, but demonstrate their distinctive feminine 
techniques and traits. They have thus become increasingly important elements in the popular 
representations of the revolutionary war. As noted by Edwards (ibid.: 9), depictions of female 
wartime spies as seductive agents have become an effective way to ‘eroticise war for 
consumers of popular culture products’. 
To summarise, by depicting a group of secret agents with complicated identities and 
personal dilemmas, The Disguiser presents espionage as an important part of the 
revolutionary war. Instead of focusing on dispersed revolutionaries and underground guerrillas 
fighting around the big city (as depicted in Struggles), this drama provides another perspective 
on the urban anti-Japanese struggle, which features a capitalist family in Shanghai. Whereas 
the 2005 series captures audience attention through dramatic physical intimacy (fights, chases, 
crude comic behaviour etc), its 2015 counterpart commands attention through the portrayal of 
far more complex emotional intimacy. Through depictions of the Ming family’s devotion to the 
dangerous espionage work, their excellent disguising skills, as well as their sacrifice of 
personal feelings, lives and family interests, the producers have managed to integrate 
individualising plotlines with the collective agenda of fighting against the enemy, thereby 
delivering the message that only the Communist Party can lead Chinese people to victory. 
Apart from depicting the Communist heroes and patriotic KMT spies, The Disguiser also 
introduces attractive female spies in order to popularise the revolutionary narrative. The 
representation of their femininity is dramatically different from those of Communist female 
fighters in the CCTV-1 dramas, yet still displays variations in accordance with their political 
affiliations. Notably, the Communist female agents in this drama are depicted as morally 
upright and chaste, whereas the villain in the ‘puppet’ regime is portrayed as seductive, evil 
and deadly harmful. This differentiation is indicative of the CCP’s moral code that Communist 
heroes/heroines are seen as chaste. Nevertheless, these female characters, as well as their 
romantic entanglement with male protagonists, have greatly illuminated the murky world of 
intelligence war for the audience.   
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The two dramas aired on Hunan TV tell a new kind of story about the revolutionary past, 
which entails complex revolutionary identities, urban environments, and abundant excitement. 
As we find from the diachronic comparison of the two TV serials, fictionalised revolutionary 
narratives have evolved from relying on earlier PRC revolutionary classics to favouring more 
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complicated, thrilling and inviting stories. Taking the popular 2015 drama – The Disguiser – 
as an example, recent productions have placed the narrative focus on exploring internal 
conflicts and emotional dilemmas of the revolutionaries. What is central to this change is a 
strategy of emotionalising the revolutionary past, by which these dramas make concessions 
to the viewers’ living experiences, particularly their emotional life and working experience. In 
addition, popular aesthetic forms favoured by contemporary audiences are also used in The 
Disguiser, which feature the depiction of a powerful capitalist family and the posh lifestyle of 
urban dwellers. This combination of affluence and revolution has provided a new narrative 
formula for the collective agenda of constructing nationalism. These new narrative traits were 
relatively absent in the TV adaptations of Red Classics which were popular a decade earlier. 
The 2005 serial Struggles demonstrates that due to many political restrictions and reactions 
from the audience, the Red-Classics TV serials could only rely on stereotypical characters 
(e.g. stupid traitors, immature young female agents), as well as some intense fighting scenes, 
to attract the audience. These are rather limited narrative techniques, judging by today’s 
standards.  
With the advent of multi-screen viewing patterns in China since 2013 (Zhang, 2014), as well 
as with Xi Jinping’s call for achieving the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’, Chinese 
TV producers are faced with more challenges when trying to make the revolutionary legacies 
both popular and politically useful. Apart from the twisted plot and personal dilemmas of main 
characters, The Disguiser relies on a variety of visual and potentially entertaining elements, 
such as sexy (female) spies, glamorous upper-class lifestyle, and romantic interest involving 
the Communist couple Ming Tai and Cheng Jinyun. It might well be the case that the addition 
of these elements to the narrative of revolution will complicate debates over the ‘authentic’ 
revolutionary ethos in the past and its relation to the new representations in the present. 
However, these approaches have revitalised the past revolutionary legacies, thereby 
facilitating current propaganda work.  
Despite the development in narrative strategies, what has remained the same is the 
omnipotent images of Communist heroes and their sacrifice in achieving the revolutionary 
goals. As Yang (2012) has argued, the Communist authorities’ consistent promotion of 
revolutionary heroes serves to provide legitimacy for the regime. On the one hand, the 
omnipotence of the heroes symbolises the CCP’s efforts and abilities in achieving victory in 
the Anti-Japanese War; on the other hand, the success of the Communist regime is worthy of 
the sacrifice of the heroes, especially the female revolutionaries. Both Struggles and The 
Disguiser have revealed the necessity of revolution by depicting the sacrifice (of personal life 
or emotional interests) of the revolutionaries. In the nationalist discourse of resisting foreign 
enemies, they implant a clear propagandistic message desired by the political authority: only 
the CCP is the legitimate ruling party of China. This propaganda content not only exists in 
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dramas aired on Hunan TV, but more extensively prevails in CCTV-1’s revolution-themed 
dramas, which offer a more mainstream revolutionary narrative. 
At the same time, there are clear differences in the narratives of revolution on CCTV-1 and 
Hunan TV. While CCTV-1’s historical dramas pay more attention to the achievement and 
leadership of political leaders, the treatment of fictional characters on Hunan TV allows a more 
diverse exploration of (fictitious) individuals’ revolutionary stories, and bolder imaginations of 
their emotional experiences. In general, the revolutionary stories retold here are in line with 
the trend in revolution-related cultural works towards turning to the personal dimension by 
focusing on individual emotions and experiences. This turn reflects the compromise between 
propaganda strategies, the market, and popular culture. Yet within the politically permitted 
realm, Hunan TV has been allowed more freedom to adopt various aesthetic elements and 
plot types, so as to popularise Communist doctrine of heroism and devotion. 
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Chapter 8 
Soap Operas for Social Education and Political Propaganda:  
Love Themes in CCTV-1 
 
In the previous two chapters we saw how contemporary TV dramas represented the 
politically important theme of revolution on two differently oriented channels. In chapters 8 and 
9, I shift the focus towards a theme that is not explicitly political, and examine how propaganda 
and entertainment play out in love-themed TV dramas. As the quantitative results suggest in 
chapter 5, the past twenty-six years have seen a rising trend in the percentage of TV dramas 
treating the subject of love on both CCTV-1 and Hunan TV. Love-themed dramas hence 
comprise an integral part of domestic TV drama production in recent years. They mainly focus 
on domestic living spaces and explore the emotional life of contemporary ordinary citizens. 
Yet, in the previous chapters we have also found that in representing a political issue, namely 
the revolution, personalised narratives became increasingly prevalent. This involved closer 
examination of personal feelings and dilemmas in the revolutionary past. In this chapter, I 
analyse three love-themed serial dramas selected from CCTV-1, in an attempt to examine 
how the politically important TV channel promotes seemingly personal issues, and how the 
subjects of love, romance and family have been integrated into the political framework of Party 
propaganda and social education, while at the same time catering to the interest of 
contemporary audiences.  
 
8.1 Soap Operas in China: ‘A blend of entertainment and education’ 
The theme of love, or in a broader sense, people’s emotional relationships, did not become 
a popular subject for Chinese TV drama producers until the 1990s. Prior to 1990, the small 
screen was dominated by either imported TV dramas from the US, Brazil, Mexico, Hong Kong 
and Japan, or domestically produced TV serials reflecting on the revolution, past political 
turmoil and social change (Yin, 2002). Narratives regarding domestic space and personal 
relationships were absent from this period. Kong (2008: 75) explains that the absence of 
personal narratives was due to the cultural legacy of socialist realism formulated since the late 
1940s, a process when the socialist state had sought to ‘appropriate and erase private space 
from social imagination and artistic representation’. As discussed in chapter 7, the suppression 
of individual aspirations for the sake of the collective good can also be seen in the revolution-
themed works created during the highly politicised socialist period (1949-1976) as a result of 
the politicised national culture. However, a decade after the beginning of economic reform, 
the rapid expansion of television nationwide and the increased broadcasting time urged 
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Chinese TV producers to open up new topics to satisfy the audience demands for more TV 
programmes.  
Media scholars (Wang and Singhal, 1992; Rofel, 1994; Zha, 1995; Yin, 2002; Keane 2005; 
Kong, 2008; Zhu, 2008) and Chinese television practitioners alike have generally agreed that 
the huge popularity of the 1990 drama Yearnings marked the starting point of domestic TV 
dramas centred on the love experiences of ordinary people, and thereafter encouraged the 
soap-opera style on Chinese TV screen. The success of Yearnings was not a chance 
occurrence. This fifty-episode serial drama depicted the joy and sorrow of two couples living 
in Beijing’s winding alleyways. It drew special attention to their life changes between the late 
1960s and 1980s, a period when the influence of the Cultural Revolution was penetrating the 
daily life of ordinary people, causing suspicion and estrangement in human relationships. 
Yearnings was released to widespread acclaim from the public, allegedly receiving an 
audience share of up to 90%.31 The sensational success of this TV serial was not only due to 
its proximity to real life, which helped the audience reflect on and release the negative feelings 
accumulated during the political turmoil. Equally important was its creation of a role model, Liu 
Huifang, which led lots of audiences to emulate her and cherish the beauty of traditional 
cultural values, such as selflessness and social harmony (Wang and Singhal, 1992). The latter 
point was particularly pertinent for the Chinese society which had just experienced the 1989 
Tiananmen Square protests. The drama’s focus on the resolution of family conflicts and its 
promotion of pro-social values and behaviour were also considered highly important by the 
Chinese government for promoting social harmony and stability. For this reason, Li Ruihuan, 
a Politburo member in charge of propaganda at that time, praised the production team of 
Yearnings in person, for their embedding of a ‘traditional Chinese view of human relations in 
a socialist context’ (Wang and Singhal, 1992: 184). He called on national media workers to 
imitate this drama and insert ‘socialist principles and moral virtues’ into artistic creation, 
making the entertainment genre speak to the broad masses and thereby educate them (Zha, 
1995: 28). The praise from the political leadership indicated that Chinese government 
recognised the pedagogical function of soap opera and was determined to exploit this genre 
more. Based on these facts, Wang and Singhal (1992) argue that Yearnings initiated a unique 
kind of soap opera in China that is characterised by a blend of entertainment and education, 
with an underlying purpose of political propaganda.  
This argument is certainly evident, because ever since the success of Yearnings, the early 
1990s saw a boom of soap operas on Chinese TV screen. These displayed not only the 
 
31 The specific figure of the audience share gained by Yearnings around 1990 is still debatable, in that there were 
no reliable measurement methods in the early 1990s. However, what can be sure is that the reactions triggered 
by Yearnings were unprecedented. Numerous newspaper articles of that time could confirm the overwhelming 
audience response to this first-of-a-kind soap opera.  
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themes of love, romance and family, but also socially and politically relevant content. Looking 
at the hit dramas of the 1990s, such as Love It to the Limit (Guobayin, 1994), Beijinger in New 
York (Beijingren zai niuyue, 1994), Love on the Pearl River (Qing man zhujiang, 1994) and 
Holding Hands (Qianshou, 1999), we find that in narrating the love relationships between 
leading characters, these dramas also offered implicit social commentary on market reform, 
cultural collision, unemployment, generational conflicts etc. Some of the content in these 
dramas are directly linked to justifying government policies – as we shall see in my detailed 
analysis of Holding Hands below. This feature of Chinese TV soaps to a great extent differs 
from soap operas made in the western context.  
Originally broadcast as daytime radio programmes to fill the free time of stay-at-home 
housewives, Western soaps frequently picture a fictional reality by portraying characters 
‘getting into trouble and out again’ (Herzog, 1941: 66). By picking topics that match women’s 
quotidian concerns, soap operas provided the audience with an emotional release, remedies 
to adjust their life, and help them overcome the dullness in their everyday life and work (ibid.). 
Because of this inherent closeness to the emotional needs of women, Harrington (2016) 
maintains that the foci of TV soaps are predominantly occupied by familial and romantic 
relationships, as well as their corresponding subjects, gender and sexuality; compared to 
these, other socially relevant identities, such as race, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, are 
largely marginalised from the narratives. But this does not mean that personal issues depicted 
in Western soaps have nothing to do with social or political relevance. As Harrington (ibid.) 
went on to state, feminist scholars have sought to establish the connection between women’s 
consumption of soap operas and female empowerment. They tend to highlight the significance 
of soaps by asserting that soap operas have provided a significant site which brings women’s 
concerns and pursuits to the central stage of public awareness. In this process, women, on 
the basis of traditional female principles disclosed through soap operas, are empowered to 
confront the patriarchal order (see Brunsdon, 1995; Rapping, 2002). However, the politics 
indicated through Western soaps have little in common with the political function prescribed 
for Chinese soap opera, particularly in those ones created by state-sponsored production units. 
In the Chinese context, soap-opera-style TV dramas have opened up ‘a cultural forum for 
various social groups and ideological agents to make sense of dramatic social changes and 
to address the everyday emotional concerns of Chinese viewers’ (Kong, 2008: 77). In this 
respect, Chinese soap opera actually undertakes the role of a mediator, connecting personal 
experience to wider social, economic and political changes. Kong (2008) argues that modern 
cultural values (e.g. individualism, materialism, cosmopolitism) have brought unprecedented 
challenges to traditional family values, which at times shake the love and marital relationships 
built on revolutionary socialist ideals in China. Dramas depicting the contemporary life of 
ordinary Chinese people appear to offer solutions to individual pains, sorrows, and family 
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conflicts resulting from the socioeconomic reforms. In a similar vein, Li (2011) states that 
Chinese soap operas provide the (not necessarily female) audience with a superficial pleasure 
of satisfaction regarding the past and present by showing them happy endings or providing 
social criticism on issues that have failed to draw public attention in reality. This resembles the 
function of Western soap opera in the sense of helping people ‘get out of trouble’. In the 
analysis in this chapter, I want to show that in the Chinese context, the ‘trouble’ people get 
into is directly or indirectly associated with the Party-state’s economic reforms, its relevant 
policies, political movements or historical developments. In the process of offering life advice 
on personal issues, the Chinese soap-opera-style TV dramas have sought to help the 
audience understand and adjust to the social and political changes occurred since the ‘reform 
and opening’. 
In the following sections, I draw on three cases to illustrate how Chinese soap operas since 
the 1990s, revolving around the emotional dimension of individual life and produced to 
entertain TV audiences, have exercised their educational and propagandistic functions. The 
three dramas were chosen from CCTV-1, so as to facilitate a comparison to Hunan TV (dealt 
with in chapter 9) in representing the theme of love: Holding Hands (Qianshou, 1999) depicts 
the marriage crisis and emotional experience of an urban couple; My Youthfulness (Wo de 
qingchun shui zuozhu, 2009) focuses on the lives of three female cousins, representing their 
attitudes to love, family and work; My Year of 1997 (Wo de 1997, 2017) traces the love 
entanglements between a hard-working young man and two girls, set against the background 
of Hong Kong’s colonial history. The former two dramas are both Feitian Award winners and 
were well received when aired on CCTV-1. My Year of 1997 was broadcast in June 2017 in 
tandem with the national campaign for the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s ‘handover’. Hence 
this drama was endowed with great official expectations and political significance. All three 
dramas have gained official approval in different ways regarding their depiction of the lives of 
ordinary Chinese people. While I am interested in finding out how the development of narrative 
elements across the three dramas have responded to consumerist trends as well as the 
changing socio-political context, I also aim to highlight the narrative conventions in the CCTV-
1 love dramas that are potentially different from Hunan TV. 
 
8.2 Holding Hands: Regaining love and success through self-improvement 
Holding Hands is an eighteen-episode serial drama, centring on the emotional experience 
of an urban middle-aged couple. The drama was jointly produced in 1998 by China 
International Television Corporation – a state-owned television production enterprise founded 
in 1984, and a private production company – Beijing Jinse Chitang Media Company Limited. 
It began airing at CCTV-1’s prime-time evening slots from 9 April 1999 on a daily basis, 
achieving an average of 9.2% audience share (CCTV, 1999). This figure is among the highest 
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with respect to TV dramas focusing on realistic themes. As one of the first few TV dramas 
touching upon the topic of extramarital affairs, Holding Hands became a hit and later in the 
same year as it was broadcast, garnered both Feitian and Jinying awards for, among others, 
Best Director and Excellent Drama. The success of this drama is partly attributed to its officially 
recognised production team led by Yang Yang, a multi-award-winning director who works for 
CCTV’s China TV Series Production Centre32 (CTPC). More importantly, the drama provided 
a reflection on the marriage and family crisis of urbanites, which resonated profoundly with 
contemporary audiences, in terms of their feelings and confusions accumulated since the 
reform era. Focusing on the plot and main characters of this drama, particularly personal 
dilemmas and conflicts, I will subsequently identify the narrative strategies that account for 
this TV serial’s sensational success. Based on the textual content analysis, I will examine how 
the personal narratives disclosing the protagonists’ internal emotional experience have been 
integrated with the interpretation of social changes. I will thereby illustrate the emotional impact, 
educational function and political implication associated with this drama.   
Set in a big city in the 1990s, the story traces the marital life and emotional predicament of 
a middle-aged couple, Xia Xiaoxue and Zhong Rui. At the beginning of the story, the wife, 
Xiaoxue, finds herself stuck in the dullness and repetition of day-to-day life. With no ambitious 
goals for career advancement, she develops an increasingly bad temper. As the story unfolds, 
Xiaoxue reveals that many years ago she had a chance to become a professional woman with 
a promising career ahead, but in order to better take care of her family, she sacrificed her 
career and chose an undemanding library job. She thinks her husband should cherish her for 
the sake of her sacrifice. However, her loving husband, Zhong Rui, a talented software 
engineer caring more about work than family, gradually loses interest in and patience with her. 
Instead, he falls for a female colleague, Wang Chun, who is younger and more attractive than 
Xiaoxue. After experiencing many fights and quarrels, Xiaoxue accepts that Zhong Rui is 
leaving her. After the divorce, Zhong Rui becomes increasingly successful in running his own 
company, whilst Xiaoxue is made redundant as a result of the market-oriented reforms in 
state-owned enterprises, becoming unemployed. In striving to raise her son and manage the 
single-parent family, Xiaoxue starts to acquire new knowledge and adapts herself to a 
competitive working environment. Having eventually become a self-reliant woman, Xiaoxue 
receives love and respect from her ex-husband again. The drama ends there, indicating that 
Xiaoxue and Zhong Rui stand a chance to get back together. It is also indicative of the success 
of the self-realisation of women, which corresponds with the TV trope of modern women in the 
 
32 China TV Series Production Centre, founded on 18 October 1983, is a CCTV-owned production unit focusing on 
the creation and production of TV serials/series. In China’s 2009 television reform aimed at separating production 
and broadcasting, CTPC transformed from a public institution into an enterprise, and is owned, managed and 
controlled by CCTV. See CCTV (2010).  
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socialist state being more than capable at both workplace and household level (see Mihelj and 
Huxtable, 2018: 184-189; Imre, 2016: 200-217). But this seemingly clichéd happy ending is 
insufficient to explain why this drama became a hit in the late 1990s.  
Unlike the revolutionary themes, which are remote from the living experiences of urban 
audiences mostly born during the PRC period, divorce and extramarital affairs were 
comparatively more familiar and, to some urbanites who were experiencing difficulties in 
marriage, had become an urgent issue. As discussed in previous chapters, the post-reform 
emphasis on economic development greatly released individualistic aspirations. The shift in 
Party line also provided conditions for the reconfiguration of family, marriage, and gender 
relations, which can be exemplified by the 1980 revision of China’s marriage law, with the new 
version for the first time permitting divorce as the result of a breakdown of mutual affection 
(Xiao, 2009). In the Mao era, the official ideology encouraged women to participate in social 
production as men, as part of the strategies to achieve women’s liberation in China. This 
empowerment of women simultaneously downplayed gender differences and emphasised the 
masculinisation of women, thereby leading to a lack of individuated female consciousness 
(Leung, 2003). However, with the advent of the market economy, the reconfiguration of gender 
politics has further reinforced gender differences. The new articulation of masculinity was 
based around economic success and political power; the new identity of women involved more 
feminine, sexual qualities, as well as obedience to traditional patriarchal order (Leung, 2003; 
Xiao, 2009). This remodelling of gender relations has therefore posed threats to established 
family structures and marriage relationships. As noted by Kong (2008: 78-79), existing 
Chinese families and marriages based on ‘revolutionary socialist ideas’ have become ‘even 
more vulnerable to the various temptations and challenges of an increasingly materialist and 
individualistic society’. Those middle-aged housewives growing up in the ‘ungendered’ Mao 
era suddenly became unattractive to their husbands, and particularly disadvantaged in a 
society increasingly favouring young femininity. As a result, divorce rates have grown since 
the 1980s; many urban families suffered from extramarital affairs, as well as other illegal 
sexual practices and relationships.  
Another important socio-political background for Holding Hands is the market reforms in the 
1990s. The rapid marketisation also induced reforms in the state-owned sector – including 
public libraries where Xiaoxue works. As a result of the market-oriented restructuring, a large 
number of workers were laid off. According to China’s Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
during the reforms between 1998 and 2002, at least 26 million state workers lost their job, 
accounting for one third of the total number of unemployed (Shi, 2017). Among the 
unemployed, women made up a bigger proportion than men (Kong, 2012). In both the job 
market and emotional relationships, middle-aged, unemployed women found it difficult to 
compete with young professional women. Many of the former therefore faced the risk of 
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becoming double victims of unemployment and divorce (Wang, Z., 2003). Against the 
backdrop of these problems, Holding Hands in many aspects provided a reflection of and a 
response to the social reality.  
The airing of Holding Hands largely echoed with the issues and concerns faced by many 
TV viewers, which to a great extent accounted for the popularity of the drama. Through non-
judgmental depictions of the main characters, its makers invited TV audiences to reflect on 
their emotional lives and allowed for identification with the drama’s characters. As a 
newspaper article (Fu, 1999) suggests, the success of Holding Hands largely resided in its 
realistic attitude, which depicted life as it is and avoided moralistic lecturing, but rather let the 
audience develop their own judgement. The proximity to real-life situations and the neutral 
stance in depicting characters indeed made this drama stand out from its counterparts. There 
are no dramatic binary opposites between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ among the leading characters. The 
narrative focus tends to be placed on neither praising the self-sacrificial wife nor condemning 
the cheating husband, but on displaying the complexity of people’s emotional world. No 
character is perfect, and everyone is faced with internal and external conflicts. At the beginning, 
Xiaoxue is depicted as an ill-tempered housewife who is eager to be loved but cannot stop 
being resentful to her husband’s frequent absences. In the first episode, where Zhong Rui 
forgets about their wedding anniversary, Xiaoxue starts a fierce argument with him. In turn, 
Zhong Rui is increasingly annoyed by Xiaoxue’s temper. Meanwhile, with the obligation to 
support the family placed mainly on him, he needs to balance his personal life and job duties. 
Pressures at work provide him with an excuse to get away from family life, which gradually 
leads to his infidelity. While the ‘good people’ often show their flaws, the ostensibly ‘bad guys’ 
have their reasonable side. For instance, Wang Chun, the ‘third party’ in Xiaoxue and Zhong 
Rui’s marriage, is portrayed as sensible and calm. Aware of the traumatic experience she has 
brought to Xiaoxue, she decides to leave Zhong Rui for good. Before returning to her 
hometown, Wang Chun passes on a letter to Xiaoxue to apologise. In this letter, she also 
suggests Xiaoxue review her role as a wife, in particular the faults that have led to Zhong Rui’s 
betrayal. After reading the letter, Xiaoxue initially refuses to face up to her own problem. Later, 
she listens to her mother’s opinion on marriage as a process of compromise and gradually 
becomes less stubborn and open to changing herself. This shows that instead of simply 
blaming ‘the third wheel’ or the unfaithful husband for the failure of the marriage, Holding 
Hands seeks to present multiple perspectives on not only the couple themselves but also the 
mistress and the wife’s mother. In this way, each person involved in the failure of the marriage 
is justified and valorised in different ways, so that viewers find it easier to imagine themselves 
as one of the characters, thereby sympathising with their feelings. This potentially provided 
psychological relief for TV viewers going through similar emotional and moral dilemmas in a 
transitional society.  
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By presenting the emotional concerns of contemporary audiences in a sympathetic way, 
Holding Hands sought to offer life advice to the Chinese families which encountered 
family/marriage crisis in the 1990s. In this drama, guidance is given primarily by a supporting 
character, Xiaoxue’s mother (Fig. 8.1). This character resembles the prototype of ‘donor’ in 
Propp’s (1984) narrative theory, which is set to provide protagonists with valuable advice on 
how to restore their life balance whenever they feel confused and need help. As the only 
character from the older generation, Xiaoxue’s mother is portrayed as an insightful and 
respected figure, an embodiment of lifelong wisdom, who therefore has much advice to offer. 
In her seemingly random talk with Xiaobing 
(Xiaoxue’s younger sister), she expresses that 
marriage is a series of compromises between 
couples, and that what love can do is to bind two 
loving people together and then let communication 
and compromises help sustain the marriage. When 
Xiaoxue hits rock bottom, her mother urges her to 
stop complaining or playing the victim. Instead, she 
advises Xiaoxue to regain her self-esteem and 
continue to pursue her career, so that her daughter 
will feel less unbalanced in her relationship with 
Zhong Rui. The mother’s position as an elder in the 
family makes her advice trustworthy. After 
accepting her mother’s advice and finding a new job, 
Xiaoxue feels confident, enthusiastic and gradually understands the efforts Zhong Rui has 
made to support the family. In turn, when Xiaoxue is completely taken up by her new job and 
cannot spare time to look after their son, Zhong Rui takes over. After messing up every day 
with their breakfast and laundry, Zhong Rui understands the difficulties in looking after a child 
and a family. The exchange of roles allows the two people to rethink their self-worth, identity 
and gender roles. It also gives them a chance to know each other better. This subsequently 
helps rebuild mutual respect and love between the couple, as the final two episodes show. 
Through these plot sequences, and particularly the lines of the respectable mother, the 
producers attempted to convey that the main source of conflict between a couple might not 
only stem from a third party, but is most likely the result of a lack of communication and 
confidence. More importantly, the revelations of urban couple’s confusion and self-identity 
dilemmas provided an opportunity for the audience to reflect on and reconfigure their own life.  
As Herzog’s (1941) research shows, audiences enjoy soaps not only because these stories 
can offer them an emotional release but also due to audiences’ preference for potential advice 
obtained from the stories. This practical use of soap operas as remedies for adjusting lives is 
Figure 8.1: Xiaoxue’s mother 
Holding Hands (1999) 
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also seen from Chinese TV audiences, particularly so in the case of Holding Hands. For 
instance, a viewer (Douban, 2015) posted on the Douban33 page of Holding Hands, recalling 
that her life had in many ways resembled Xiaoxue’s life, and that watching this drama at the 
time let her realise how risky it was to live in a marriage lacking mutual understanding, 
communication and equality. Consequently, the viewer decided to quit her mediocre job, 
moved to her husband’s city and worked there, which in her view saved her marriage. In this 
way, we can find the potential function of social education associated with this drama. 
Yet, the significance of Holding Hands is not only limited to providing life advice in the private 
sphere. More importantly, through depicting the self-realisation of Xiaoxue – a former laid-off 
worker, the TV serial helped justify government policies on market reforms, especially in a 
period when a large scale of unemployment had led to social discontent. On the one hand, 
Holding Hands attempts to legitimise the market reforms by highlighting their positive side. In 
Xiaoxue’s discussions with her new friend, Shen Wuyi, a successful entrepreneur, the latter 
states that he is very grateful to the policy of market reform because without it he would not 
have been able to rise from rags to riches. On the other hand, the drama also portrays 
unemployment, the downside of market reforms, as an opportunity for self-realisation. After 
Xiaoxue becomes a divorced, laid-off worker due to the transformation of state enterprises – 
a worst-scenario bothering many middle-aged women at the time, she embarks on a route of 
self-professionalisation. For instance, she attends ‘evening school’ – a project launched by 
the government to give the unemployed workers specialised trainings and thereby facilitate 
reemployment. Encouraged by her mother, Xiaoxue learns to embrace new opportunities 
brought about by the market reform, which eventually leads her to an ideal job and greater 
confidence in both her workplace and her relations with men. By presenting unemployment as 
a second chance for laid-off workers, Holding Hands thus supports the notion that the Party-
states’ market reforms are correct.  
As Zhao (2002: 121) finds, official propaganda guidelines of that period instructed the media 
‘to acknowledge the problem [of laid-off workers], to promote non-sensational and constructive 
reporting’, and to highlight the government’s reemployment efforts. With regard to these 
guidelines, Kong (2012: 37) argues that the mass media’s approaches of rationalising market 
failure were twofold: one was to conceal the social trauma caused by it; the other was to 
package the story of reemployment success into a myth of the liberal market, calling on 
unemployed workers to learn from it. These two approaches are particularly evident in Holding 
Hands. On the one hand, this drama attributes the breakdown of marriages primarily to 
personal reasons, such as a lack of communication and of willingness to compromise, or 
 
33 Douban is a Chinese online database which provides information related to world films and TV programmes. 
On the web page of an individual film or TV programme, there is also space for Douban users to post comments 
and give ratings for the programme.   
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incompatibilities between couples. Comparatively, it puts much less emphasis on depicting 
Xiaoxue’s emotional and practical difficulties when she is unemployed, nor does it clearly point 
out the relation between her personal dilemma and the collective outcome of being laid off. 
On the other hand, the drama converts a story of midlife crisis to a myth of female self-
realisation. Through such representations, the burden of maintaining stability in working 
conditions was in effect shifted to the people, in that the people were encouraged to actively 
adjust to the new environment, so as to eventually realise their value. It should be noted that 
the key character who convinces Xiaoxue to change is her mother. In many scenes, the 
mother acts as an educator, or a propagandist, teaching not only the family members in the 
drama, but also the TV viewers on how to cope with life challenges resulting from the market 
reform. So far, we can see that this drama was inspired by the emotional confusion in a time 
of social transition. In turn, it helped justify these transitions by providing life advice, and 
furthermore upheld the Party’s polices on market reforms. In these ways, it came as little 
surprise this drama could win official recognition.  
 
8.3 My Youthfulness: Maintaining harmonious relations through communication 
Focusing on a different age group to Holding Hands, My Youthfulness portrays 
contemporary urban youths’ attitudes to love, marriage and work. The 32-part serial drama 
was directed by a prestigious Chinese TV drama director, Zhao Baogang, who gained fame 
as the co-director of Yearnings in 1989. Aside from the famous director, My Youthfulness also 
stars a group of youth idols, such as Lu Yi, Wang Luodan, Zhao Ziqi, Bai Baihe, some of whom 
became well-known stars in recent years. My Youthfulness was produced in 2008, primarily 
by Zhao’s Xinbaoyuan Film & TV Investment Cooperation. It began airing daily on CCTV-1 
from 12 to 28 April 2009, receiving an audience share as high as 9.8% on a single day 
(Renminwang, 2009a). After the first round of broadcasting, it was rebroadcast on several 
provincial satellite TV channels during daytime or prime-time slots. Regardless of the extent 
to which the rebroadcasts were driven by genuine audience interest, the drama has in effect 
led to a breadth of discussion regarding life pursuits of the young generation, family 
relationships and generational conflicts. In a seminar organised by the producers of My 
Youthfulness, media commentators highly praised this drama for its social relevance and 
educational function (Sina Entertainment, 2009). In the 28th Feitian Award ceremony, My 
Youthfulness also garnered a Feitian Award as the First Place, suggesting official recognition 
of this drama. How could a serial drama focusing on young people’s love story be socially and 
politically so significant? What kind of educational messages has it delivered? In this section, 
I shall analyse the leading characters and main conflicts represented in this drama, aiming to 
explore the relations between personal narratives of youth and the changing socio-political 
contexts. 
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Although framed as a family drama, My Youthfulness largely adopts the storytelling 
strategies of the ‘urban love-affairs’ drama (dushi aiqingju) and the ‘idol’ drama (ouxiangju) by 
focusing on the love story of youngsters. Set in contemporary Beijing, the drama traces three 
young women, Zhao Qingchu, Qian Xiaoyang and Li Pili, in particular their conflicts with their 
parents. The three characters are maternal cousins, having the same grandmother who is a 
retired Professor of Law (See Diagram 8.2). Their mothers are the Yang sisters, who were 
born and grew up in the Mao era.  Qingchu’s and Xiaoyang’s mothers, Yang Yi and Yang 
Shan, both became ‘rusticated youth’34 during the Cultural Revolution, being sent to rural 
areas near Shanghai and Yinchuan respectively. The two mothers’ fate after the political 
turmoil was terminated in 1976 resembles that of other rusticated youth, in that they have to 
live in the place they were sent to, far away from their hometown, Beijing. In the post-reform 
era, such people often regretted that they could not return to their native cities, but their 
children had more flexibility. In My Youthfulness, Qingchu has gone back to Beijing to study 
and since then has been living with their grandmother. Inspired by her example, Xiaoyang has 
quit her job, left her parents in Yinchuan and also moved to Beijing, wishing to start a new life 
there. The youngest cousin, Li Pili, has grown up in Beijing with her parents but is sent to the 
UK for education.  
 
34 The rusticated youth, also known as sent-down or ‘educated’ youth, refers to young people who were sent to 
remote areas of China from the 1950s to the end of the Cultural Revolution. This movement was initially designed 
to ease employment pressure in the big cities, and later echoed Mao Zedong’s call for the ‘Up to Mountains and 
Down to the Countryside’ (Zhishi qingnian shangshan xiaxiang) movement. The latter was initiated partly as a 
countermeasure to bourgeois thinking, which Mao believed to be prevalent in cities. As a result, around 12 to 18 
million of urban youth were relocated to mountainous or farming areas to engage in agricultural labour in this 
period. 
Diagram 8.2: Character relationships in My Youthfulness (2009) 
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Despite having been raised at different places, the three young characters share a similar 
dilemma: they want to take control of their own lives but are subject to different degrees of 
objection or intervention from parents. Xiaoyang falls in love with Fang Yu, a mechanic living 
in Beijing’s winding alleys. Considering Fang Yu’s job unstable and thus impossible to support 
a future life as a couple, Xiaoyang’s mother strongly disagrees with their relationship. Instead, 
she wants to match Xiaoyang with Gao Qi, a medical doctor, who according to Xiaoyang’s 
mother is able to provide a stable life for Xiaoyang. Qingchu’s boyfriend, Zhou Jin, is a 
successful young entrepreneur owning a real estate company, and therefore, from the 
perspective of the older generation, a perfect husband. However, as a promising, young 
lawyer, Qingchu thinks her current focus of life should be on advancing her career rather than 
entering into marriage. For this reason, she wants to keep independent from Zhou Jin, both 
financially and mentally. But this plan at times clashes with the will of her mother, who often 
seeks to take advantage of Zhou Jin’s power and wealth for the benefits of herself (e.g. to buy 
a flat from Zhou Jin’s company at a discount). Although Pili is not involved in any love 
relationship, her conflicts with her parents are also intense. Firstly, she stays secretly in Beijing, 
opening her own restaurant, which runs counter to her mother’s plans for her to study at 
Cambridge University; secondly, she meddles in her divorced father’s new romance with a 
waitress and works towards the remarriage of her parents, even though they have not got 
along with each other for many years. Different socio-economic status, living experiences and 
opinions thus set the backdrop for the subsequent arguments and conflicts among the 
members of three interrelated families across three generations.  
We have seen in previous chapters that the conflicts in revolutionary serials often take place 
between binary opposites of good and evil, brave and cowardly. In My Youthfulness, however, 
the narrative is primarily organised around the conflicts between young and old, a topic not 
only limited to the personal and private dimensions of individuals, but with a profound social 
significance. Generational conflicts between parents and adult children are not a unique topic 
to Chinese TV dramas, but rather a common theme in East Asian TV soap operas where the 
ideology of Confucian filial piety takes effect (Kang and Kim, 2011). The traditional virtue of 
filial piety rests upon a reciprocal relationship, in which the youngsters show respect and 
obedience to the elders, often because of the latter’s support when they were young. In film 
and TV representations, such traditional values result in paternalism or an ‘authority-
submission’ mode of communication between parents and their children (ibid.: 315). This 
creates lots of frictions between the generations, with adult children’s marital and career 
options becoming the primary issues of contention (see Lü, 2007; Kang and Kim, 2011).  
In My Youthfulness, conflicts among main characters also reflect different attitudes to love 
and career. Moreover, family issues are often interwoven with certain historical experiences 
of the older generation. This is especially true of the Cultural Revolution, which deeply 
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influenced the lives of the three Yang sisters. Having experienced the collectivist enthusiasm 
in the Mao era, they find it difficult to understand their self-centred, post-1980s (balinghou) 
children, who were born into and grew up in a more individualised, capitalised society. At the 
same time, trials and tribulation experienced by the elder generation during their adolescence 
make them choose a stable life trajectory for their children. However, such paternalistic 
arrangements of imposing a way of life on adult children often lead to misunderstandings and 
conflicts between the two generations in the TV serial.  
In order to systematically delineate the various conflicts and relate them to the real-life 
concerns of the audience, this drama introduces three distinct young characters from different 
demographic background. The three families are a microcosm of Chinese society at large. 
Xiaoyang is portrayed as a wayward girl from a working-class family in Yinchuan. Her 
aspirations to wealth and success, combined with a lack of willpower and working skills, often 
lead her into trouble, making her a rebellious figure within the extended family. In contrast to 
Xiaoyang’s wilfulness, Qingchu is represented as a sensible, ambitious, well-educated young 
professional. Having grown up in a middle-class, single-parent family (her father died before 
the story begins), Qingchu understands the importance of having a career and tends to see it 
as the only resource that can give her a sense of security. In contrast to her two cousins, Pili 
was born with a silver spoon in her mouth, owing to the success of her mother’s business. 
Better living conditions enable her to have more opportunities, but none of her choices conform 
to what her mother wants. The three young people and their families resemble many Chinese 
families off screen since the economic reforms, which enables viewers to recognise 
themselves in the drama. 
The three main characters’ conflicts with their parents unfold as a result of their choices in 
terms of love and work, as mentioned earlier in this section. But rather than dismissing the 
conflicts as trivialities of everyday life, the drama incorporates unexpected accidents and 
melodramatic turns into the story of each family. In Xiaoyang’s case, her mother’s strong 
objection to her love relationship with Fang Yu, prompts the two young adults’ plan to elope. 
When they appear at the railway station, Xiaoyang’s father shows up and seeks to take 
Xiaoyang back with him to Yinchuan. It is at this moment that Fang Yu’s motorbike accidentally 
bumps into the father, causing spinal injury and possible paralysis. This sudden tragedy turns 
Xiaoyang’s family life upside down. Yang Yi and Yang Er take this opportunity to conclude that 
‘they should not have let the children take control of their lives’. They think Xiaoyang’s 
wilfulness has led to the father’s tragedy. Similarly, Qingchu’s love story encounters twists as 
well. When Qingchu finds herself deeply in love with Zhou Jin and prepares to get married, 
her lover becomes a suspect in a crime case she is working on. Although her mother asks her 
to keep distance from Zhou, Qingchu wants to go ahead with marrying him, but inevitably sees 
herself as caught up in a dilemma. According to television scholar Dai Qing (2007), the use of 
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sudden tragic events in Chinese family dramas is a tool to create dramatic tension, so as to 
better reflect the development of characters from being immature to becoming a sensible and 
responsible adult. This is certainly applicable to, for example, the character development of 
Xiaoyang, who changes dramatically through her father’s accident, developing from a carefree 
girl into a responsible young adult.  
However, it is more likely that such dramatisation serves to perform an educational function. 
By showing the negative consequences of disobedient, rebellious behaviour, the drama on 
the one hand tends to highlight the failure of young adults who disregard parental advice. 
Qingchu’s insistence on taking full control of her own life means she also needs to confront 
her emotional dilemmas alone and without help. Pili’s decision to open a restaurant and her 
meddling in her father’s marital choices make everyone in her family unhappy. On the other 
hand, depicting tragic outcomes of generational conflicts demonstrates the failure of parents 
through ineffective, inappropriate intervention in their children’s lives. For instance, Xiaoyang’s 
parents insist on taking her to Yinchuan so as to force a breakup of her relationship, which 
eventually leads to her father’s physical injury. In a similar manner, Pili’s mother forces her 
daughter to vicariously realise the former’s dream of studying at a prestigious university 
abroad, which deepens the rift between the two. The traumatic experiences of the characters 
suggest that none of the parents’ decisions or advice really works. The drama therefore 
delivers the educational message that these unilateral actions are not helpful and that an 
effective strategy of communication and negotiation between different generations is needed.  
To alleviate the conflicts between family members, and thereby depicting these people 
‘getting out of trouble’, this drama also relies on the authoritative figure, Lang Xinping, a senior 
intellectual, grandmother of the three cousins, and mother of the Yang sisters. As in Holding 
Hands, the grandmother is portrayed as a respected figure having lifelong wisdom. In contrast 
Figure 8.3: The three generations are having a family meeting. My Youthfulness (2009) 
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to her daughters’ discouraging attitude and ineffective guidance, the grandmother is 
supportive of the youngsters throughout the drama, and always provides insightful advice to 
the granddaughters. For instance, when the Yang sisters express their opinion that one should 
marry for material advantage, the grandmother heavily criticises them for interfering in 
Qingchu’s emotional world and approves Qingchu’s decision of marrying for love. She thus 
appears to be the only competent educator in the extended family. More importantly, she acts 
as a mediator, working towards alleviating the family conflicts between her daughters and their 
adult children. She suggests having family meetings as a necessary way to communicate 
equally. Following the dramatic changes in their lives, we finally see the three generations 
sitting around a table, each family member expressing their views in meaningful and more 
respectful ways (see Fig. 8.3). In the end, all characters have become calm and sensible, 
which indicate that the core value expressed in Chinese family dramas is harmony within the 
family. 
So far, we have seen that this drama starts off as a youth drama that centres on young 
peoples’ love relationships and career struggles, but ends up a hybridised family drama, 
dedicated to family problem-solving. Also, rather than encouraging the individualities of 
youngsters, the drama puts more efforts into promoting the value of family harmony. 
Maintaining harmonious family relationships is not only socially important but politically correct 
in the Chinese context, especially in the mid-2000s. As discussed in chapter 3, ‘building a 
harmonious society’ was a political slogan promoted by the Party-state during President Hu 
Jintao’s tenure. Borrowing from Confucian thinking on social harmony, this political vision 
strove to maintain stability and stressed sustainable development in every aspect of society, 
despite concurrently obscuring problems such as social inequality and corruption. In 
Confucian thought, families are considered the basic unit of social structure; and the stability 
of the family becomes a prerequisite for maintaining social stability. In this context, Chinese 
family dramas, which are often formulated within the framework of Confucian family ethics, 
play the role of a mediator linking official ideology to ordinary people’s family lives (Peng, 
2007).  
First, they pick up the political vision of the Party and insert it into the private lives of the 
characters. In My Youthfulness, the word ‘harmony’ or ‘harmonious’ often appears in 
conversations. In a scene where Pili and her father are exchanging views on marriage, the 
father maintains that people at his age still considering remarriage would search for a partner 
capable of maintaining a harmonious relationship with them (xingge hexie), paying less 
attention to educational level or romantic feelings. In the same episode, when Xiaoyang is 
sneaking out of Fang Yu’s house, she is caught by a staff member of Resident Committee 
(juweihui) who regards this as a violation of public order. The head of the Resident Committee 
requests a written guarantee from Xiaoyang stating that, she will never again violate shared 
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norms by working with the committee towards building a harmonious society. These are two 
examples illustrating the embedding of political ideologies in ordinary people’s everyday lives. 
Second, by providing useful tips of dealing with conflicts between spouses, parents and 
children, as well as between young people and their employers, these family dramas 
emphasise the importance of harmony in people’s domestic and social lives (ibid.: 26). In My 
Youthfulness, this is achieved through the character of the insightful grandmother. Even 
though the advice in relation to mutual respect, equal dialogues and negotiation, might seem 
to underestimate the complexity of human relations and the internal emotional worlds of 
individuals, they nevertheless have the potential to reinforce the ideology of familial harmony, 
thereby contributing to social harmony and stability. The generational conflicts depicted in My 
Youthfulness have therefore reflected the issues faced by lots of Chinese households caught 
up in the confusion of the transitional period between socialism and reform. It has also 
demonstrated the distinct Chinese characteristics of the soap-opera-style dramas, informed 
by both traditional Confucian culture and the mark of China’s socio-political transition.     
 
8.4 My Year of 1997: Embracing the ‘Chinese dream’ through a personalised 
story 
Compared with the former two TV dramas, My Year of 1997 demonstrates a case of 
stronger correlation between personal success and economic and political reforms. Framed 
as a period drama, it depicts the life story of Gao Jianguo, particularly the emotional 
vicissitudes that he and his family experience between 1976 and 1997, a period in which both 
Hong Kong and mainland China were undergoing drastic transformations. The 32-episode TV 
serial was jointly produced by CCTV, Xinhua Winshare Publishing and Media Co. Ltd, and 
other independent production companies. It began filming in 2016 and aired on CCTV-1 from 
late June to July 2017. As mentioned at the outset, broadcasting this drama was to echo the 
national celebration on 1 July 2017, the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s ‘return’ to China. 
Therefore, the authorities placed high expectations on showing this drama. Official 
newspapers noted that this drama showcased the new era created by the ‘reform and opening’ 
policy, as well as reflecting the vitality and prosperity of Hong Kong society brought by the 
principle of ‘one country, two systems’35 (Renminwang, 2017). Thus, at first sight, My Year of 
1997 has a more explicitly propagandistic meaning compared to the two dramas discussed 
earlier in this chapter. The previous two sections have also made us aware that CCTV-1’s 
prime-time serial dramas show a social and political alignment with the periods that saw their 
 
35 ‘One country, two systems’ is a constitutional principle formulated by Deng Xiaoping, former political leader 
of the PRC. He suggested after the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to the PRC, Hong Kong would retain its 
own economic and administrative systems for a period of 50 years, while the rest of China would adhere to the 
socialist system with Chinese characteristics. 
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creation. It is therefore reasonable to speculate that, even though My Year of 1997 is set in a 
comparatively distant past time, it still aligns itself with the political ideology at the present time, 
namely, with regard to the ‘Chinese dream’ promoted by the current paramount leader, Xi 
Jinping. By focusing on the narrative devices, as well as the plot and character developments, 
I shall examine how a personal life story is inscribed into the Communist Party’s reform 
discourse, thereby establishing the link between a seemingly nostalgic story of individual 
development and the Party’s present political goals.  
As indicated by its title, My Year of 1997 adopts an individualistic approach of narration, 
tracing the life story of the male lead character, Gao Jianguo, from his youth. In 1976, Jianguo 
and his girlfriend, An Hui, also belong to the generation of ‘rusticated youth’ and work in a 
remote area of Inner Mongolia. When they take a holiday to their hometown, Beijing, they 
decide to announce their love relationship to the parents. But this relationship is strongly 
rejected by An Hui’s family, especially her brother, An Guoqing, because Jianguo’s father was 
a purged ‘rightist’ intellectual. Instead, An Hui’s parents want to match her with Wang Le, the 
son of a political commissar. In a violent altercation, Jianguo accidentally breaks An Guoqing’s 
skull, leaving the latter in coma for months. For fear of being sentenced to jail, Jianguo flees 
to British-governed Hong Kong. The plot then becomes more twisted as Jianguo’s mother, 
Yue Fangying, an upright police officer who has absorbed the revolutionary ethos and belief 
in the collective, seeks to bring Jianguo to justice, ending up in Hong Kong as well. In the late 
1970s, fleeing to Hong Kong was a capital offense in the PRC. Mother and son therefore have 
no other option but to stay in Hong Kong and start over again. However, this is no easy task 
in a society totally different to Beijing. Constantly blackmailed and threatened by corrupt police 
officers, they are determined to integrate into the new environment. Encouraged and 
supported by his mother, Jianguo is admitted to the University of Hong Kong. During this 
process of self-improvement, he becomes acquainted with a Hong Kong real estate magnate, 
Li Jiansheng, who appreciates Jianguo’s talent and agrees with his daughter marrying Jianguo. 
Sponsored by his father-in-law, Jianguo launches his real estate company and becomes a 
businessman. When Hong Kong is approaching to the date of ‘handover’, many rich Hong 
Kong residents prepare to transfer their property and migrate abroad. But Jianguo chooses to 
stay in Hong Kong, because he has faith in Hong Kong’s future led by socialist China.  
On the surface, this is a typical story of ‘rags to riches’, in that it depicts the individual tale 
of Jianguo from absolute obscurity to wealth and influence. What makes this drama more than 
a soap opera is primarily the narrative technique of combining a fictional story with the style of 
a documentary, which features archival footage and voice-over commentaries. The story 
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follows two narrative threads. In addition to presenting Jianguo and his mother’s life in 
colonised Hong Kong, it also depicts the changes in Jianguo’s father’s, brother’s, and ex-
girlfriend’s lives on the mainland. In doing so, historical footage and voice-over explanations 
are occasionally inserted into the narration of mundane life situations. As the director 
explained, the use of archival footage reflects a realistic approach to displaying the major 
events that emerged from the Party’s economic and political reforms, thereby immersing the 
audience into the time frame and narrative space of the drama (Yang, 2017). Basically, the 
director wanted to highlight the positive impact of the Party’s reforms, particularly the ‘return’ 
of Hong Kong to China, on ordinary people’s lives.  
Therefore, from the fifth episode onwards, we can see the somewhat obtrusive insertion of 
historical events into the sequence of plots about main characters’ life struggles. These events 
include the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the resumption of university entrance 
examinations in 1977, the holding of the Third Plenary Session of the CCP’s Eleventh Central 
Committee in 1978 (that marked the beginning of the ‘reform and opening’ policy), the 15th 
meeting of the Fifth National People’s Congress in 1980 (that agreed on developing five 
special economic zones on the southern coast of China, close to Hong Kong), the 1982 
meeting between British Prime Minister Thatcher and China’s political leader Deng Xiaoping 
on the sovereignty of Hong Kong after 1997, and the formulation of the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong in 1990. As stated above, these segments appear in the form of archival footage and 
voiceovers. The historical footage, such as people marching in the streets to celebrate the 
termination of the Cultural Revolution (Fig. 8.5), and parliamentary representatives attending 
the National People’s Congress (Fig. 8.6), is taken from news reports from past periods. They 
Diagram 8.4: Relationship of main characters in My Year of 1997 (2017) 
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are accompanied by voice-over commentary specially created for this drama, which first 
introduces the events and then emphasises their impact on both mainland China and Hong 
Kong. These documentary-style segments constantly remind the viewers how these social 
and political events have created turning points for China and Hong Kong, and brought life-
changing opportunities to the Chinese people. 
 
To better represent the positive impact of the economic and political reforms, the drama 
establishes causal relations between the reform policy and the emotional fulfilment of the 
characters. For instance, before the revival of university entrance exams, An Hui is stuck in 
an unsatisfactory library job and a violent marriage with Wang Le. An Hui’s route of self-
realisation starts from her admission to Beijing Normal University. While receiving higher 
education, An Hui terminates her unhappy marriage with Wang Le and decides to leave for 
Shenzhen, one of the five special economic zones created by the Party-state, to pursue her 
career. Her new professional life enables her to once again meet Jianguo, who by this time 
has become an established entrepreneur and runs a factory in Shenzhen, also benefitting 
from the policy of reform and opening. This reunion provides an emotional release for the two 
individuals, who have been separated for nearly two decades.  
The relationship between Jianguo and his father and younger brother follows a similar path. 
Uncertain whether their flight to Hong Kong will cause trouble to the family members remaining 
in Beijing, Jianguo and mother do not dare contact them until the Cultural Revolution has 
ended and the question of sovereignty over Hong Kong has been settled. As a result of the 
political reforms after the Cultural Revolution, the conviction of Jianguo’s father is revoked. 
The father is then assigned to the newly established Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of 
the State Council, which provides him with opportunities to meet Jianguo. Notably, Jianguo’s 
father is portrayed as a representative of the lucky few surviving intellectuals – despite having 
Figure 8.5: People march in the streets to 
celebrate the termination of the Cultural 
Revolution. My Year of 1997 (2017) 
Figure 8.6: National representatives are 
attending a meeting of the National People’s 
Congress. My Year of 1997 (2017) 
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been subjected to political prosecution in the past, they continue to have faith in the Party and 
its government, ready to devote themselves to building a new China. My Year of 1997 has 
indeed put much effort in depicting these people’s emotional predicament resulted from 
separation, such as the father’s sorrow over the news of Fangying and Jianguo’s alleged death, 
the mother’s hesitation about starting a new marriage, and her disappointment knowing that 
Jianguo’s father is remarried to another woman. However, the emotional predicament serves 
more as a backdrop to emphasise the cheerful reunion of the Gao family. Based on this, the 
drama suggests that it is because of the ‘reform and opening’ policy that mainland China 
regained sovereignty over Hong Kong, and it is this that enables the Gao family to become 
reunited. The archival footage and voice-over explanations of historical events, combined with 
character development, have worked together to illustrate the positive impact of the Party-
state’s reform policy on ordinary people’s lives.   
In addition to portraying an increasingly prosperous society in mainland China, that offers 
the people career advancement and emotional fulfilment, the drama also depicts the other 
side of the binary opposites, a deteriorating Hong Kong society. If the progression of the story 
on the mainland indicates hope and prosperity, the other thread of the drama is concerned 
with conspiracy, fraud, uncertainty and risk. Jianguo is portrayed as a witness who personally 
experiences this deterioration. He encounters villains who keep stirring up trouble for him. 
Prominent among these is Long Hua, a corrupt detective. His corruption and greed come out 
especially in a scene where he frames Jianguo for stealing money from the workplace. In the 
following sequence, Long Hua puts Jianguo in custody and blatantly asks Fangying for 5000 
HKD, indicating that he will release Jianguo only upon receiving the money. Believing that 
Hong Kong is a law-abiding society and Jianguo is not guilty, Fangying employs a lawyer to 
confront Long Hua. However, the lawyer is threatened by Long Hua to drop the case; 
otherwise, Long will expose Jianguo as an illegal refugee. The lawyer subsequently admits to 
Fangying that British-governed Hong Kong tolerates this unlawful behaviour of Long Hua, 
even though this often leaves the poor people no place to find justice. Knowing this, Fangying, 
an upright former police officer, decides to accuse Long Hua of corruption. But the letter she 
has submitted to a British chief of police is soon passed to Long Hua himself. It appears that 
the chief and Long Hua collude with each other. Through these events, the drama alleges that 
Hong Kong’s police system is corrupt, and implicitly denounces the inaction and incompetence 
of the British governors. Such a depiction of Jianguo’s life struggles in Hong Kong is filled with 
dramatic tension and evil schemes. In the narrated world, Hong Kong in the last years of 
colonial rule shows stark contrast to the development in the mainland. In juxtaposing the two 
different environments, the drama suggests that Hong Kong needs a new government, which 
must be picked by the PRC. The transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to mainland China is 
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accordingly represented as expected and needed by the public, for the public good of the 
Hong Kong society.  
As the above analysis shows, the primary goal of My Year of 1997 was to showcase the 
Party’s achievements in the reform within the 20 years from 1976 to 1997, in particular relation 
to the transfer of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China. By selectively inserting a series of 
historical events into the personal life story of Jianguo, the drama presents the ‘handover’ as 
a predetermined, necessary process. This propagandistic tone is obvious. What is also salient 
is the feeling of national pride this drama seeks to evoke. Each episode starts with a theme 
song titled A.D.1997, and this is accompanied visually by the image of a flying red flag that 
later transforms into to the flag of Hong Kong. The symbolism of opening centres on the colour 
red, which is reminiscent of the Communist rule of China and indicative of the Party’s 
achievement of regaining Hong Kong. Furthermore, the main characters in the drama are 
portrayed as proud and loyal PRC citizens, who are keen to watch television news related to 
the ‘return’ of Hong Kong. These news programmes range from the holding of milestone 
meetings to the live broadcast of the ceremony of the Hong Kong handover. In the last episode, 
when the ceremony is live on TV, every character is dressed up, sitting in front of the TV to 
watch the programme. The rooms are decorated with lots of little red flags. When China’s five-
star red flag is raised in Hong Kong, as seen in the live broadcast, everyone seems so excited 
that they stand up and celebrate the greatness of the motherland, China (Fig. 8.7). The drama 
ends with people’s cheerful voices, a passionate commentary from the off-screen speaker and 
the drama’s theme song. These details not only reinforce national pride and evoke the 
audiences’ emotional identification with the drama, but also echo the Party’s current political 
vision of realising the individual and collective ‘Chinese dream’. What is central to the 
Figure 8.7: Gao Jianguo and his family and friends are watching the live 
broadcast of the Hong Kong ‘handover’. My Year of 1997 (2017) 
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articulation of the ‘Chinese dream’ is the emphasis on connecting individual aspirations to the 
prosperity of the Chinese nation, ‘with the twin goals of reclaiming national pride and achieving 
personal well-being’ (China Daily, 2014). In this sense, Jianguo’s life story embodies this 
political vision, in that the success in his personal life is paralleled and enabled by China’s 
achieving prosperity. This story thus visualises the current official ideology.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter compares three CCTV-1 drama serials broadcast in a twenty-year period. 
Even though these dramas centre on the emotional dimension of people’s domestic lives, the 
personal experiences depicted in them are intertwined with wider social, economic and 
political changes. This means that these mainstream soap operas are framed within a broader 
social and political space, recording and embodying dominant ideologies at the respective 
time of production. Holding Hands (1999) seeks to persuade the viewers to embrace the 
market reforms, so as to minimise the possibility of dissent at a time when unemployment 
became a primary social concern in the late 1990s. My Youthfulness (2009) proposes using 
effective communication and patient persuasion to ease family conflicts, thereby constructing 
family harmony, which was in conformity to the political vision of building a harmonious society. 
In My Year of 1997 (2017), the focus has shifted to glorifying the ‘return’ of Hong Kong and to 
proving the greatness of the Chinese state. This TV serial on the one hand contributes to state 
celebrations around 1 July 2017, and on the other, aligns with the contemporary political vision 
of realising the Chinese dream.  
Although their narrative foci relate to different periods, the dramas discussed above share 
similarities and continuities. First, they all demonstrate aspirations to stability, harmony and 
prosperity in either the private or public space. This is partly in line with Confucian thinking on 
family stability and harmony, but more importantly, conforms to the Party’s desires for social 
stability in the country. In this regard, dominant ideologies and official visions have a prominent 
presence in mainstream cultural products to the extent that these provide legitimacy for the 
Party’s rule. 
Secondly, in order to solve the problems emerging within a family environment or a 
changing society, a respectable female character is introduced in each of the three dramas. 
In the narrative space, they help the protagonists overcome difficulties, acting as moral and 
ethical mentors. They represent the ideal motherhood, being not only patient and sensible to 
the children, but also helpful to the community. Furthermore, they disseminate educational or 
propagandistic messages to the audiences on behalf of the authorities. The function of these 
female roles resembles Imre’s (2016: 200) observation of the central female characters in the 
socialist TV series made in Eastern Europe who act as problem solvers, linchpins between 
the private and public worlds.  
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Finally, all the three dramas regarding human emotions and love have depicted a 
heterosexual world, where a financially successful husband is depicted as necessary for a 
happy marriage. This is exemplified by Zhong Rui (Holding Hands), Zhou Jin (My Youthfulness) 
and Gao Jianguo (My Year of 1997). All three are successful entrepreneurs, some of them 
experiencing a development ‘from rags to riches’. This type of character on the one hand 
shows the Party-state’s recognition of capitalists as one of the achievements of economic 
reform; on the other hand, they represent a popular narrative device widely prevailing in 
contemporary – not exclusively Chinese – TV and film fictions. This will be discussed in further 
detail in the next chapter. As for the leading female characters, the above dramas tend to 
portray them as both financially independent and competent in housework. But such double 
burden of women often poses extra difficulties for them, especially at domestic space, where 
the male is used to be positioned in centre and dominance. This socialist model of ‘gender 
equality’ portrayed in these state-sponsored dramas has in fact served for the reinforcement 
of a patriarchal social structure, where women are eventually expected to return to the 
domestic space. Overall, the three love-themed dramas discussed in this chapter are 
correlated with the grand narratives of the nation and social change, showing a propagandistic 
and educational function. In the next chapter, we will look at love dramas that are primarily 
associated with providing pleasure and entertainment to audiences. 
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Chapter 9 
Soap Operas for Entertainment:  
Melodramatic Formulas and Fantasies in Hunan TV 
 
In the discussion of love-themed dramas aired on CCTV-1 in the previous chapter, we have 
seen how narratives of love, romance and family within the domestic space have been 
integrated with Chinese television’s functions of social education and propaganda. In this 
chapter, we look at a different set of romantic TV serials, this time screened on Hunan TV. 
Given that Hunan TV came to mainly target the young generation after its rebranding in 2003, 
it can be hypothesised that both the programming and content afterwards would reflect this 
change. By focusing on three love-themed dramas broadcast in different periods, Women in 
Beijing (2000), Meteor Shower (Season 2, 2010) and The Interpreters (2016), I aim to take a 
comparative approach to examining the unique traits of popular narrative forms provided by 
Hunan TV in telling love stories, and their development over the last two decades. Special 
attention is given to the investigation of the difference between Hunan TV and CCTV-1 in 
terms of both programmes’ political orientation, pedagogic commitment and entertainment 
production. 
 
9.1 Making popular TV soaps: From imports to clones to domestic innovations  
As mentioned in chapter 8, the success of Yearnings in the early 1990s inspired a series of 
Chinese-style soap operas that offered social comfort and helped to make sense of the 
economic and political transformation. These dramas often tackle emotional and familial 
issues that were encountered by Chinese people in a transitional society. While many of the 
soap-opera-style, romantic-themed Chinese TV serials indeed demonstrate realistic concerns 
with socio-political issues, there are also alternative types of TV soaps not intentionally tied to 
educational or propaganda purposes. Claiming to have been the first genuine entertainment 
provider in mainland China, Hunan TV has developed its own distinct types and genres of 
soap opera. As shown in the quantitative results in chapter 5, the proportion of love-themed 
dramas broadcast by Hunan TV during the last twenty-six years was almost sixty percent more 
than that of revolution-themed ones. This larger proportion suggests where this TV channel 
places its main interest. 
Subject to less political control but driven by more blatant commercial imperatives, such as 
striving for novelty and audience attention, Hunan TV has embarked on a different route of 
programming since it was launched in 1997. Unlike its peer provincial satellite TV channels, 
which were still satisfied with propaganda delivery and education by entertaining at the time, 
Hunan TV departed from this path and began stepping into the imitation and appropriation of 
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international TV programmes (Keane, 2002). Following this strategy, the soap operas 
broadcast by Hunan TV, notably those on urban romantic themes, caught up with the 
transnational media flows in East Asian countries from the late 1990s, represented by the wide 
circulation of the Korean ‘trendy drama’ and the Taiwanese ‘idol drama’. Characterised by 
‘beautiful settings, idolised characters, melodramatic romances, unrequited love which 
necessitates tragic endings’, Korean TV drama successfully made its way into East Asian 
markets, including mainland China, Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong (Leung, 2008: 60). It has 
been recorded that in 2002, there were 67 Korean TV dramas aired on various Chinese 
satellite and terrestrial TV channels (ibid. 59). A notable reason for the popularity of Korean 
dramas in mainland China is the fascination they exert on the young generation, which 
includes capitalism, urban lifestyle, romance, modernity, as well as a new standard of beauty 
and fashion (Kim, 2007: 127). 
Almost in the same period, Taiwanese imitations of Japanese ‘idol drama’ – that was often 
adapted from well-known manga (comic stories), likewise achieved great success in East 
Asian TV markets. Among these productions, Meteor Garden (Liuxing huayuan, aired on 
Taiwan’s Chinese Television System from April to August 2001) was the earliest and most 
successful.36 Based on a Japanese manga series – Hana Yori Dango, it traces the lives and 
romances of several college students. Notably, the Taiwanese remake effectively blended key 
elements of Japanese ‘idol drama’, such as employing pop idols to play the leading characters 
and Western pop music as background music, featuring Japanese-style filming locations, with 
unique Taiwanese narrative conventions, such as the introduction of rustic elderly characters, 
generational conflicts and a hint of folk religion; it thereafter initiated a distinctly Taiwanese 
style of ‘idol drama’, which found markets in Singapore, Hong Kong and mainland China (Liu 
and Chen, 2004). The second drama I analyse in this chapter – Meteor Shower, is an exact if 
unauthorised copy of Meteor Garden by Hunan TV. The transnational popularity of these 
imported dramas has provided both ready-made formats and inspiration for Hunan TV to make 
a profit out of its prime-time slots.  
In general, Hunan TV enjoys more flexibility in programming than CCTV-1, which allows it 
to explore the profitability of imported TV programmes. Although CCTV was the first mainland 
TV station to import and broadcast Korean trendy dramas and thereafter initiated the ‘Korean 
Wave’ – a term used to describe the spread of Korean popular culture overseas since the late 
1990s (see Kim, 2007; Leung, 2008), its evening prime-time slots remained strictly confined 
to airing domestically produced dramas and serving a propaganda function. This conservative 
programming strategy prevented CCTV from maximising the financial returns generated by 
 
36 Following the sensational success of the 2001 TV series Meteor Garden, CTS released a sequel of this drama in 
March 2002. 
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popular Korean dramas. It should be noted that such a prohibition of foreign TV programmes 
appearing at prime time also applies to provincial satellite TV channels, including Hunan TV. 
However, it did not diminish the determination of Hunan TV to broadcasting imported dramas, 
even if it had to allocate them a later prime-time slot at 10pm. In 2005, Hunan TV successfully 
purchased the exclusive rights to broadcast the 2003 Korean hit drama, Jewel in the Palace 
(Dae Jang Geum, produced by MBC of South Korea). This operation generated enormous 
financial returns, both in terms of advertising revenue and market share (Wang, 2005). It 
further encouraged Hunan TV’s investment in other popular TV dramas from East Asia, 
including Korean trendy dramas, Taiwanese idol dramas, as well as a certain number of 
Japanese and Hong Kong melodramas. Among these, high-rated ones include Taiwanese 
idol drama, Romantic Princess (Gongzhu xiaomei, produced by GTV in 2007 and aired on 
Hunan TV in 2008), and Korean TV series, My Fair Lady (first released on KBS of South Korea 
in 2009 and then on Hunan TV in 2010). These dramas helped Hunan TV to obtain an 
unrivalled market share in those years.  
It is worth noting that the import of TV dramas was not the only way to maintain an 
advantageous position on the national market. Alongside the transnational and transregional 
flows of East Asian popular TV dramas, Hunan TV’s programming strategy was also informed 
by the rise of female consumers on the domestic TV market from the early 2000s. Facing an 
increasingly differentiated market, Hunan TV also demonstrated a strong awareness of the 
consumer power of female audiences. Aside from purchasing female-centred TV dramas from 
South Korea and Taiwan, it attempted to make its own ‘idol dramas’ featuring central female 
characters by either cloning or copying successful TV productions. The first round of prominent 
experiments included four seasons of Ugly Wudi (Chounü wudi, 2008-2010), adapted from a 
Colombian telenovela and its more recent American version Ugly Betty (2006-2010, broadcast 
on ABC). This was followed, as mentioned earlier, by an imitation of Taiwanese ‘idol drama’ 
series, Meteor Garden. Having no license from either Taiwanese TV producers or the authors 
of the original Japanese manga, Hunan TV changed the name of the leading characters and 
produced two seasons named Meteor Shower (2009-2010).37 These productions inevitably 
stirred extensive public debates involving either comparisons between the remake and the 
original (see Fung and Zhang, 2011), or criticism for the violation of intellectual property and 
the poor quality of the imitation. Despite the controversies, Hunan TV’s ownership and 
exclusive broadcasting rights to these dramas ensured a relatively high market share, which 
would have been reduced if other provincial satellite TV channels had been allowed to 
simultaneously air the same drama.  
 
37 It is worth noting that as I write this chapter, Hunan TV is broadcasting a 2017 remake of Meteor Garden, which 
has the same title as the original Taiwanese drama. This time, however, it has obtained a license agreement and 
produced the TV drama in cooperation with Angie Chai, the chief producer of the Taiwanese version. 
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From 2010 onwards, Hunan TV continued to follow this logic and invest in domestically 
created dramas that embody its branding strategy of providing entertainment for young people, 
as well as obtaining the exclusive right to broadcast them (Zhang, 2013). The advantages of 
this strategy were evident. It not only distinguished Hunan TV from its provincial competitors, 
thereby securing a firm foothold in national TV market, but also proved to be an effective way 
of enlarging the audience and increasing the ratings of individual TV programmes (ibid.). In 
recent years, therefore, a growing number of original love-themed trendy/idol dramas have 
been customised or jointly produced by Hunan Broadcasting System and then exclusively 
broadcast on Hunan TV at prime time. In 2013 for instance, 73.3 percent of the TV dramas 
aired on Hunan TV’s prime-time slot fell into this category, signifying Hunan TV’s extensive 
interest in this dramatic genre.  
Mostly set in contemporary urban environments, these romantic dramas invariably focus on 
a group of young people and typically depict the romantic love between a courageous, 
innocent, hard-working female protagonist of lower social status and a male character of 
higher social status and often greater wealth and power. This narrative pattern, which was 
already evident in Korean and Taiwanese trendy/idol dramas, bears much resemblance with 
the melodramatic formula described by Cawelti with regard to the popular literature prevailing 
in the nineteenth-century England and America. Specifically, this narrative formula centred on 
the melodramatic triangle between a virtuous lower-class heroine, a noble hero and a 
dastardly villain (Cawelti, 1991: 34-35). Cawelti also holds the view that the evolution of social 
melodrama is continually shaped by new social conditions, ideas and in particular the social 
values and moral standards embraced by the middle class in those periods (ibid. 47). This 
suggests that the melodramatic plots in popular cultural texts cannot be fully understood 
without situating them in their historical and social contexts. However, contemporary Chinese 
media scholars (see Yin and Yang, 2014: 17) tend to argue that urban romantic dramas, 
especially those targeting the younger generation, have only created illusions of romantic love 
by telling a fairy-tale-style story between ‘a prince and a Cinderella’, but failed to honestly 
relate to the real-life experiences of young audiences. It may be true that the melodramatic 
plots in popular narratives, whilst emphasising suspenseful excitement and intensity of 
emotion, show comparatively less interest in addressing social concerns compared to the 
more ‘serious’ romantic TV dramas aired by CCTV-1. Yet, if we take into consideration the 
long-established tradition of TV propaganda in China, the state ownership of Hunan TV and 
the realistic frame of the urban romantic theme, it remains to be explored to what extent Hunan 
TV’s romantic dramas are indeed detached from the socio-political reality. Especially when 
taking into account that after 2002, a new middle-class discourse and the citizen-consumer 
society have been constantly promoted by the Party-state, it is worth investigating whether the 
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melodramatic elements in popular Chinese TV serials carry the marks of new class identities 
and cultural imaginations.  
In the following parts of this chapter, I shall draw on three TV serials selected from Hunan 
TV’s evening prime time in different periods to identify how the narratives of romantic love 
have evolved over time in the light of the changing political, economic and social context. The 
first serial, Women in Beijing, was produced in the late 1990s when the accelerated market 
reforms were sweeping through China. With a similar storyline to Holding Hands, it also 
enables a comparison between Hunan TV and CCTV-1 in the era prior to Hunan TV’s 
rebranding in 2003. The second drama, Meteor Shower, as mentioned earlier, is HBS’s 
unauthorised imitation of the Taiwanese series Meteor Garden. Produced in the late 2000s, 
when television entertainment increasingly targeted young female audiences, it provides 
insights into the adaptation of an original format to the tastes of these audiences. The last TV 
serial, The Interpreters, embodies the recent domestic innovation in ‘idol dramas’ during the 
early 2010s, and many of them were based on popular novels and network literature. Overall, 
the three dramas cover a range of different issues of different time, while all dealing with the 
emotional lives of urban residents in contemporary settings. Next, I turn to an in-depth analysis 
of the main characters, plots and conflicts in each drama. I then explore whether the narrative 
world in each drama is detached from or reflects the changing socio-political context. Finally, 
I examine if and to what extent the seemingly ‘detached’ melodramatic productions still 
propagate state ideologies and seek to educate the audience.  
 
9.2 Women in Beijing: Vengeance of the boss, and redemption of Love 
Women in Beijing is a twenty-episode TV serial jointly produced in 1998 by the state-run 
Chinese International Culture and Arts Company (CICAC), together with CCTV’s Film and 
Television Department, and other two private media companies. It was aired daily on Hunan 
TV from 9 to 22 March 2000. Although the audience rating is hard to determine for this drama, 
it won two Jinying Awards for Excellent Drama Serials and Best Actress later in the year, 
suggesting both official recognition and audience success. The drama tells the story of a 
complicated love relationship between laid-off worker Fang Xiaoyu and her ex-boyfriend Feng 
Xiao, a successful entrepreneur, set against the background of China’s market reforms in the 
1990s. As one of the few domestically produced urban romance TV dramas broadcast on 
Hunan TV in this period – Hunan TV’s evening prime time was also considerably occupied by 
historical/costume dramas and imported romantic TV dramas at the time, Women in Beijing 
provides a platform to examine the narrative formula of romances offered by Hunan TV. 
Starting from a textual analysis of the main plots and characters, I will illustrate the difference 
and similarities between Hunan TV and CCTV-1 in treating the same romantic theme. 
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The story begins with Xiaoyu’s betrayal of her love relationship with Feng Xiao ten years 
ago. At the outset of the story, the female protagonist is heavily influenced by her mother’s 
opinion that marrying into the family of a government official will pave the road to success. 
Persuaded by the mother, Xiaoyu decides to marry Peng Dongdong, the son of a government 
minister, rather than Feng Xiao, the son of a butcher. Ten years later, after Feng Xiao has 
made a fortune and become a successful businessman in Shenzhen – China’s first Special 
Economic Zone, he returns to Beijing, seeking to take revenge on Xiaoyu. It is at this time that 
Xiaoyu is made redundant amid the market-oriented restructuring in state-run enterprises. 
Feng Xiao takes this opportunity to offer Xiaoyu a new position as a ‘white collar’ worker in his 
Beijing company. To vent his resentment toward Xiaoyu, Feng Xiao gives Xiaoyu a hard time 
at work. Faced with difficulties from both her boss and a malicious colleague, Xiaoyu gradually 
learns her lesson and transforms from an obedient figure, who is remarkably forbearing and 
even suffering, to a tough, confident career woman who still retains traditional feminine traits, 
such as gentleness and kindness. When she eventually excels in the workplace, her marital 
relationship with Peng Dongdong becomes fractured, leading to a divorce. At the same time, 
owing to the trust and understanding built through their shared work, Xiaoyu and Feng Xiao 
fall in love again. However, when Feng Xiao discovers he has a brain tumour that will kill him 
any time, he immediately cancels the plan to marry Xiaoyu and then leaves the city, leading 
to an open ending.  
Evidently, the main plot of this drama reflects several topical, and even thorny, social issues, 
such as unemployment, divorce and extramarital affairs, which immediately marked its 
difference from other historical/costume/parody dramas aired by Hunan TV. As a realistic 
theme revolving around the emotional and marital life of urbanites in the reform period, Women 
in Beijing demonstrates plenty of similarities with Holding Hands: both trace the evolution of a 
middle-aged, divorced woman who is laid off in the fast-changing era; in depicting the female 
protagonists’ emotional predicament, both highlight the impact of external factors, such as 
increasing working pressure mounting upon the nuclear family, and a sudden job loss owing 
to the market reforms. All of these reflect the social reality at the time. Specifically, Xiaoyu’s 
misfortune in Women in Beijing much resembles that of Xiaoxue in Holding Hands: at the start 
of the serial, she is a care-free working mother, employed by a state-run publishing house, 
doing her work leisurely; yet the market-oriented reforms affect the publishing house and bring 
about drastic changes to her life. This situation becomes worse when not only she becomes 
unemployed, but her husband, son of a former minister, also faces personnel changes. In this 
situation, Xiaoyu has no choice but to accept the job offered by former lover, Feng Xiao, even 
though she will need to endure Feng’s resentment and potential vindictive acts on his part.  
When tracing Xiaoyu’s development from a junior ‘white collar’ to a competent manager, 
Women in Beijing likewise seeks to repackage unemployment as a second chance for the 
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laid-off women. This TV trope of the self-realisation of the unemployed, as in Holding Hands, 
was in line with the authorities’ call for promoting reemployment as a vehicle of the liberal 
market. Xiaoyu is thus represented as a role model who not only survives being unemployed 
but also becomes a successful professional woman. A commentator from CICAC (Gao, 2000) 
states that Xiaoyu embodies the ideal image and spirit of modern Beijing women, who are not 
afraid of changes, but bravely embrace the opportunities brought about by the economic 
reforms. In other words, this character has both propagandistic and educative functions. 
Furthermore, the drama also valorises Feng Xiao, the successful businessman, who takes full 
advantage of the market reforms by transforming from an underestimated butcher’s boy to a 
successful and wealthy businessman. On the contrary, those who continue to rely on the 
state’s administrative power for personal gain, such as Dongdong and another character, Lao 
Wu, are portrayed as villains in the dramatic plots. It thus becomes obvious that the drama 
attempts to highlight the benefits of the economic reforms in general, and to praise the qualities 
and values embodied by Xiaoyu in particular.  
Although the two dramas both tend to emphasise the importance of modern women having 
a professional career, Women in Beijing offers a more liberal interpretation of female 
independence and individualism than does Holding Hands. Throughout the drama, the 
emphasis is on the need for women to obtain an independent, equal status both at home and 
in the workplace. For instance, Xiaoyu repeatedly tells her female colleague and friends that 
women should not rely on men, either emotionally or financially, but need to become 
independent. In line with this view, she also encourages Ms. Shan, a successful entrepreneur 
trapped in an unhappy marriage, to leave her ungrateful husband and pursue her own 
happiness. Following this individualistic tone, Women in Beijing discards the traditional ‘happy 
ending’ that entails a reunion of divorced couples, as indicated by the romantic ending of 
Xiaoxue and Zhong Rui’s story in Holding Hands. Rather, it encourages divorced or unhappy 
women to make choices on the basis of their own feelings, not of familial obligations such as 
getting back together for the sake of children. Moreover, as the romantic relationship between 
Xiaoyu and Feng Xiao indicates, Women in Beijing portrays divorce as a ‘second chance’ for 
the divorcees to embrace new opportunities. In these ways, the female protagonists in Women 
in Beijing reflect a higher degree of individualism that values personal happiness and a liberal 
outlook. This nevertheless accords with the individualistic aspirations released by the 
liberalisation of economic markets since the 1980s. Based on these representations, we can 
conclude that the romantic dramas broadcast by Hunan TV in this period were by no means 
insulated from the wider social reality; on the contrary, they were highly attuned and 
responsive to the changing economic and political context.  
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While set against the same historical background and telling a similar story, it would be 
misleading to interpret Women in Beijing as an equivalent of Holding Hands. In many ways, 
Women in Beijing bears the imprint of melodramatic formulas adapted from various foreign 
imported TV dramas, particularly Korean ones. After all, the melodramatic features are most 
likely the ones that match audience expectations best. Typically, the climax of the drama is 
dedicated to the romantic entanglement between Feng Xiao and Xiaoyu. The original intention 
of Feng offering Xiaoyu a job is to humiliate her. To his surprise, Xiaoyu accepts the challenge 
and endures all difficulties, including the sabotaging behaviour of a malicious female 
subordinate, Lingzi, which constantly leads to Feng’s misunderstanding of Xiaoyu. However, 
when Feng sees Xiaoyu actively engage in her work and swallow all the difficulties thrown in 
her way, he is moved and spontaneously wants to protect her (see Fig. 9.1). Feng’s affection 
for Xiaoyu has been twisted by Xiaoyu’s choice ten years ago, and this twisted, unrequited 
love leads to the trials and tribulations encountered by Xiaoyu at work, but at the same time 
rekindles affectionate feelings between the two. These are typically melodramatic elements 
used in Korean trendy dramas, where the main storyline always revolves around the romantic 
love between a lower-class woman 
in a secondary role at work and a 
bossy, authoritative male character 
who rescues the heroine whenever 
she encounters trouble (see Lin 
and Kwan, 2005).  
Moreover, the tragic ending of 
Feng and Xiaoyu’s love story adds 
another layer of tension to this 
drama’s melodramatic narrative. 
As Ang (2007: 28) states, the 
depiction of ‘a tragic structure of 
feeling’ seems to be the source of 
popularity of the Japanese and Korean trendy dramas from the 1990s to early 2000s. 
Depicting an ideal of ‘true love’ that is constantly disrupted by fate and various circumstances 
creates a sympathetic feeling among audiences, especially young females, and make them 
feel sorry for the melodramatic characters (ibid.). Although there is no direct evidence showing 
that Feng’s fatal disease or Xiaoyu’s unfulfilled love are based on certain Korean dramas that 
were popular in China at that time, the melodramatic appeal of Women in Beijing is still obvious: 
it creates a role model in Xiaoyu, who endures everything and eventually acquires an 
independent and professional status, while the final twist destroys the possibility of a happy 
ending in marriage; likewise, Feng Xiao, after waiting for ten years, still cannot marry Xiaoyu 
Figure 9.1: Feng Xiao (right) stands in the rain alongside 
Xiaoyu (left) to support her. Women in Beijing (2000) 
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due to his illness. This unabashedly sentimental narrative resembles the characteristics of the 
Korean trendy drama, which is known for ‘melodramatic romances, unrequited love which 
necessitates tragic endings’ (Leung, 2008: 60). Arguably, these narrative traits are not 
commonly seen in CCTV-1’s urban romantic serials, which shows the particular narrative 
conventions adopted by Hunan TV in order to appeal to audiences. 
Set in the same historical period as Holding Hands, Women in Beijing reflects the emotional, 
marital and social issues encountered by Chinese urban dwellers living through this 
transitional period. It promotes the feminist view that modern Chinese women should invest in 
their professional career, particularly in a fast-changing society, in order to obtain an equal 
and independent status in both the domestic sphere and the workplace. In so doing, this drama 
aligns itself with official ideology by advocating the state’s reform project and reemployment 
scheme, and educates the audience by establishing a role model. At the same time, this drama 
also utilises melodramatic characters, plots and narrative devices to appeal to the female 
section of the audience. The extensive use of melodramatic formulas in depicting a realistic 
theme demonstrates Hunan TV’s pronounced difference to CCTV-1 in narrating romantic 
stories. 
 
9.3 Meteor Shower: Amnesia, conspiracies and unforgettable youthful Love 
As mentioned earlier, Meteor Shower is a remake of the enormously popular Taiwanese 
‘idol drama’ serial, Meteor Garden. Following the structure of the model, Hunan TV likewise 
produced two seasons for the remake. What I analyse in this section is the second season of 
Meteor Shower – Yiqi youkan liuxingyu, which was broadcast daily at 10pm on Hunan TV from 
9 to 30 August 2010. Benefiting from the heated discussion and controversies raised by the 
first season,38 the second season’s ratings exceeded the previous year’s figures soon after its 
debut, achieving an average viewership rating of 2.03 percent and a market share 9.04 
percent (Tencent Entertainment, 2010). Despite the mixed feedback from the public, Meteor 
Shower has gained phenomenal popularity among young viewers. Its leading actress, Zheng 
Shuang, was nominated for two Jinying Awards for Best and Most Popular Actress of the year, 
signifying public recognition of her performance. Since these dramas all revolve around the 
love pursuits of young people, the following analysis of Meteor Shower (Season Two) not only 
provides insights into format adaptation in Chinese TV, but also a horizontal comparison to 
the CCTV-1 youth drama, My Youthfulness, mentioned in the previous chapter. The analysis 
 
38 Meteor Shower season 1 (Yiqi laikan liuxingyu) was screened from 8 to 29 August 2009 during Hunan TV’s late 
evening prime-time slot. Since it went on air, it has stirred widespread public discussion and criticism for 
‘extensive product placement’, ‘poor quality of adaptation’, its ‘copycat’ character, and ‘the awful hairstyle of the 
male protagonist’. Yet, such extensive public attention in turn contributed to the high rating and market share. 
The first episodes achieved an average audience rating of 1.9 percent and a market share of 7.73 percent, which 
allegedly ranked first among the TV programmes broadcast at the same time slot. See Hunan TV (2009a). 
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will particularly illustrate the unique narrative devices adopted by Hunan TV in promoting its 
‘idol drama’, as well as commitment and constraints on entertainment production.  
Although the producers emphasised the originality of this series by highlighting the 
difference in the main characters’ names (Hunan TV, 2009b), the main plot and characters of 
Meteor Shower still largely resemble those in Meteor Garden. They both focus on the romantic 
love and life of a group of students at a prestigious college, tracing their emotional ups and 
downs. The sequel of Meteor Shower follows the first season’s ending, where Murong Yunhai, 
leader of the little ‘gang’ made up of the four richest students at Elliston Business School, has 
lost his memory and cannot remember his girlfriend, Chu Yuxun, a hardworking girl coming 
from a poor family background. At the beginning of the new season, he remembers everything 
but Yuxun. This situation worsens as Murong mistakes another girl, Jiang Yuan, daughter of 
the principal of Elliston, for his long-lost girlfriend (see Fig. 9.2). The subsequent plot revolves 
around the ensuing melodramatic triangle: when Murong struggles to reunite with Yuxun, 
Jiang Yuan joins Murong’s mother in creating obstacles for them; Jiang Yuan becomes 
paralysed as a result of an accident happening while she is trying to save Murong; she 
therefore demands that Murong accompany her to Europe for treatment, to which Murong 
agrees but which leads to another separation from Yuxun. Aside from this narrative thread, 
subplots depict the respective love triangles of the other three members of the ‘gang’. In the 
end, the drama mostly has happy endings for the main characters, who become more mature 
in coping with challenges from school and life.  
 
Figure 9.2: Yuxun and Murong get back together, which stimulates  
Jiang Yuan’s (in the distance) jealousy. Meteor Shower 2 (2010) 
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One might be tempted to interpret this drama as a timeless love story, reliant on a clichéd 
love triangle and which can be applied to any social, cultural background, hence with no 
specific reference to the socio-political reality of Chinese society. Indeed, this youth drama is 
different to My Youthfulness, which is set against the background of the historical experiences 
from the Cultural Revolution. In Meteor Shower, there is so such explicitly social 
contextualisation. However, this does not mean this drama has neither a connection to the 
wider social context, nor propagandistic and educative implications. In many aspects, it is still 
tied to the official ideology of the time and automatically committed to promoting the official 
Party-state discourse. As discussed in previous chapters, from 2002 onward until the early 
2010s, the state had devoted itself to building a socialist harmonious society, and central to 
this new political line was to expand the middle classes and foster social aspirations towards 
a stable and prosperous middle-class lifestyle (see Anagnost, 2008). Part of this plan included 
accepting capitalists as socialist citizens, as well as state endorsement of entrepreneurship 
and promotion of consumption, in order to boost the national economy while at the same time 
masking social inequality resulting from the widening income gap (Goodman, 2016). Produced 
in this context, Meteor Shower also integrates the middle-class aspirations and the recognition 
of entrepreneurship into its melodramatic plots.  
The story is set in a fictional business school in China which excels in training business 
students and sending the students abroad to the world's leading business schools. The 
school’s foreign-sounding name implies its background of established collaborations with 
foreign universities. Its main pedagogical aim is to give the students essential skills to become 
successful entrepreneurs. Following this narrative framework, the central female character, 
Yuxun, is portrayed as a studious girl and a talented young entrepreneur. She not only obtains 
highest grades in her courses, but also successfully launches her own business through an 
internship programme, thereby winning praises from the principal. Even though she comes 
from a working-class family, that struggles to pay her tuition fees, the drama suggests that 
because Yuxun works hard, she has the chance to transcend her current social status and 
have a promising future. It is reasonable to speculate here that Yuxun embodies the dreams 
of the working-class people in Chinese society, who yearn for better living conditions and work 
hard to advance their social status. 
In contrast to Yuxun’s lower social position, the male protagonists from the little ‘gang’ are 
identified as the second generation of wealthy families, their family background including 
entrepreneurs, doctors and IT elites. This character design also reflects the wider social reality 
at a time when the admiration for entrepreneurship and successful middle classes became 
increasingly evident. In the drama, the four characters’ parents are also members of the school 
board. Hence, the four students become the most powerful and influential people on campus. 
Almost all the other students see them as idols, which in turn makes them arrogant, rebellious 
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and ready to challenge school regulations. Whilst delineating class differences among the 
main characters, the drama also seeks to ease the tensions deriving from the class difference 
and wealth gap, as required by the official ideology. To this end, the drama highly praises the 
studious and diligent female protagonist with her working-class identity; more importantly, it 
introduces an authoritative figure, the principal, who curbs the unruly behaviour of the ‘gang’ 
and thereby reins in the privileges with which their class identity appears to have endowed 
them. Responding to the controversy about the representation of class/wealth difference in 
the drama, the screenwriter, Wang Hailin, claimed that the producers had wanted to highlight 
the importance of personal effort and hard work when touching upon wealth inequality, but 
had had no intention to ‘show off wealth’ (xuanfu), as they had been accused of doing by some 
viewers (Renminwang, 2009b). 
While it becomes evident that this act of self-censorship points to the producers’ conscious 
alignment with the official ideology, the production team also seem to have paid attention to 
the educational function of this serial. As one of the screenwriters recalled, they wanted to 
deliver not merely entertainment content, but also meanings and values, so as to provide 
guidance for the young audience on how to deal with complicated love relationships and 
friendships (Tencent Entertainment, 2010). It turns out that by juxtaposing several modes of 
love affairs, including Jiang Yuan’s insistence on Murong’s physical presence by her side, and 
Yuxun’s understanding and support of Murong, the screenwriters expected the young 
audiences to make their own moral judgement as to which mode is better. This shows the 
producers’ educational intentions of preparing young viewers for emotional challenges, as well 
as to promote the value of altruistic love. In this sense, this drama demonstrate a similar 
commitment to ‘educating’ the audience as was seen in CCTV-1’s My Youthfulness. 
Yet what obviously differentiates Meteor Shower from My Youthfulness is its blatant reliance 
on commercial sponsorship, as well as the entertainment tastes of the young audiences. As 
Yin (2002) has shown, commercial sponsorship started to appear in Chinese television drama 
production from 1987, and in the 1990s gradually replaced state subsidies, becoming the main 
source of television stations’ revenue. Following this production strategy, product placement 
has become increasingly prominent in the production of TV serials, and this trend was fuelled 
by the state’s emphasis on consumer society in the last decade. While product placement was 
not obvious in Women in Beijing, it was a salient feature of Meteor Shower ten years later. In 
the latter series, various commercial brands from clothes to luxury cars, from banks to real 
estates, have been integrated into the narrative. This is particularly evident in a scene where 
Yuxun’s uncle goes to the Bank of China, seeking advice about student loans: after hearing 
the staff member detail the policy, he seems quite satisfied and immediately shares the good 
message with his sister, Yuxun’s mother, that with the help of student loans provided by Bank 
of China, they will be able to send Yuxun abroad for further education. Through this plot 
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sequence, Bank of China, a state-owned commercial bank, successfully promoted its loan 
scheme for studying abroad, or at least made the scheme known to young TV viewers, most 
of whom were students enjoying summer holidays in front of TV. This is only one of many 
examples of product placement in this TV serial. Other examples include the franchise store 
Yuxun runs in the TV serial – Seven-coloured Flower (Qi Se Hua), which is a real-life chain 
store selling girls’ accessories. All these examples indicated the close linkage between product 
placements and television drama in recent years. Some audiences even criticised the Meteor 
Shower series for its overt product placements.   
On the other hand, the production team integrated various popular elements used in 
Japanese and Taiwanese idol dramas, such as employing star actors, integrating tokens of 
affection, sweet-sounding music, branded products, comic roles and generational conflicts into 
the plot (Liu and Chen, 2004: 67-68). For instance, the leading actors were mainly chosen 
from the young stars who gained fame through Hunan TV’s self-produced entertainment show, 
Super Boy (Kuaile nansheng, 2007). They also sing the theme song of this drama, which 
appears as a recurring melody to express the emotions of the main characters. Besides, a 
Saturn necklace given by Murong to Yuxun symbolises the love and commitment between the 
two. This token is broken at the beginning of season two, echoing the moment when Murong 
cannot remember Yuxun. While much effort has been made to depict romantic love, the drama 
also includes comic effects – a key entertainment element inherited from both Japanese 
manga and Taiwanese TV series. For this purpose, the production team inserted animations 
to the shots, as a way of underscoring the exaggerations of comic roles (see Fig. 9.3). In sum, 
in addition to the resemblance of storylines, Meteor Shower contains various narrative devices 
that are commonly seen in other transnationally popular TV dramas in East Asia.  
Figure 9.3: When Shangguan is speaking, lots of Chinese characters 
come out of his mouth. Meteor Shower 2 (2010) 
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However, it is noteworthy that the considerable reliance on foreign formats does not 
necessarily lead to a wholesale acceptance of them. Rather, as Huang (2008:110) has argued, 
they often ‘become sites for further reproduction of local identities and meanings’. Hunan TV 
intentionally tailored the borrowed content for domestic consumption. This included the 
insertion of in-house stars, original music, domestic brands and filming locations, all of which 
facilitated domestic consumption of both the TV serial and related commodities. More 
importantly, the production of this drama has displayed conformity to the official discourse, 
showing ambiguities in representing the gap between rich and poor. Even though in the 
original story, wealth and the sense of superiority that comes with it constitute important 
personality traits of the main characters, especially of Murong, Hunan TV’s producers sought 
to downplay this aspect and altered the luxurious lifestyle depicted in the original Taiwanese 
version. At the same time, they changed the story with an emphasis on the personal efforts of 
an aspiring girl. This appropriation explicitly shows the reconciliation between commercial 
imperatives and the impact of state censorship, as well as the negotiations between producing 
entertainment and adhering to the political line. 
 
9.4 The Interpreters: Work hard and you will fulfil your dream 
If the ‘idol drama’, as exemplified by Meteor Shower, is made to appeal to college and high 
school students, urban romance dramas like The Interpreters can be considered targeting 
female professionals living in cosmopolitan cities (see Zhu, 2008: 90). Focusing on a group of 
Shanghai-based professional French translators, The Interpreters is a typical example of the 
newly emerged hybrid genre of contemporary urban romance drama and ‘workplace drama’ 
(zhichang ju). Conventional Chinese workplace dramas mostly focus on the life of doctors, 
lawyers or policemen. The Interpreters was therefore allegedly the first workplace drama 
representing the life of professional interpreters. The drama was adapted from the best-selling 
workplace novel by Miao Juan, staring Yang Mi and Huang Xuan, and then exclusively 
broadcast on Hunan TV from late May to mid-June 2016. Despite the divided opinions 
expressed in viewers’ comments regarding the discrepancies between the dramatic plots and 
real-life situations (Gu, 2016), the drama still obtained the highest viewing figures of the year, 
with an average national viewership of 2.63 percent and a market share of 8.74 percent. In 
the following part, based on the main characters and plots depicted in the drama, I examine 
how this hybridisation of urban romance and workplace story has achieved such popularity 
whilst stimulating widespread discussions. I also pay attention to the unique narrative 
techniques aiming at TV consumption and entertainment, and potential linkages to China’s 
current socio-political reality.  
The central female character in The Interpreters, Qiao Fei, in many ways resembles Chu 
Yuxun in Meteor Shower: she is portrayed as a strong-willed, self-reliant girl wanting to 
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advance from a humble background through hard work. Qiao Fei is a French language 
graduate who decides to become a professional interpreter. She comes from a poor single-
parent family, her mother having suffered from a brain disease for many years. The family 
income depends on Qiao Fei’s part-time job as a waitress and her salary as a junior interpreter 
at the Institute of Advanced Translation. From the moment Qiao Fei meets Cheng Jiayang, an 
interpreter from the same institute and later assigned as her supervisor, she not only becomes 
involved in a series of troubles but also gets herself into a romantic entanglement with Cheng 
Jiayang. In contrast to Qiao Fei, Cheng Jiayang is from a well-off elite family, his father serving 
as a diplomat and his mother owning a company. As with the plot of Women in Beijing, the 
romance develops in the workplace, where Cheng Jiayang initially gives Qiao Fei a hard time, 
but the latter proves to be a qualified interpreter, thus receiving Cheng Jiayang’s respect and 
affection (see Fig. 9.4). However, their love meets with opposition from Jiayang’s family, 
particularly his mother. In order to continue their relationship, the hero and heroine have to 
fight against various obstacles, including the brain tumour that threatens Qiao Fei’s life. Having 
experienced emotional ups and downs and overcome their respective life challenges, the two 
people are eventually reunited.  
At first glance, the plot and characters exhibit many of the melodramatic formulas prevailing 
in Chinese urban romance dramas since the late 1990s, which are particularly familiar from 
Korean trendy dramas popular in the late 1990s and the 2000s. The plot in The Interpreters is 
therefore reminiscent us of similar scenarios in the two dramas discussed earlier in this 
chapter. For example, in The Interpreters, the love relationship between Qiao Fei and Cheng 
Jiayang encounters strong objection from Cheng’s mother because of their vastly different 
family backgrounds; in Meteor Shower, Murong’s mother likewise becomes the main obstacle 
in his relationship with Yuxun. Moreover, Qiao Fei suffers from a brain disease in the second 
Figure 9.4: A romance gradually develops between Qiao Fei and 
Cheng Jiayang. The Interpreters (2016) 
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half of The Interpreter, which nearly leads to a tragic ending of her romance with Cheng 
Jiayang. A similar plot development can be found in Women in Beijing, relationship between 
Xiaoyu and Feng Xiao comes to an end due to Feng’s illness.  
Most importantly, class differences between the hero and heroine are a defining feature of 
all three Hunan TV dramas, and the depiction of class differences is intertwined with their 
distinct gender roles. In each case, the heroine occupies the weaker position compared to her 
richer and more powerful male suitors. She is depicted as both vulnerable but optimistic, 
always having a hero to save her from the hardships of life. At the same time, in order to make 
them appear worthy the hero’s love, they are represented as hard-working, self-reliant and 
diligent. Because of these virtues, they become exceptionally attractive to the heroes. As 
discussed in chapter 8, women’s engagement in the workforce was characterised as a key 
feature of Chinese feminism in the Mao era. The subsequent economic reforms and opening 
to the West have brought about new feminine qualities, which reinforced gender differences 
but did not challenge the socialist model of ‘gender equality’ that still insists on women’s 
participation in social work. As we see from the three dramas discussed in this chapter, 
women’s excellence at work tends to be depicted as important feminine qualities in 
contemporary popular narratives, but these representations are largely limited within the 
framework of a traditional patriarchal order. This is particularly true in the aspect that the 
female characters are always subordinate to more powerful male characters, and their 
independent spirit has been portrayed as an enchanting quality to please the male.  
These narrative features can certainly be attributed to the impact of Korean trendy dramas 
on Chinese melodramatic soap operas over the last two decades. However, this only provides 
a partial view. In fact, these narrative traits have in fact proved to be a widely favoured formula 
in both Eastern and Western contexts. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the 
melodramatic formulas in Korean trendy dramas found their resemblance in the nineteenth-
century popular literature in the West. As indicated by Cawelti (1991), the dramatic depiction 
of class and gender differences between heroines and heroes in popular novels was to 
foreground the virtues embodied by the heroines, as well as to valorise the moral ideals that 
define what is right and significant in a changing society. Apart from the similarity in character 
design, the depiction of sudden turns of events, confrontation between good and evil, romance 
and tragedy in Chinese romantic dramas also embody the main features of what Brooks has 
called ‘melodramatic imaginations’, which essentially involve ‘extreme states of being, 
situation, actions’; ‘persecution of the good, and final reward of virtue’ etc. (1995: 11-12). It 
should be noted that these elements of popular narratives can still be found in recent Western 
films and drama series, such as Pretty Woman (dir. Garry Marshall, 1990) or Sex and the City 
(HBO, 1998-2004). Particularly, the representations of wealth, power and glamourous life in 
some American soap operas are considered having provided a fantasy world for viewers to 
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temporarily escape from their mundane daily life (see Livingstone, 1988: 67). Likewise, the 
love relationship between members of different social classes in contemporary Chinese 
romantic dramas invites the audience to a world full of surprises and excitement, tragedies 
and happy endings. These are not commonly found in the viewers’ own lives. Hence, they 
provide an opportunity to experience another kind of life, which helps the audience to cherish 
or adjust their own lives.  
It appears that the extensive use of melodramatic elements in The Interpreters has made it 
a typical romantic TV serial that disregards its groundings in real life and instead lets the 
audience indulge in romance. This is precisely what the drama has been criticised for. For 
instance, the Party-official newspaper Guangming Ribao published an article which expresses 
disappointment that the drama is only a romance disguised as a workplace drama, and that it 
fails to thoroughly present the extensive training, hidden rules and hardships associated with 
the profession of translation (Renminwang, 2016). It is certainly the case that The Interpreters 
spends much narrative time on depicting the emotional side of the protagonists rather than 
their professional side, which weakens its representation of the complex social forces and 
relationships in real-life working environments. However, we should not ignore the drama’s 
realistic values and political implications simply because of its continuous depictions of 
romantic love. 
With a melodramatic mode and the guise of a workplace TV drama, The Interpreters might 
not probe into the fields of translation or diplomacy. Nevertheless, it is reflective of recent 
social agendas and serves as the embodiment of official ideologies. As Rofel (1994: 706) 
claims, melodramas tracing back to Yearnings, as with all others, have their ‘specific cultural 
and historical location(s)’. The Interpreters is no exception. It is closely tied to the middle-class 
aspirations promoted in the 2000s and the political vision of the ‘Chinese dream’ put forward 
in the 2010s. As mentioned earlier, following the state’s encouragement of economic growth 
and consumption since 2002, there has emerged an increasingly prominent trend in popular 
narratives that celebrates the affluent lifestyle of the rich, and admires the privileged and 
powerful. This trend is reflected in the plots of The Interpreters: whenever the poor junior 
interpreter Qiao Fei fails to accomplish her tasks no matter how hard she tries, Cheng Jiayang 
helps her out and solves the problem, as he has easier access to various social resources 
and superior networks. But, as Meteor Shower purposively downplays the protagonists’ 
different class identities, The Interpreters also attempts to mask class differences by 
romanticising them, instead of presenting the social gap as a serious social issue. For instance, 
in a sequence of plot, Cheng Jiayang expresses enormous interests in Qiao Fei’s daily life 
and street wisdom: he enjoys taking a bus to work with Qiao Fei and eating street food – a 
lifestyle he is not familiar with due to his different upbringing. He also admires Qiao Fei’s 
fighting for a better life. These qualities make her exceptionally attractive to Jiayang. As a 
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result, the differences between the hero and heroine, that are somehow associated with their 
respective family background, social status and class identity, add more romantic elements to 
their relationship. In these regards, both Meteor Shower and The Interpreters display high 
degree of conformity to official views in treating the sensitive class issue.  
Moreover, The Interpreters seeks to guide public opinion in the way it represent the social 
tendency of ‘hatred towards the rich’ (choufu xinli). It portrays Cheng Jiayang’s friend, Wang 
Xudong, the son of a rich entrepreneur, as a warm-hearted, diligent and cautious young man, 
who tries to change the public’s negative perceptions of second-generation wealthy people. 
In correcting the image of the rich, the drama also makes reference to cyberspace violence 
and represents it as a key factor that leads to conflict between rich and poor. In the last few 
episodes, Cheng Jiayang falls victim to violent comments in cyberspace after he makes a 
mistake during a live broadcast on TV. Because of Cheng Jiayang’s identity as the son of a 
businesswoman and a diplomat, the upper class, which involves successful entrepreneurs, 
Party and state cadres and their families, becomes an immediate target of public hatred and 
criticism. Although this event in the drama turns out to be part of a conspiracy hatched by 
Cheng Jiayang’s mother to break her son’s relationship with Qiao Fei, the irrationality 
embedded in this event still has its root in trends within current Chinese society that are related 
to the widening income gap and the increasing social stratification.   
The above analysis thus suggests that a Chinese romantic drama relying on a melodramatic 
mode still to some extent has its political mission, namely, to contribute to resolving social 
contradictions through exposing them. The analysis of romantic dramas on both Hunan TV 
and CCTV-1 so far has shown in order to exercise their socio-political function, Chinese TV 
serials have normally resorted to establishing a role-model character within their narratives. 
As Li (2011: 340) has noted when explaining how a melodrama transforms from an emotionally 
grounded fiction to an ethical and educative social text: ‘the virtuous characters exemplified 
not only moral value but correct and practical social actions.’ This is also the case in The 
Interpreters. In its key melodramatic character, Qiao Fei, it softens the tensions emerging 
through unequal distribution of wealth and presents a role model for viewers who are 
dissatisfied with their current social position. To this end, the drama does not dwell on 
portraying the difficulties Qiao Fei encounters but leaves sufficient narrative space to 
emphasise the opportunities given to her. It traces her development from a naïve graduate to 
a professional interpreter who eventually realises her dream. In many aspects, this trope of 
success shows connections to the political slogan of realising the ‘Chinese dream’ promoted 
by the current Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, who encourages Chinese young people to ‘dare to 
dream, work assiduously to fulfil the dreams and contribute to the revitalisation of the nation’ 
(Global Times, 2013). While this assertion may overstate the political implications of The 
Interpreters, some core concepts demonstrated by this drama, such as the interpreters’ 
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responsibility of ‘serving the country’ and ‘defending national honour’, still remind us of the 
alignment with the official political line.     
Evidently, the seemingly unrealistic, sentimental TV melodrama has shown its groundings 
in reality and its potential to facilitate state propaganda. Yet, as a successful serial drama, its 
narrative also incorporates various product placements, ranging from washing liquid to 
medicines to real estate agents. At the same time, the commodification of the domestic space 
is accompanied by an extensive cosmopolitan imagination which has become a typical formula 
adopted in urban romantic dramas in recent years. In The Interpreters, the main characters 
frequently travel between China and Switzerland, for humanitarian rescue, personal 
transnational business or medical treatment. These plots and events all contributed to 
constructing a modern and cosmopolitan image of China, which likewise illustrated the 
complexity of romantic TV serials between political meaning and entertainment values.  
   
9.5 Conclusion 
    The above analysis has shown that love-themed TV dramas on Hunan TV are driven by a 
melodramatic formula that consists the depiction of romantic love between a lower-class 
female and a male of a higher social class. It should be noted that the class differences 
between hero and heroine often serve as a dramatic catalyst that reflects commercial 
considerations rather than expressing social criticism. Compared to the romantic dramas on 
CCTV-1, the melodramatic narratives on Hunan TV commit less to the resolution of socio-
political conflicts in the stories. Rather, they are dedicated to providing romantic fantasies for 
the audiences.  
Noticeably, Hunan TV’s romantic dramas before 2003, of which Women in Beijing is 
representative, still demonstrate clear similarities with the CCTV-1 dramas in that they reflect 
social concerns of unemployed female workers and provide emotional release for them. 
However, along with the prominent transnational cultural flows in East Asia at the turn of the 
century, the dramas aired on Hunan TV have become increasingly influenced by popular 
dramas made in South Korea and Taiwan. This suggests that the narrative forms shown in 
Hunan TV are subject to constant change, from adhering to traditional, politically oriented 
programming and narratives to gradually embracing new and unprecedented narrative 
formulas. This change has been informed by transnational cultural influences, an increasing 
creative autonomy of Chinese TV producers, as well as the consumerist trend among the 
audience. 
This is not to say these TV serials were exempted from political functions or educative 
purposes. Although they do not explicitly use the language of official propaganda, they still 
implicitly reflect the neo-liberal logic that has pervaded Chinese society as a result of the 
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market reforms, which were marked by the admiration of wealth and power, a commitment to 
material enjoyment, middle-class imaginations and the promotion of the ‘Chinese dream’. 
Besides, all these romantic dramas remain strictly compliant with official requirements on 
depicting romantic love. They generally display heterosexual love between men and women, 
without any other form of love relationships or overly sexual scenes, namely, any physical 
contact that goes beyond a light kiss or hug between lovers. Furthermore, the representation 
of gender relations still conforms to a traditional patriarchal hierarchy, hence continuing to 
reinforce existing power relations. Within this politically sanctioned discourse, we see that 
various social issues have been dramatised and transformed into a melodramatic formula for 
public entertainment, which demonstrates the resilience of Hunan TV’s romantic dramas in 
negotiating audience demands.  
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Chapter 10  
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this project was to examine the changing role of Chinese television in facilitating 
the Party-state’s propaganda work in the new era characterised by marketisation and popular 
entertainment, with a focus on prime-time television dramas. Rather than giving a macro 
explanation of the landscape of Chinese television, this project has sought to explore the 
changes and continuities as exemplified by the content of selected TV programmes. 
Particularly, it considers the making of Chinese television programmes as a process of 
constant negotiation between various factors that derive from both domestic developments 
and global trends. Hence it has situated the analysis of TV dramas within the spectrum of two 
poles – propaganda and entertainment, aiming to explore how these TV programmes have 
related themselves to the propaganda imperatives of the Party-state, while at the same time 
responding to audience demands regarding entertainment.  
In order to meet these aims, this project has adopted a mixed-method approach which 
includes a quantitative content analysis to delineate long-term trends within the genre of TV 
drama, and four qualitative case studies to establish a more thorough understanding of the 
transformations that have occurred in Chinese television. In this chapter, I will summarise the 
key empirical findings of this project, with a focus on the changes and continuities reflected 
through the chosen TV programmes over the sampling period. After this, I will reflect on the 
limitations of this thesis and then highlight its potential contributions to existing knowledge.  
 
10.1 Nuanced changes in Chinese television  
In chapter 3, I outlined the changing political, economic and cultural context in China since 
the reform era which gave rise to the transformations in Chinese television. By and large, 
owning to the 1978 policy of ‘reform and opening’, Chinese television has departed from its 
role as an explicit propaganda tool and evolved into a multifaceted industry that needs to 
balance obeying the Party’s propaganda imperatives with satisfying the creative needs of TV 
producers and audience interest in television entertainment. That is to say, the production of 
TV programmes has changed from a previously top-down model to a multi-way system that 
involves negotiation between political and commercial interests. In order to further shed light 
on the complexities in China’s state television and how it has changed to be popular, chapters 
5 to 9 provide answers regarding these changes, which can be grouped into three sections.  
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10.1.1 Rise of commercial influence 
The most prominent aspect of change in the post-1992 era was the rise of commercial 
influence in the television sector. This was evidenced by not only the quantitative trends in the 
content of broadcasts, but also by the detailed findings from the qualitative case studies. In 
chapter 5, I have shown that both central and provincial television stations have adopted 
commercial strategies in broadcasting prime-time TV dramas. This was demonstrated through 
the higher proportions of themes favoured by audiences on each TV channel over the 
sampling period. Despite CCTV-1 being the officially designated mouthpiece of the Party-state, 
it has still allocated an increasingly large proportion of its prime time to broadcasting the widely 
favoured romantic dramas. At the same time, Hunan TV, as the flagship TV channel of an 
economically less developed province, has shown more devotion to commercial operations 
and its programmes have been closely tied to the purpose of making profits. Hence TV dramas 
depicting romantic love have become the most favourable genre on this TV channel.  
When looking at the results from the qualitative case studies, we find that they confirm the 
trend towards increasing commercial influence on Chinese television. This is notably 
demonstrated by the rise of production value in making TV dramas. The analysis of the 
politically important genre – revolutionary TV serials – in chapters 6 and 7 has demonstrated 
this change. No matter whether in historical war dramas aiming for propaganda, or in fictional 
stories of armed struggles to entertain the audience, there has been a significant growth in the 
use of popular elements to depict the revolutionary war. These techniques included using car 
chases or gun fights to increase tension and excitement, and employing well-known actors to 
draw public attention. Some recent productions (e.g. On the Taihang Mountains, 2015) have 
also sought to integrate global cinematic techniques into their representation of the revolution 
in order to increase audience appeal. These measures have made the revolutionary dramas 
produced in the 2010s more exciting and potentially more profitable than those made in the 
late 1990s.    
The commercial influence brought about by the market economy has been even more 
pronounced in the making of love-themed dramas. As shown in chapters 8 and 9, a form of 
melodramatic narrative that has wide audience appeal has been increasingly adopted in the 
domestically produced dramas focusing on the private sphere, regardless whether these 
dramas were tied to propaganda, social education or entertainment. Such melodramatic 
formulas were marked by the depiction of romantic love between members of different social 
classes, tales of ‘rags to riches’ and a positive portrayal of financially successful male 
characters. These narrative formulas stem from popular drama genres available on the East 
Asian TV market and have meanwhile become an indispensable narrative device adopted by 
Chinese domestic TV dramas with a romantic plot, including the propaganda dramas aired on 
CCTV-1 (e.g. My Year of 1997, 2017). On the other hand, the growing emphasis on 
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commercial values of TV programmes has also been reflected in direct product placement in 
dramas broadcast by commercial channels. As seen from the case of Hunan TV, the strategy 
of product placement was not yet prominent in the 2000 TV drama, but has since then become 
a salient feature in the romantic dramas made a decade later. This has led the recent 
entertainment-oriented romantic dramas to become a showcase for displaying various 
commodities. 
The commercial transformations in either the form or content of TV programmes can be 
interpreted within the framework of transnational cultural flows and the national boost for the 
development of a cultural industry. On the one hand, China’s ‘opening’ to the world, particularly 
its admission to the WTO in 2001, has enabled more frequent contacts between Chinese TV 
producers and experts from abroad. This has introduced popular formats, narrative devices 
and visual effect techniques not only from the West, but also from neighbouring countries in 
East Asia which share similar cultural roots with China. On the other hand, since the 
establishment of a market economy in 1992, the Party-state has been keen on transforming 
the state-controlled television system into profitable state enterprises. While the state’s aim 
has been to increase both the revenue and competitive strength of its TV stations, at the same 
time, the Party has sought to gain more cultural influence using popular media forms such as 
TV drama. This explains why the state-sponsored propaganda productions have also 
increasingly drawn experience from commercially successful cultural products.  
 
10.1.2 The changing articulation of nationalism and Chinese socialism 
As noted in chapter 3, the key focus of the Party’s propaganda work in the post-1989 era 
has been promoting nationalism, patriotism and socialism. This point was directly supported 
by the analysis of revolutionary TV dramas in chapters 6 and 7: these dramas broadcast in 
different periods have all been dedicated to the discursive construction of nationalism and 
have highlighted the significance of the Communist revolution and the founding of a socialist 
China. Yet, in terms of specific articulation of nationalism and socialism, we can still detect 
subtle changes in the revolutionary narratives.   
The first aspect of change is concerned with the content of nationalism, which was 
demonstrated by the changing depiction of the KMT. In both the propaganda dramas aired on 
CCTV-1 and the popular narratives shown in Hunan TV, the depiction of the CCP’s former 
enemy in the civil war has become increasingly positive over the sampling period. Whereas 
the Japanese army remained the evil Other in nationalist discourse, the contributions made 
by the KMT in the anti-Japanese war have been more positively acknowledged and praised, 
particularly in the dramas produced after the mid-2000s. This change in TV representation 
was in line with the CCP’s changing attitude to the KMT. In the official discourse – which has 
in recent years evolved into a consensus among mainland Chinese people, all the ‘patriotic’ 
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KMT members, or Taiwanese in general, are considered part of the ‘national Self’ if they treat 
the Japanese invaders as the enemy and believe in the ‘one China’ policy promulgated by the 
mainland. Hence it is reasonable to argue that the subtle shift in the official discourse has 
provided ideological stimulation for artistic creations.  
Another aspect of change is the way key propaganda messages have been articulated in 
the revolutionary dramas. These changes were particularly evident in the dramas selected 
from CCTV-1. Even though all three dramas aim to support the legitimacy of the ruling Party 
by propagandising that only the CCP could have led the Chinese people to victory and 
prosperity, this propaganda message has been articulated differently. This changing 
articulation was actually aligned with the CCP’s official ideological lines of constructing 
socialism at different times. Whereas the 1999 drama – War of China’s Fate – still emphasised 
gaining victory through armed struggles, the 2005 drama – Eighth Route Army – attributed the 
success of the CCP to the ‘mass line’ policy which stressed representing and fighting for the 
interest of Chinese people. The latter was a timely response to the promulgation of Three 
Represents in 2002. Besides, the 2015 drama, On the Taihang Mountains, highlights the 
necessity of uniting all national patriotic forces to achieve victory, thereby realising the 
rejuvenation of the country. This also echoes the political vision of China’s current leadership 
in building the socialist society. These changes in televised content have reflected 
transformations in the political context since the 1990s, when the Party sought to transform 
itself from a revolutionary party to a ‘party in power’ with the goal of maintaining its rule (Brady, 
2008: 47). 
In addition to the changes found in the revolution-themed dramas, the dynamics of televised 
propaganda messages and their relation to the political context are also evident in the love-
themed dramas broadcast on CCTV-1. As summarised in chapter 8, the narratives of these 
soap-opera-style dramas were intertwined with wider social, economic and political changes. 
Educational or propagandistic meanings were embedded into these dramas, aiming to support 
dominant political ideological shifts that have emerged at different times. Holding Hands (1998) 
was shown to justify the policy of market reforms during a period when such reforms had 
resulted in a large-scale unemployment. My Youthfulness (2009) stresses the importance of 
maintaining family harmony and delivers the message that only when harmony in each 
household is achieved will the country be able to realise the goal of building a harmonious 
society. My Year of 1997 (2017) uses a past historical event – the ‘handover’ of Hong Kong in 
1997 – to eulogise the political achievement of the Party-state, thereby echoing the theme of 
the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. Each of these CCTV-1 dramas embodies what 
the political authority said at different historical periods about the route of building a socialist 
country. This shows the continuous political influence on the television programmes in China.  
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10.1.3 A growing emphasis on individualism and human interest  
In the televised content sampled from different periods, there has been a trend indicating a 
rise of individualism and a narrative turn to human interest. This trend was comparatively more 
prominent in the revolutionary dramas. Set against the background of collectivist warfare, the 
revolution-themed dramas have seen a growing emphasis on individual abilities and human 
interest in the revolutionary narratives. The rising importance of individualism is particularly 
evident in the popular representations of the revolutionary struggles on Hunan TV. While the 
dramas in CCTV-1 tended to treat the collective power of the CCP and Chinese people as the 
most important factor in securing victory, the revolutionary narratives on Hunan TV have put 
more emphasis on the individual leadership, courageous actions and combating skills of the 
omnipotent Communist heroes. This is best illustrated by the recent hit drama, The Disguiser 
(2015), in which the collective revolutionary movement is used as no more than a backdrop to 
display the personal heroism of Communist undercover agents.  
The rise of individualism in revolutionary stories was paralleled by a growing emphasis on 
human interest. Since the dramas started zooming in on individual lives, there has been a 
significant growth in the plot depicting the internal world of revolutionaries. As we saw in 
chapters 6 and 7, revolutionary dramas made in the mid-2000s and afterwards have shown a 
growing interest in representing the personal dilemmas, sacrifices, and wellbeing of the people 
during wartime. In the serials made in the mid-2000s, for instance Eighth Route Army (2005) 
and Struggles in an Antient City (2005), such narratives only started to emerge; those 
produced in the 2010s – On the Taihang Mountains (2015) and The Disguiser (2015) – focus 
considerably more on personalised narratives to depict the turbulent life of people living in the 
revolutionary era. These individualising narrative techniques have become increasingly 
significant in the theme of propagandising the collective victory of China.  
These changes can be understood with reference to their cultural, economic and political 
context. On the one hand, the narrative traits that highlight individual abilities, autonomy and 
leadership were designed to cater for the cultural tastes of audiences living in the era of 
popular entertainment. As noted in chapter 3, a key feature of China’s popular entertainment 
culture since the late 1990s lies in the aspect that it tended to simplify any kind of social and 
historical experiences and to remould them into dramatic plots built around ‘conflict and 
resolution’. In so doing, this type of entertainment provided the audience with a sense of 
excitement and symbolic satisfaction, especially when all conflicts were resolved within the 
narrative space. The revolutionary stories analysed above, which were made in the new 
century, somehow echoed this feature of the entertainment culture. They restyle the 
revolutionary war as a ‘conflict’ that individual Communist Party members have to resolve. In 
this way, the revolution-themed dramas are able to link the past events to the individual lives 
of present viewers, thereby making the revolutionary stories more appealing.  
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On the other hand, the growing narrative focus on the wellbeing of people reflected the 
ideological stance of the Party in the last two decades and a half. Particularly, the theme of 
humanism was an important dimension of the Confucian ideals promoted in the mid-2000s. 
As outlined in chapter 3, the Party elites drew inspirations from Confucianism to articulate their 
political line, notably ‘building a harmonious society’. This ideological stance provided political 
conditions for the revolutionary narratives to start focusing on the personal dimension. In the 
period after 2012, the political authorities put forward a new slogan – the ‘Chinese dream’. In 
this discourse, the collective goal of realising the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is 
articulated as tied to individual wellbeing and success. We can see that the official discourse 
has continued to promote the dimension of individual wellbeing and happiness since the mid-
2005s for the purpose of maintaining social stability. It was therefore not a surprise that 
narratives focused on human interest have become an essential part in both propagandistic 
and popular representations of the collective war, particularly in the dramas made around and 
after the year 2005.  
Furthermore, the rise of individualism and the increasing focus on human interest can also 
be found in the love dramas sampled from CCTV-1 and Hunan TV. Actually, the growing 
proportion of love-themed dramas on the two TV channels was already an indicator of this 
trend, in that these dramas specifically focus on the personal feelings and individual lives of 
urban Chinese. As I have shown in chapters 8 and 9, the popularity of love themes in the post-
1992 period came not only as a result of the emergence of an urban-oriented entertainment 
culture, but also because of the increasingly frequent cultural exchange with foreign countries. 
In general, these two aspects of change signify the rise of the private sphere, as well as 
individualistic aspirations and personal values on Chinese television screens in the post-1992 
period. However, we should be wary of exaggerating the power of the private sphere by 
arbitrarily drawing the conclusion that state power has weakened in the meantime. As we shall 
see in the next section, all the agents contributing to the changes in the media sphere needed 
to operate carefully within politically sanctioned discourses.  
 
10.2 Continuities in Chinese television 
While the transformations in the wider context have induced the above changes in television 
content, what has remained consistent in this process is the general purpose of propaganda 
and the political bottom line set for all the activities conducted in the television sector. As 
summarised in chapter 2, propaganda as a form of communication can take various forms, 
including using popular and entertaining elements to help the propagandists achieve their 
intended purposes. Hence we can use the analysis of narrative techniques in television 
programmes to interpret the propagandistic purposes embedded in them.   
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10.2.1 General purpose of propaganda 
As discussed in chapter 3, the central focus of the Party’s propaganda work in the post-
1989 period has revolved around legitimising its rule over China and maintaining the political 
status quo of the one-party state. For this purpose, the political authorities are keen on 
adapting new strategies and techniques from a wider global context to support their 
propaganda work (Brady, 2008). The qualitative findings of this thesis have verified this point, 
with particular regard to the prime-time TV dramas broadcast on CCTV-1. As this channel is 
closely tied to the central government, its TV programmes aired during prime time have 
invariably reflected propagandistic purposes. Such connections are visible not only in the 
explicitly political content, but also in the ‘life-world content’ that does not address self-evident 
political themes. 
Chapter 6 mapped how revolutionary dramas produced in different periods have responded 
to the distinct ideological line promoted at the time of their production. However, an important 
continuity in the recurrent revolutionary narratives has been the construction of nationalism 
and patriotism, embodied in the propaganda message that only the CCP could have been the 
legitimate force to lead the Chinese people to victory. In order to make the revolutionary stories 
appealing, thereby effectively delivering the propaganda message, the dramas have drawn 
on new narrative content and forms, such as techniques of personal narratives and 
incorporating more fictional plot elements. Yet despite the increasingly advanced methods of 
propaganda, the ultimate political purpose of these dramas was to show support to the 
leadership of the Communist Party.  
From another perspective, chapter 8 displayed the enduring propaganda effort in prime-
time Chinese TV dramas. Even though the dramas analysed in this chapter are centred on 
the emotional and familial experiences of fictional characters, they are nevertheless tied to the 
above-mentioned propagandistic purposes. Particularly, all the three dramas involve a 
respectable female character whose role consists in helping the protagonists overcome 
difficulties in their private lives and work. More importantly, this female character seeks to 
guide not only the characters in the drama, but also the TV viewers towards appreciating 
stability, harmony and prosperity in both the private and public spheres. The individual hopes 
as depicted in each drama are in line with the Party’s long-term goals of maintaining social 
stability and national cohesion. In this respect, the propaganda use of the ‘life-world content’ 
in China accords with existing scholarly discussions about the political potential of seemingly 
apolitical content (for instance, see Holbert, 2005), and also resonates well with Imre’s (2016: 
199-224) discussion of the propagandistic and educational function of socialist ‘soap operas’ 
in the context of Eastern Europe. This suggests that, although television propaganda has been 
prominent in contemporary China, it is by no means unique to the Chinese broadcasting 
system. 
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10.2.2 Operating in the sanctioned discourse 
The other significant continuity seen from the televised content is that political control of the 
television sector has always been in place. This was explicitly proven by CCTV-1, in that TV 
programmes on this channel have been closely tied to propaganda. Surprisingly, however, 
this continued political influence is best illustrated by the commercial TV channel, Hunan TV. 
As revealed by both the quantitative and qualitative findings, all creative activities, commercial 
considerations and artistic expressions on this TV channel have had to proceed within officially 
sanctioned discourses. The quantitative results in chapter 5 have shown that even though 
Hunan TV has been granted more autonomy in its commercial operations and its programming 
has primarily centred on providing audience-friendly entertainment, it has also shown 
allegiance to the Party’s propaganda work by promoting nationalist themes during politically 
important commemorative periods.  
The qualitative case studies have provided a more detailed account of this point. In chapter 
7, I analysed two dramas that drew on popular elements to represent the revolutionary past. 
In both the TV adaptation of the canonised Red Classics and the spy dramas based on popular 
novels written in the post-reform era, TV producers have made moves to popularise the 
revolutionary narratives. The development of narrative strategies have included 
emotionalising and romanticising the revolutionary past in order to make more concessions to 
the viewers’ interests. It is notable that the efforts to incorporate increasingly dramatic plots 
were carried out within the politically permitted realm; and despite the development in narrative 
devices, the underlying political message – that only the CCP can save China – has not been 
changed at all. Rather, these approaches have in effect continued to revitalise the past 
revolutionary legacies, showing the contribution commercial TV makes to the collective 
agenda of constructing a nationalist discourse. 
Chapter 9 featured two love-themed dramas on Hunan TV. Compared with the politically 
important theme of revolution, the dramas discussed in this chapter deal with a seemingly 
non-sensitive subject that involves romance, love and family. Given this politically safe topic, 
the narrative content and forms of TV romance on Hunan TV have been able to develop 
constantly, from obeying traditional, politically oriented programming rules to gradually 
embracing new and popular formulas originated in other countries. However, as the analysis 
suggested, the narrative content has had to be consistent with the mainstream spirit of the 
times by complying with official requirements on depicting romantic love and conforming to an 
established patriarchal hierarchy. Moreover, the exploration of new entertainment forms must 
stick to the bottom line given to provincial satellite TV channels, according to which they must 
avoid indulging in entertainment while also paying attention to the social educational function 
of their TV programmes. Abiding to these principles helped these TV channels run their shows 
smoothly, thereby avoiding unnecessary loss in commercial returns. This situation, which the 
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case studies have verified, evidences my central argument in this thesis: Chinese television 
in the post-reform era has involved constant negotiations and compromises between various 
forces and demands.  
 
10.3 Concluding reflections: Limitations and contributions of the thesis 
While this thesis has identified key changes and continuities in Chinese television and 
mapped them onto the wider political, economic and political transformations in the post-
reform era, it is not without limitations. The first limitation to note is that this research is mostly 
based on the intersection between popular culture and political communication in China. The 
popular culture discussed here operates within officially sanctioned discourses, so that the in-
depth analysis has not taken into account cases that were controversial. Certainly, there have 
been problematic prime-time TV dramas in the sampling period which were subject to 
censorship in the middle of being broadcast.39 However, in-depth analyses of these dramas 
would have gone beyond the scope of this study, as this project is expected to provide a timely 
examination of the evolution of China’s political communication in recent decades, with a focus 
on the subtle changes that occurred. This is not to valorise this broadcasting system. On the 
contrary, this study recognises the limit of the one-party system by highlighting the enduring 
political control and propaganda motives in its television. 
A further limitation of this study is that the analytical approach mainly focuses on the content 
of television programmes rather than, for instance, production studies or audience studies. 
There are three reasons why I opted for the analysis of content. First, as discussed in chapter 
2, to analyse the politically relevant content forms an important first step to approach to and 
in evaluating the political significance of any media messages. This ensures that the research 
on political communications does not miss any important evidence, including the seemingly 
irrelevant, entertaining materials. This also reminds us of the trend in which politics tends to 
be repackaged in the form of popular entertainment. Before venturing into making judgement 
about the role of entertainment media in politics, we need to capture the basic meaning and 
ideological stance as demonstrated in the content of the media.  
Second, the content of prime-time TV drama in China is what the state wants or allows the 
people to watch. In another word, it is the result of negotiations between different social agents, 
 
39 A well-known case in point is the 2003 Chinese historical drama aired on CCTV-1, Marching towards the 
Republic (Zouxiang gonghe). This TV serial depicts the history of China from the collapse of the Qing Dynasty to 
the founding of the Republic of China (to the year 1917). Because its portrayal of key historical figures, such as 
the Empress Dowager Cixi, and minister Li Hongzhang, was considered having challenged the officially prescribed 
versions, and its reinterpretation of the struggles at the time was deemed by the CCP authorities as having the 
potential to promote political reforms in contemporary China not in line with the CCP’s stance, this show 
triggered government censorship while being shown on CCTV-1. As a result, the last few episodes were reedited 
and shortened, and the whole serial finished ahead of the scheduled broadcast time. For further details on this 
issue, see Zhu (2008: 42).  
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including state and market players. Long-term changes and development in the content of TV 
programmes suggest a new round of negotiation and reconciliation. Hence an analysis of the 
dynamics and nuances in the content would help understand the transformation in power 
relations among Chinese media, the state and the audience. 
Third, as we have already seen from above, the content change in Chinese TV programmes 
over the sampling period has still operated within the politically sanctioned discourses. If I 
chose production studies and interviewed Chinese TV producers in the first place, it would be 
unlikely that these actions can lead to subversive answers, because the Chinese TV producers 
know exactly what the official ideological line is. The views of producers that we can access 
from websites are normally what they can provide to the general public, including researchers. 
An insider’s view is of course crucial for understanding the transformation in the propagandistic 
features of Chinese Television. In my case, however, the analysis of content can also achieve 
this purpose.  
As for audience studies, this thesis does not indeed include many discussions of audiences’ 
reception of these programmes. It has assumed a relatively homogeneous and cooperative 
audience that accepts the preferred meaning contained in TV programmes. Knowing what the 
Chinese TV viewers actually think about these programmes would be helpful in assessing the 
development in the Communist Party’s propaganda strategies, particularly with respect to the 
integration of political agenda with popular agenda. However, audiences’ responses might not 
seriously challenge or alter the official discourse. Certainly, audience studies form a fruitful 
approach to measure the political impact and effects of specific entertainment programmes. 
Future research involving reception analysis will further our knowledge of China’s current 
political communication and give more insights into ‘audience interests’ in viewing TV 
programmes.  
Despite the limitations, the thesis has made several major contributions to existing literature 
on the transformation of Chinese television in recent decades. First, existing studies of 
Chinese television seldom develop a temporal comparison that charts changes and 
continuities over a lengthy period. This research addresses this gap by providing a quantitative 
content analysis, so as to delineate the long-term transformations in the content production of 
TV dramas. In so doing, it illustrates how the different levels of television stations have 
navigated between complying with the propaganda mission and fulfilling the requirement of 
making profits during different periods of China’s recent history.  
Secondly, previous works have conducted considerable macro-structural analyses of the 
changing features of Chinese television and attributed change to either state control or market 
forces; but such research lacks nuanced studies of specific programmes from a micro 
perspective. This project fills that gap by providing detailed analyses of television content and 
its change, as well as explaining them with reference to not only domestic developments but 
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transnational and global cultural influences. Furthermore, this project also pays attention to 
important continuities in Chinese television. It provides systematic case studies that not only 
illustrate the enduring socialist appeals for propaganda, but also note the evolvement of state 
propaganda into the cultural form of television entertainment.  
The wider contribution of the thesis to the field of media studies is also evident. First, this 
project has generated meaningful empirical results in relation to the relationship between 
propaganda and popular entertainment. As noted in chapter 2, existing literature on political 
communication has fully recognised the political function of entertainment media. My studies 
of Chinese television enrich this view with evidence suggesting that the prime-time TV dramas 
not only amuse and resonate with the audience, but more often, have acted as a propaganda 
tool to articulate official views. Furthermore, different levels of Chinese TV broadcasters have 
demonstrated varied degrees of concessions to the entertainment pursuit of the audience, 
striking a fine balance between propaganda, education and entertainment. This shows that in 
the Chinese context, television entertainment can provide fun, but it can also be transformed 
into politics, depending on the political imperatives of the Party-state, the operational model 
and branding strategies of the TV station.  
Another aspect of contribution to the wider literature lies in the historical approach of this 
project. Existing media studies, particularly media-centric research, have tended to focus on 
the synchronous process in textual production and consumption. These approaches have 
often lost track of the social and political dynamics in media production and reception, hence 
having failed to understand them as diachronic processes (Deacon, 2003). This project has 
sought to refute this tendency by adding temporal values to political communication studies. 
Specifically, I consider the making of television content as the process and result of constant 
negotiations between political, commercial, cultural and ideological forces. The content 
therefore embodies temporal features of the prevailing socio-political context in which it was 
produced. The empirical findings have verified the two stances and demonstrated that China’s 
political, economic and cultural transformations over decades have not only influenced the 
form and content of television propaganda, but provided rich sources of popular elements for 
the Party-state to engage in cultural propaganda. This shows the importance of historical 
context in shaping communication practices. 
The final contribution of the thesis is the aspect that it shows the unique features of socialist 
television contexts. Rather than being exceptionally politicised, socialist television has enjoyed 
a great extent of editorial freedom and creative autonomy, as long as it operates within the 
ideological lines permitted by governing bodies. Meanwhile, as seen from the case of Hunan 
TV, the ideological requirement from the political authorities can sometimes be negotiable, for 
the purpose of satisfying commercial interests. An investigation of these internal dynamics 
and historical changes has contributed to the de-westernised approaches to studying socialist 
181 
 
media systems. In addition, this thesis links observations of the Chinese television system to 
a wider literature concerned with the state television of former socialist countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. While noting the distinctiveness of Chinese television in relation to its 
historical, political and cultural background, this project also seeks to map China’s socialist 
television onto the established world system of socialist TV cultures. Guided by a similar strand 
of operational principles, Chinese television has shown intriguing transnational similarities with 
other (former) socialist television systems, including the utilisation of popular TV soaps for 
promoting political agendas, the idealisation of central female characters for social education, 
and in particular, the distinct temporalities of socialist TV broadcasting which were tied to 
celebrating the revolutionary achievements of communist parties. These findings suggest that 
contemporary Chinese television culture belongs to a global constellation of socialist media 
cultures. 
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Appendix 1. Coding Scheme 
 
1.1 Coding Schedule 
Case 
No. 
Year  Month  Feitian 
Award 
Jinying 
Award 
No. of 
episodes 
Genre  Historical 
setting 
Theme 
1 
Theme  
2 
Producer 
           
 
 
1.2 Coding Manual 
 
Year of Broadcasting 
 
Month of Broadcasting 
 
Recipient of Feitian Award?  
1. No 
2. Yes 
 
Recipient of Jinying Award?  
1. No 
2. Yes 
 
Number of Episodes 
 
Genre 
1. Long TV serials 
2. Mini-series (3-9 episodes) 
3. One-off single drama (1-2 episodes) 
4. Sitcom 
5. Other 
 
Period setting 
1. Contemporary era: 1978-present 
2. Modern era: 1949-1978 
3. Republican period: 1911-1949 
4.    Ancient times: before Xinhai Revolution in 1911 
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5.    Other 
 
Theme 1  
1.    The revolution led by the CCP before the foundation of People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
2.    Military development – reflecting the development of Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) 
3.    Rural life – the construction and development of the rural/remote areas in China  
4.   Biopics of role models recommended by the CCP – including political leaders, Party 
members, and other important historical figures 
5.    Love and romance – focusing on romantic relationships and courtships 
6.    Family – reflecting family ethics and the relationship between family members 
7.    Children/student life – focusing on school education and the growing up of children  
8.    Crime – including anti-corruption and cop drama 
9.    Economic reforms – reflecting enterprise reform and entrepreneurship in post-1978 era 
10.  Dynasty drama set in the imperial courts of ancient China 
11.   Martial arts  
12.   Other  
 
Theme 2 (code if a second theme is found; code 0 if no second theme) 
 
Producer 
1.     Unknown 
2.     Imported 
3.     State TV: Television station or affiliated studios 
4.     Independent media companies 
5.     Joint production between 3 & 4 
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Appendix 2. Filmography 
 
General information of the eleven prime-time TV dramas selected for case studies: 
1. War of China’s Fate (Zhongguo mingyun de juezhan) 
Director: Wang Jin 
No. of episodes: 30 
Broadcast time: Sep-Oct 1999 
Storyline: It focuses on important historical events and political struggles taking place in 
mainland China from the end of Second World War to the founding day of the PRC (1945-
1949). It aims to address the key question:  who – the CCP or KMT – would legitimately rule 
China after the Japanese invaders had withdrawn from China. The story unfolds from the US 
intervention to support Chiang Kai-shek in establishing a democratic government in mainland 
China, but this financial and military support is later used by Chiang to suppress Mao’s 
revolution. The CCP’s political leaders hence need to resist the repression from the KMT, and 
at the same time seeks to unite various national democrats to subvert Chiang’s Nationalist 
Government. 
Original works: N/A 
 
2. Eighth Route Army (Balujun) 
Director: Song Yeming, Dong Yachun 
No. of episodes: 25 
Broadcast time: August 2005 
Storyline: At the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the CCP’s Red Army 
joined the KMT’s National Revolutionary Army in order to establish a united front against 
Japan, changing its name to the Eighth Route Army whilst in practice still being led by the 
CCP. Set against this background, Eighth Route Army depicts how the Communist Party 
leader Mao Zedong and General Zhu De lead the Eighth Route Army and the Chinese nation 
to final victory, with a focus on the effectiveness of the ‘mass line’ policy developed by the 
CCP. 
Original works: N/A 
 
3. On the Taihang Mountains (Taihangshan shang) 
Director: Li Wei 
No. of episodes: 32 
Broadcast time: August 2015 
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Storyline: Set against the background of the CCP’ revolutionary period between 1937 and 
1947, this drama traces the development of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army led 
by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping – the commander and political commissar of the 129th 
Division. It recounts their guerrilla warfare against the Japanese army in the CCP’s largest 
wartime base – Taihang Mountains. The serial also reflects the economic development in the 
Taihang area while it is governed by the Liu-Deng Army. 
Original works: N/A  
 
4. Struggles in an Ancient City (Yehuo chunfeng dou gucheng) 
Director: Lian Yiming 
No. of episodes: 20 
Broadcast time: August 2005 
Storyline: Set in mid-August of 1945, when the Second World War is coming to an end in 
Europe, whereas in the Far East, the Japanese Army still occupies several major cities in 
North China. In this situation, a CCP agent, Yang Xiaodong, is secretly sent to a Japanese-
occupied city in Hebei Province with the mission to promote an uprising in the local 
collaborationist government against the Japanese Army. With the help of Communist 
underground agents and guerrillas, Yang Xiaodong defeats the Japanese military advisor, and 
saves the city from being bombed by the Japanese army.   
Original works: Novel – Yehuo chunfeng dou gucheng, by Li Yingru, 1958; 
                           Film – Yehuo chunfeng dou gucheng, by Yan Jizhou, 1963. 
 
5. The Disguiser (Weizhuangzhe) 
Director: Li Xue 
No. of episodes: 48 
Broadcast time: August 2015 
Storyline: Set during the Japanese occupation of China, the story centres on the powerful 
Ming family in Shanghai. The younger brother, Ming Tai, is a college student who has been 
secretly recruited to be a secret agent of KMT Juntong. Ming Lou, the elder of two brothers, 
serves as the chief financial officer of the Shanghai collaborationist government but has secret 
identities, devoted to eradicating traitors and collecting intelligence for the frontline battles 
against the Japanese army. The Ming’s eldest sister, Ming Jing, is a capitalist who covertly 
financies the CCP-led anti-Japanese movement for years. Unaware of each family member’s 
secret actions, Ming Tai returns to Shanghai to engage in assassinations and intelligence 
gathering. Through co-operation between the KMT Juntong and CCP undercover agents, the 
Ming siblings manage to bring down the enemies in the collaborationist regime and support 
the CCP in its frontline battles. 
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Original works: Novel – Spy War in Shanghai (Diezhan Shanghai tan), by Zhang Yong, 
2012. 
 
6. Holding Hands (Qianshou) 
Director: Yang Yang 
No. of episodes: 18 
Broadcast time: April 1999 
Storyline: Set in a big city in the 1990s, the story traces the mid-life crisis of an urban couple, 
Xia Xiaoxue and Zhong Rui. The wife, Xiaoxue, finds herself stuck in the dullness and 
repetition of day-to-day life. With no ambitious goals for career advancement, she develops 
an increasingly bad temper. Her husband, Zhong Rui, gradually loses patience with her and 
instead, falls for a female colleague. After experiencing many fights, they end their marriage. 
After the divorce, Zhong Rui becomes increasingly successful in running his own company, 
whilst Xiaoxue becomes unemployed as a result of the market-oriented reforms. In striving to 
raise her son and manage the single-parent family, Xiaoxue starts to acquire new knowledge 
and adapts herself to a competitive working environment. Having eventually become a self-
reliant woman, Xiaoxue receives love and respect from her ex-husband again. 
Original works: N/A 
 
7. My Youthfulness (Wo de qingchun shui zuozhu) 
Director: Zhao Baogang 
No. of episodes: 32 
Broadcast time: April 2009 
Storyline: Set in contemporary Beijing, the drama traces three young women, Zhao Qingchu, 
Qian Xiaoyang and Li Pili, in particular their choices of love and work. The three characters 
are maternal cousins. Qingchu has gone back to Beijing to study and since then has been 
living with their grandmother. Inspired by her example, Xiaoyang has quit her job, left her 
parents in Yinchuan and also moved to Beijing, wishing to start a new life there. The youngest 
cousin, Li Pili, has grown up in Beijing with her parents but has her own life pursuits that are 
against her parents’ expectations. Focusing on these characters, this drama reveals the 
conflict between these young adults and their parents.  
Original works: N/A 
 
8. My Year of 1997 (Wo de 1997) 
Director: Wang Weimin 
No. of episodes: 32 
Broadcast time: June 2017 
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Storyline: In 1976, ‘rusticated youth’ Gao Jianguo and his girlfriend, An Hui, return to their 
hometown, Beijing, to announce their love relationship to the parents. But this relationship is 
strongly rejected by An Hui’s family, especially her brother, An Guoqing. In a violent altercation, 
Jianguo accidentally injures An Guoqing, leaving the latter in coma for months. For fear of 
being sentenced to jail, Jianguo flees to British-governed Hong Kong and seeks to start a new 
life there with his mother. Having lived in Hong Kong for twenty years, Jianguo expects the 
‘return’ of Hong Kong to China in 1997 and has strong faith in Hong Kong’s future led by 
socialist China.  
Original works: N/A 
  
9. Women in Beijing (Beijing nüren) 
Director: Li Sanlin, Yin Dawei 
No. of episodes: 20 
Broadcast time: March 2000 
Storyline: The story begins with Fang Xiaoyu’s betrayal of her love relationship with Feng 
Xiao ten years ago. At the outset of the story, Xiaoyu decides to marry Peng Dongdong, the 
son of a government minister, rather than Feng Xiao, the son of a butcher. Ten years later, 
Feng Xiao has made a fortune and returns to Beijing, seeking to take revenge on Xiaoyu. It is 
at this time that Xiaoyu is laid off in the market reforms. Feng Xiao takes this opportunity to 
offer Xiaoyu a new position in his Beijing company. To vent his resentment, Feng Xiao gives 
Xiaoyu a hard time at work. Faced with difficulties, Xiaoyu gradually transforms from an 
obedient figure to a tough, confident career woman. This change also leads to a romantic 
reunion of Xiaoyu and Feng Xiao. 
Original works: Novel – Beijing nüren, by Liang Ni, 1997.  
 
10. Meteor Shower: Season 2 (Yiqi youkan liuxingyu) 
Director: Ding Yangguo, Song Yang 
No. of episodes: 35 
Broadcast time: August 2010 
Storyline: This sequel of Meteor Shower follows the first season’s ending, where Murong 
Yunhai has lost his memory and cannot remember his girlfriend, Chu Yuxun. At the beginning 
of the new season, he remembers everything but Yuxun. This situation worsens as Murong 
mistakes another girl, Jiang Yuan, for his long-lost girlfriend. The subsequent plot revolves 
around the ensuing melodramatic triangle. Aside from this narrative thread, subplots depict 
the respective love triangles of the other three members of the ‘gang’. In the end, most of the 
main characters have happy endings and become more mature in coping with challenges from 
school and life. 
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Original works: Japanese manga series – Boys over Flowers (Hana Yori Dango), by Yoko 
Kamio, 1992-2008; 
                           Taiwanese drama series – Meteor Garden (Liuxing huayuan), produced by 
Angie Chai, 2001-2002. 
 
11. The Interpreters (Qin’ai de fanyiguan) 
Directors: Wang Ying 
No. of episodes: 44 
Broadcast time: May-June 2016 
Storyline: Qiao Fei is a French language graduate who decides to become a professional 
interpreter. She comes from a poor single-parent family, her mother having suffered from a 
brain disease for many years. The family income depends on Qiao Fei’s part-time job as a 
waitress and her salary as a junior interpreter at the Institute of Advanced Translation. From 
the moment Qiao Fei meets Cheng Jiayang, an interpreter from the same institute and later 
assigned as her supervisor, she not only becomes involved in a series of troubles but also 
gets herself into a romantic entanglement with Cheng Jiayang. In contrast to Qiao Fei, Cheng 
Jiayang is from a well-off elite family. Their love relationship meets with opposition from 
Jiayang’s family. In order to continue their relationship, the two people have to fight against 
various obstacles. 
Original works: Novel – The Interpreter (Fanyiguan), by Miao Juan, 2006. 
 
